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Zusammenfassung
Online IT-Dienste sind allgegenwa¨rtig, ko¨nnen jedoch oft nur dann verwendet wer-
den, wenn der Nutzer personenbezogene Daten preisgibt, beziehungsweise diese
Daten den Diensten zur Verfu¨gung stehen oder gestellt werden. Anbieter von IT-
Diensten nutzen personenbezogene Daten, um Zugriffsentscheidungen zu treffen
oder um einen Dienst u¨berhaupt anbieten zu ko¨nnen. Zwar ko¨nnen Nutzer bei
zahlreichen IT-Diensten sogar selbst Einstellungen vornehmen, die Einfluss auf die
O¨ffentlichkeit oder Weitergabe personenbezogener Daten haben, jedoch mangelt
es den Nutzern oft an Bewusstsein fu¨r Privatspha¨re sowie Versta¨ndnis der Prozesse
und Implikationen, um mit diesen Einstellungen ada¨quat umgehen zu ko¨nnen. Ins-
besondere im Kontext sozialer Medien, wie etwa Sozialen Online-Netzwerken (engl.
Online Social Networks, OSNs) entstehen konsequenter Weise (ggf. unerwu¨nschte)
Datenflu¨sse zu Dritten. Ko¨nnen Dritte die offenbarten Daten nutzen, um beispiels-
weise umfassende digitale Abbilder der Nutzer (auch Profile genannt) zu bilden, kann
dies zu einem erheblichen Schaden fu¨r die Nutzer selbst fu¨hren. Die zentralen Fragen
dieser Arbeit sind daher: Wie kann die unerwu¨nschte Ausbreitung personenbezo-
gener Daten quantifiziert werden und wie ko¨nnen Entwickler und Administratoren
im Enterprise-Umfeld sowie Nutzer im OSN-Umfeld die Ausbreitung von Daten
u¨berwachen, kontrollieren und gegebenenfalls einschra¨nken? Im Fall existierender
unerwu¨nschter Datenflu¨sse interessiert ferner, welche Mo¨glichkeiten sich fu¨r Dritte
ergeben, diese Daten zu sammeln und zu korrelieren oder gar nicht preisgegebene
Daten zu pra¨dizieren. Im Kontext der angefu¨hrten Fragestellungen sind die Ziele
der hier beschriebenen Arbeit zweigeteilt. Einerseits werden jene Komponenten von
IT-Infrastrukturen betrachtet, die eine Basis fu¨r die Integration von IT-Diensten
darstellen, um einheitliche Zuga¨nge zu diesen anbieten zu ko¨nnen. Diese Kompo-
nenten bilden zusammengefasst das sogenannte ”Enterprise Identity Management“.Andererseits werden OSNs und das darin beobachtbare Nutzerverhalten untersucht,
um die resultierende o¨ffentliche Pra¨senz von personenbezogenen Daten in OSNs zu
quantifizieren und Risiken zu identifizieren. In beiden Bereichen galt es zuna¨chst
zu bestimmen, welche Daten von Dritten (potenziell ungewollt) eingesehen wer-
den ko¨nnen. Des Weiteren wird untersucht, welche Auswirkungen die Offenlegung
der Daten gegenu¨ber Dritten haben kann. Schließlich werden Maßnahmen imple-
mentiert, die verhindern, dass Daten unerwu¨nscht an Dritte weitergegeben werden
bzw. den Nutzer bei der Aufgabe unterstu¨tzen, den U¨berblick u¨ber dessen offen
zuga¨nglichen Daten zu bewahren.
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Abstract
Today’s online IT services are provided more and more ubiquitously. However, many
of these services can only be used if they are provided with personally identifiable
information (PII) either by the users themselves or another service that provides
the information. IT service providers make use of this PII to perform access control
decisions or to provide the service at all. Although users can often adjust certain
settings to influence the accessibility or forwarding of PII, a significant number of
users are not aware of the risks, e.g., privacy risks, combined with certain possible
flows of PII. Hence, we can often identify a lack of understanding of the implications of
flows of PII that, in turn, would constitute an essential basis to adjust provided settings
adequately. In particular, in the context of Online Social Networks (OSNs), such
inappropriately adjusted settings induce unintended flows of PII to third parties. Since
those third parties can make use of this PII to, for instance, create comprehensive
digital images of a particular user (i.e., profiling), shared PII poses privacy risks
and can induce damage. Therefore, in the following, we state the main research
questions addressed in this dissertation: How can the unintended proliferation of PII
be quantified? How can developers and administrators of an enterprise environment,
as well as users within an OSN environment be supported to control and monitor
existing unintended data flows and how can they avoid unintended flows of PII
before their occurrence? Furthermore, the thesis addresses which pieces of personally
identifiable information can how often be gathered, correlated, or even predicted (if
not accessible) by third parties to be used for their (possibly illegal) business. In light of
the aforementioned research questions, the goals of this dissertation are twofold: On
the one hand, we investigate components provided within enterprise environments
that constitute a basis to integrate IT services in order to provide uniform service
access, i.e., enterprise identity management systems. On the other hand, we focus
on OSNs and the users’ behavior regarding publicly sharing of information in order
to quantify the mass of data available to the public and to identify corresponding
privacy risks. For both areas of research, i.e., enterprise identity management and
OSNs, we initially identify PII that can potentially be accessed by third parties in an
unintended manner. Furthermore, we investigate the implications of publicly shared
PII and, finally, we introduce implemented measures to avoid unintended flows of
PII and for demonstrating users the potential receivers of their shared information,
as well as corresponding privacy risks.
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1Introduction
”If people feel like they don’t have control over how they’re sharing things,then we’re failing them“ Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg
This dissertation addresses the avoidance of potentially unintended flows of per-
sonally identifiable information (PII). In particular, we focus on Enterprise Identity
Management and Online Social Networks. The risk that third parties can get unin-
tended access to PII is quantified from different perspectives and (technical) measures
to avoid these data flows are presented. In this chapter, we motivate the research topic
and point out today’s challenges of avoiding unintended flows of PII. Afterwards,
the vision of a “perfect world” regarding the flows of information is sketched. Fur-
thermore, we state the research questions addressed in this thesis and summarize
the main contributions provided in the following chapters. Finally, the structure of
the remainder of this dissertation is presented.
1.1 The Challenges of Managing PII
During the last decades, information technology (IT) has changed everyday life of
millions of people worldwide. In particular, the daily business and even the private
life of many people is dominated by an extensive use of IT services – primarily
provided and consumed via the Internet. Those IT services are not only provided
for the use by professional stakeholders, e.g., employees of a company, students of a
university, partners of other organizations, etc., but also a significantly large number
of IT services are offered for personal use. Hence, IT services become more and
more ubiquitous and increasingly determine peoples’ professional and private life.
Furthermore, most of these IT services rely on identity information, i.e., personally
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identifiable information (PII) of individual users1. In other words, an essential basis
for providing IT services is constituted by users’ PII that is made available to these
services by another service, or even by the users themselves. We refer to IT services
that rely on identity information as identity-related services in the remainder of this
dissertation. PII is required by identity-related services, for instance, to perform
authorization decisions or to offer the service at all. It is further necessary that users
share PII with certain identity-related services, e.g., social media services, as a basis
of, for instance, communication and interaction with other users of these services.
However, the other side of the coin is that the PII required by identity-related services
might result in a large amount of information that is accessible by entities that are
actually not intended to be able to see, or even process the data. This situation poses
privacy risks for the owners of the PII, particularly, if the data is unintentionally
accessible by third parties as a result of, for instance, users who are not provided with
adequate support to overview who can access which piece of their PII. Therefore,
(potential) flows of PII from one entity, which can be a service or a user, to another
entity represent the main subject of research focused in this dissertation. In this
context, an unintended data flow constitutes the abstract term for the situation that
data could be accessible and processed by third parties in an unintended manner.
As already mentioned, today’s users often interact with different and, in fact, hun-
dreds of identity-related services during their everyday life. For instance, the com-
puting center of the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT) – the Steinbuch Centre
for Computing (SCC) – offers about 1702 individual IT services for their customers,
i.e., for more than 9,200 employees, almost 24,000 students, as well as guests and
partners of the KIT3. Thereby, a large amount of flows of PII is induced by solely
providing, for instance, an e-mail service or a portal for students to offer teaching
material and insights into their individual course grades. In the context of social
media, the situation regarding privacy that is potentially at risk is even more obvious.
In particular, Online Social Networks (OSNs) provide IT services, or rather service
platforms extensively used by millions of users for interconnecting and communi-
cating with friends and others, as well as for sharing information with a certain (and
often broad) audience. Facebook4 – the currently largest OSN – stated that their
services were used by, on average, 655 million daily active users in March 2013 and
that the OSN has “an increase of 26% year-over-year” with respect to the number
of users5. Already in 2011, Facebook revealed that every user shares, on average, 90
1In this context, PII subsumes the data that characterizes an individual person in a specific context.
For instance, identity information reveals users’ current location, their hometown, age, relationship
state, etc.. However, PII is also a user name and corresponding passwords that are necessary to
access an IT service, or just data that results by using an IT service, e.g., the IP address that can
be determined by service providers and that can identify the user who has accessed the service
(cf. [TLH12]). Krishnamurthy and Wills define PII “as information which can be used to distinguish
or trace an individual’s identity either alone or when combined with other information that is linkable
to a specific individual” [KW10a].
2Includes only services described in the Configuration Mgmt. Database (CMDB) of the SCC.
3http://www.kit.edu/kit/english/data.php [Last downloaded 2013-05-28].
4https://www.facebook.com/ [Last downloaded 2013-05-28].
5http://newsroom.fb.com/Key-Facts [Downloaded on 2013-05-28 and 2013-03-14].
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pieces of content each month. It is likely that this number is even increasing because
of the growing of the network itself and its still rising importance in everyday life of
the more than one billion monthly active users6 (“1.11 billion monthly active users as
of March 2013.”7). However, besides revealing PII on Facebook, users share also a lot
of PII with other OSNs, such as Xing8, LinkedIn9, MySpace10, StudiVZ11, etc.. In this
context, Mislove et al. found that also the number of active members of other OSNs
is growing [MKG+08]. Therefore, in this dissertation, we do not only focus on the
investigation of data flows induced by identity-related services provided within enter-
prise environments, but also and in particular on Online Social Networks because
of the extensive use of these identity-related services.
We started this introduction by quoting Mark Zuckerberg’s statement on privacy
he gave during an interview by Charlie Rose12. In this statement, Mark Zuckerberg
said that Facebook would fail their customers if they feel that they cannot control
the flows of their own data. In fact, it is likely that most Facebook users do not feel
that they lost control over their PII and we show in this thesis that, fortunately, not
only Facebook, but also most other OSNs actually provide a wide range of features to
adjust who can access which piece of information. However, in the context of OSNs,
the main challenge is constituted by the issue to provide users with an appropriate
chance to understand potential flows of PII as a basis to adjust already provided
privacy settings in an appropriate manner. This not only includes the need for novel
concepts for privacy enhancing technologies, but also and in particular appropriate
quantifications of the risks regarding unintended flows of PII, which also constitutes
a major challenge addressed in this dissertation. We tackle the mentioned challenges
by presenting empirical investigations of privacy risks and by introducing technical
measures to establish appropriate awareness and to avoid unintended data flows. In
fact, we address these challenges for both Enterprise Identity Management systems
and Online Social Networks. Therefore, we separately point out the specific challenges
regarding flows of PII for both enterprise and OSN environments in the following.
Referring to Enterprise Identity Management, developers and administrators often
already have the capability to improve the flows of PII to avoid unintentional access.
Therefore, in most cases, it is not challenging to implement and provide privacy
enhancing technologies in terms of improved processes that handle PII. However,
the actual challenge is to implement solutions that are deployable at low effort, as
well as operable and maintainable such as the existing infrastructures. Additionally,
in enterprise environments, we can observe an increase of service integrations into
6On October 4th, 2012, Mark Zuckerberg announced – via a Facebook post –
that “more than one billion people using Facebook actively each month” Source:
https://www.facebook.com/zuck/posts/10100518568346671 [Last downloaded 2013-03-14].
7http://newsroom.fb.com/Key-Facts [Last downloaded 2013-05-28].
8https://www.xing.com/ [Last downloaded 2013-05-28].
9http://www.linkedin.com/ [Last downloaded 2013-05-28].
10http://www.myspace.com/ [Last downloaded 2013-05-28].
11http://www.studivz.net/ [Last downloaded 2013-05-28].
12http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LFdUEkTzDeI [Last downloaded 2013-05-28].
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organizational service infrastructures based on a organization-locally implemented
system that handles the identity information, i.e., an Enterprise Identity and Access
Management (IAM) system. Furthermore, the increase of collaborations between
organizations require the federation of IT services and IAM systems across organiza-
tional borders. Therefore, IT infrastructures within enterprise environments become
more and more complex and data flows are not limited by organizational borders.
This situation makes it even more and increasingly difficult to keep any potential
flow of PII between the individual services comprehensible. Even developers and
administrators are challenged with the task of maintaining an overview of potential
data flows, which constitutes a key element for implementing technical measures
to adequately monitor, control, and, if necessary, avoid unintended flows of PII. In
summary, the key challenge regarding the avoidance of unintended flows of PII con-
stitutes the question whether or not these solutions can be deployed into existing (or
even legacy) systems and also operated and maintained at a reasonable effort.
Within OSNs, probably the large amount of accessible PII, as well as the structure of
OSNs result in confusions on user side in terms of no comprehensive understanding of
who can access which piece of PII. Moreover, in a social media context, no developer
or administrator is in charge of the monitoring and control of potential data flows.
Instead, the user is responsible to protect his/her PII according to his/her own privacy
demands. In combination with a demonstrable lack of privacy awareness (cf. [KW08]
and [LTH11]) and potentially existing lacks of the usability of provided features to
“adjust privacy” [TLH12], users might be overcharged with the situation or even do not
care about possible privacy threats (cf. [KHG+08]). The findings of this thesis show
that this is, at least, manifested in the adequacy users adjust privacy settings provided
byOSNs to restrict the audience of shared PII.The logical consequence of this situation
is that PII – and possibly very sensitive information – can be accessed by third parties
that are actually not intended to see the data. Even worse, with a certain amount of
information third parties can gain knowledge out of the accessible data that, in turn,
leads to a great potential for third parties for making money with this information or
even for threatening users’ privacy. Hence, in this dissertation, we quantify the risks
concerning accessible PII, which empowers users to perform an adequate (personal)
risk management regarding privacy. Furthermore, we introduce (technical) measures
to make flows of PII comprehensible and to even avoid unintended and potentially
threatening flows of PII. In summary, the identification of potential threats, as well
as to make those risks clear to users constitute the main challenges with respect to
unintended flows of PII due to the use of OSNs that are addressed in this dissertation.
Certainly, also the users can profit from the knowledge third parties can get about
themselves in terms of, for instance, interesting product recommendations or IT
services provided for free. Therefore, flows of PII to third parties are not per se
threatening in any case. Moreover, even not every unintended flow of PII is, at the
same time, a privacy threatening data flow and both intended and unintended flows
of PII might be significantly beneficial for users. However, some pieces of PII might
be very sensitive information, especially if those pieces of information end up in
the wrong hands. From the perspective of a user (or in some cases even from the
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provider’s perspective), the unintended access to possibly sensitive information by a
third party might pose one of the biggest threats in the area of consuming identity-
related services, regardless whether the service is provided via a local network of an
organization or via the Internet for a broader target group. In fact, if third parties
get access to data in an unintended manner, they might be able to use this data for
potentially privacy threatening, or even illegal, but profitable business. In turn, the
identification and avoidance of unintended flows of PII constitute themajor challenges
for consumers and providers of identity-related services.
1.2 Managing PII in a Perfect World: an Idealized Vision
The following vision for future use of identity-related IT services forms the basis
on top of which the investigations presented in this thesis have been carried out:
in a perfect world, everyone would be able to identify any potentially unintended
flow of PII as a basis to avoid these data flows, i.e., a situation of full and perfect
transparency of data flows. On this basis, not only developers and administrators
would be able to detect possible privacy threats within the environments they have to
manage, but also users could determine who can access which piece of information
forwarded by a service to another service, or even provided (or shared) by the users
themselves. Such ability constitutes the basis for a comprehensive understanding of
possible privacy threats, which, in turn, is necessary to act in a privacy aware manner
when using identity-related services. In order to achieve such a situation, we have to
invent features that support developers, administrators, and users in the evaluation of
their current situation regarding privacy. In enterprise environments, it is necessary
to introduce solutions to avoid unintended flows of PII that can not only just be
implemented, for instance, as a prototype, but also can be deployed, operated and
maintained at a reasonable effort, i.e., with minimal overhead. In the area of OSNs,
users should be provided with the capabilities of developers and administrators of
enterprise IAM systems, i.e., features are needed that can put users into the position
of being able to monitor and control their PII that potentially can be accessed by
third parties in an unintentional manner. In particular, those features should enable
users to determine who can get access to information that is about to be shared
(i.e., support before PII is actually shared) and it is necessary to support users in
monitoring data flows and control access to PII after sharing pieces of information.
Furthermore, quantifying the privacy risks is a must to provide a basis for users to be
able to perform an adequate (personal) risk management, i.e., the comparison of the
benefits of providing PII, the probability of occurrence regarding privacy leaks, and
the potential damage if the PII unintentionally ends up in the hands of third parties.
1.3 Today’s Situation Regarding Flows of PII
Figure 1.1 illustrates an abstraction of the current situation regarding IT services that
are consumed in users’ professional and private life. On the left hand side of the
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Figure 1.1: Usage of IT services provided, on the one hand, in Enterprise Environments
and, on the other hand, by Social Media providers.
figure, we show exemplary IT services provided within an enterprise environment. In
contrast, the right hand side of the figure illustrates the use of Online Social Networks.
In the case of IT services provided within enterprise environments, an infrastructure
of identity-related services is often not monitored and controlled by only a single
individual person or single team employed by the respective organization for these
specific tasks. On the contrary, we have to consider a worse case: several instances
are responsible for IT services, or rather are in charge of users’ PII processed by
these services (illustrated by the green figures on the left side). The services are
provided in a more or less integrated manner, i.e., these services are interconnected
with each other or, at least, rely on PII not administered by the respective service
itself, but rather by one or more centralized instances of IAM components. In the
context of such complex infrastructures, it becomes evident that often just a few
people – if at all – can overview any potential flow of PII that can occur. Therefore,
the situation of progressing integration of services might pose the inherent risk of the
existence of unintended data flows despite the fact that access control is mandatory
in an enterprise environment.
Referring to the right hand side of Figure 1.1, in OSNs, the user has to care about
the management of his/her personal data13 on his/her own, i.e., access control is a
discretionary matter in those environments. No illustrated administrators on this side
of the figure indicate that no one other than the users themselves have been imposed
with the management of their PII available to these kind of services.
13Note that the terms personally identifiable information and personal data are used synonymously
in this thesis.
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1.4 Problem Statement and Research Questions
Unintended flows of PII can occur in enterprise environments, as well as due to
the use of Online Social Networks. The problem with which privacy stakeholders,
i.e., users, developers, and administrators, are confronted is the fact that often not
every flow of PII, i.e., every potential third party that can get access to the data, is
comprehensible. Regardless of the actual privacy awareness, transparency and a
comprehensive understanding of the implications of data flows are the issue to solve
and the essential basis to act in a privacy aware manner. Therefore, it is necessary to
provide capabilities to trace the proliferation of PII – or, at least, adequate support
to determine who can potentially get access to PII –, and features to control the
accessibility of PII in an appropriate – i.e., a privacy preserving – manner. Moreover,
a need for adequate risk assessment becomes obvious.
Based on this problem statement, we state the following research questions on top
of which we present research findings in this dissertation:
– PII Management: How can potentially unintended flows of PII be identified,
quantified, monitored, and – if applicable – avoided by developers, administrators,
or by users of identity-related services?
– Risk Assessment: Which kind of possibilities exist for third parties to correlate
and/or infer users’ PII by exploiting unintentionally accessible information?
1.5 Main Contributions of this Thesis
As already mentioned, the focus of the presented research is twofold: first, we focus
on Enterprise Identity Management systems and, second, unintended data flows are
investigated in the area of Online Social Networks. However, the emphasis is set on
contributions in the context of OSNs. In the following, we provide an overview of the
main contributions of this thesis that improve the way adequate management of PII
and assessments of the privacy risks can be performed by the stakeholders of privacy:
Deployable, operable, andmaintainable solutions to avoid unintended flows of
PII in the context of Enterprise Identity and Access Management (IAM) systems:
in order to provide cross-organizational access to IT services, IAM systems handle
authentications and manage PII of the users. Due to increasingly complex and highly
decentralized infrastructures, as well as requirements that have to be fulfilled by an
IAM system, some entities within such a system or even third parties can potentially
get access to PII in an unintended manner. If such unintended access to PII is
possible, the reason can be constituted (1) due to PII that can unintentionally flow to
third parties because of inadequately implemented processes in the backend of the
IAM systems or (2) due to the frontend implementation that might threaten users’
privacy, i.e., due to user names and passwords typed in within insecure environments.
For example, such insecure environments are lecture halls where others can spy
on the users’ keyboard or open terminals on which key loggers can be installed.
In this dissertation, we address flows that result from both backend processes and
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frontend implementations. In particular, referring to (1), today’s common IAM
systems potentially forward credentials, i.e., user names and passwords, to identity
management components that are not intended to get these pieces of PII. For this case,
we introduce two solutions that can avoid the unintended forwarding of credentials,
i.e., the JAAS Dispatcher and the Extended Login Module, which can be individually
deployed or also in combination. The JAAS Dispatcher aims at forwarding credentials
just to those components that are in charge of the data. The Extended Login Module
can interconnect an IAM system with components that only provide proprietary
interfaces and can include further characteristics into an authentication decision, e.g.,
the IP address of a user. The Extended Login Module constitutes also the basis for
the improvement of frontend implementations to avoid data flows to third parties,
i.e., credentials that can be accessed by others due to spying or logging users’ inputs
(2). To tackle this problem, we introduce a solution that can be deployed in common
IAM systems to provide alternative authentications based on, for instance, Quick
Response (QR) codes or social media logins. This solution can be deployed instead
of or additionally to authentications via combinations of user names and passwords.
In the context of enterprise IAM systems, the main research contribution of the
solutions presented in this dissertation is constituted by the fact that components
implemented on the basis of the introduced approaches can be deployed in already
implemented IAM systems without changing much of the existing components and
that the IAM system can be operated and maintained just as without the deployment
of the introduced components.
Attribute availability: in the context of research in the field of OSNs, we initially in-
vestigate which pieces of users’ PII can in howmany OSN profiles actually be accessed
by third parties and analyze corresponding privacy risks. Since this contribution is
based on the analysis of more than 1.5 million OSN profiles (in total) and because of
the large number of individual pieces of PII that have been analyzed, to the best of our
knowledge, we provide the so far most extensive study on this topic. Furthermore, the
presented results can be compared to previous studies that analyzed the availability of
users’ PII in OSNs, in order to derive and, particularly, quantify how the users’ privacy
awareness has been established through the years. Moreover, the results provide a
valuable interdisciplinary input for research in the field of social science.
Linkability of several OSN profiles of a single user: with this contribution, we
demonstrate that it is possible for third parties to link several profiles of a single user
registered in different OSNs at low cost. In particular, we show that more than a half
of the millions of OSN users publicly provide their list of OSN friends. Based on this
available information, it is demonstrated that a user’s profiles registered in different
OSNs can easily be linked without exploiting sophisticated linking algorithms or high
computational power. Instead, just comparisons of the friends’ names are sufficient to
determine whether or not a profile was registered by the same user who owns another
profile. This contribution supports the design of future technical measures for users to
identify and avoid unintended flows of PII in terms of a clarification of whether or not
their different OSN profiles are linkable (cf. last contribution stated in this section).
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Investigation of the risk that third parties can infer non-provided PII of a user:
if users provide public access to their list of OSN friends, we answer the question
whether or not attacking third parties can infer a user’s non-provided PII based
on information publicly shared by his/her friends. This investigation constitutes a
key element of understanding the IT services provided by OSNs. In contrast to, for
instance, IAM systems, we demonstrate that flows of PII are not only induced by
the implementation of the OSN itself, but also by the possibilities an OSN provides
to interact with the services and each other user.
Investigation of the gaps between technical measures provided for users to con-
trol privacy in OSNs and users’ mental models of the accessibility of their PII, as
well as between privacy settings provided by OSNs and capabilities of developers
and administrators working in an enterprise environment: with this contribution,
we identify a gap between today’s technical measures provided to adjust who can
access which piece of PII shared via an OSN and users’ understanding of potential
data flows. We investigate the psychological motivation for sharing PII and users’
mental models of potentially existing data flows as a basis to identify key requirements
for future privacy enhancing technologies. Furthermore, we contrast the capabilities
of developers and administrators of Enterprise Identity Management systems with
current features provided forOnline Social Network users and demonstrate how devel-
opers’ and administrators’ capabilities can provide a template for the implementation
of features that support OSN users in managing their PII.
A Facebook App that aims at supporting users in matching their mental mod-
els to potentially unintended flows of PII: in particular, a further contribution of
this dissertation is constituted by the presentation of a novel concept of implement-
ing privacy support. We show the concept and design, as well as a prototypical
implementation of a privacy application that demonstrates a user his/her current
situation regarding privacy based on the data he/she and his/her friends have publicly
shared via the respective OSN.
Parts of the contributions presented in this thesis have been previously published in:
– Sebastian Labitzke, Florian Werling, Jens Mittag, and Hannes Hartenstein.
Do Online Social Network Friends Still Threaten My Privacy? In Proceedings
of the third ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy
(CODASPY’13), San Antonio, TX, USA, February 2013. ACM.
– Irina Taranu, Sebastian Labitzke, and Hannes Hartenstein. Zwischen Ano-
nymita¨t und Profiling: Ein technischer Blick auf die Privatspha¨re in sozialen
Netzwerken (German). In Hannelore Bublitz, Irina Kaldrack, Theo Ro¨hle, and
Mirna Zeman, Herausgeber, Automatismen – Selbst-Technologien, Seiten 105–
129. Wilhelm Fink, 2012.
– Jens Ko¨hler, Sebastian Labitzke, Michael Simon, Martin Nussbaumer, and
Hannes Hartenstein. FACIUS: An Easy-to-Deploy SAML-based Approach to
Federate non Web-based Services. In Proceedings of the 11th IEEE International
Conference on Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing and Communications
(TrustCom-2012), Liverpool, UK, June 2012. IEEE.
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– Sebastian Labitzke. Who got All of My Personal Data? Enabling Users to Monitor
the Proliferation of Shared Personally Identifiable Information. In Jan Camenisch,
Bruno Crispo, Simone Fischer-Hu¨bner, Ronald Leenes, and Giovanni Russello,
editors, Privacy and IdentityManagement for Life, volume 375 of IFIP Advances
in Information andCommunication Technology, pages 116–129. Springer Berlin
Heidelberg, 2012.
– Sebastian Labitzke, Irina Taranu, and Hannes Hartenstein. What Your Friends
Tell Others About You: Low Cost Linkability of Social Network Profiles. In Pro-
ceedings of the 5th International ACMWorkshop on Social Network Mining
and Analysis (SNA-KDD), San Diego, CA, USA, August 2011. ACM.
– Sebastian Labitzke, Jochen Dinger, and Hannes Hartenstein. How I and Others
can Link My Various Social Network Profiles as a Basis to Reveal My Virtual
Appearance. In LNI - Proceedings of the 4th DFN Forum Communication
Technologies, GI-Edition, Bonn, Germany, May 2011. DFN.
– Sebastian Labitzke, Martin Nussbaumer, Hannes Hartenstein, and Wilfried
Juling. Integriertes Informationsmanagement am KIT: Was bleibt? Was kommt?
(German). In Arndt Bode and Rolf Borgeest, Herausgeber, Informationsman-
agement in Hochschulen, pages 35–46. Springer, 2010.
– Sebastian Labitzke, Michael Simon, and Jochen Dinger. Integrierter Shibboleth
Identity Provider auf Basis verteilter Identita¨tsdaten (German). In LNI - Pro-
ceedings of the third DFN Forum Communication Technologies, GI-Edition,
Konstanz, Germany, May 2010. DFN.
– Furthermore, the following publications – in which the author of this disser-
tation was involved – are also related to the contributions presented in this
thesis: [SWS+12], [LH11], [HLS+09a], and [HLS+09b].
1.6 Structure of the Thesis
This dissertation is structured as follows. In Chapter 2, we refine the research questions
stated in this introduction with a focus on enterprise IAM systems. Beforehand,
IAM systems are introduced and fundamentals are presented that constitute the
essential basis of research in the field of data flows within enterprise environments.
In particular, we define terms and introduce basic concepts of IAM in this chapter.
Furthermore, selected relatedwork is presented. Chapter 3 is dedicated to demonstrate
the approaches that can improve today’s common IAM systems in terms of avoiding
unintended data flows. Furthermore, we show statistics of the use of the productive
IAM infrastructure of the KIT that has been integrated the JAAS Dispatcher and the
Extended Login Module. Afterwards, we switch the context and present research in
the field of OSNs. In Chapter 4, we introduce OSNs, as well as corresponding terms
and definitions. Afterwards, we discuss the concept of privacy settings provided by
OSNs. Furthermore, we state the specific and refined research questions focused on
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OSNs that this dissertation addresses in the following chapters. We complete this
chapter by introducing related work. Chapter 5 constitutes the first of two chapters
dedicated to present the results in the context of OSNs. In this chapter, we start by
discussing requirements for studies in OSNs (mainly) imposed by the German data
protection act. Afterwards, the attacker model, on top of which the findings have
been gained, is introduced. Furthermore, we give insights into the methodology
of the studies presented in this chapter. Finally, we present the results of empirical
studies and investigations on privacy risks with respect to PII available due to the use
of OSNs and the actual adjustments of privacy settings. In particular, we address how
many information can be gathered from OSN profiles, whether or not PII provided
in different OSNs can be gathered and linked to each other, and whether or not
third parties are able to infer PII that is actually not provided by a user based on
other information a third party can gather out of the OSN, e.g., PII of a user’s OSN
friends. In Chapter 6, we present an application that aims at establishing privacy
awareness due to the demonstration of a user’s current and actual situation regarding
privacy. To introduce the concepts, on top of which this application is build, we
discuss the psychological reasons for sharing PII via OSNs, demonstrate that users’
mental models of flows of PII are not adequate at this point in time, and transfer the
findings from the presented research in enterprise IAM systems to the situation in
OSNs to build a basis for implementing privacy enhancing technologies. Chapter 7
concludes this dissertation and provides an outlook on future research. Appendix A
provides information on how the solutions presented in Chapter 3 can be deployed.
In Appendix B, we show further results on the linkability of different OSN profiles
of the same particular user, whereas Appendix C provides further results on the
investigation of inferable attributes of OSN users. Figure 1.2 gives a structure overview
of the chapters of this dissertation and shows the belonging of each of the chapters
with respect to the addressed research areas, i.e., Enterprise Identity Management
and Online Social Networks. Additionally, Figure 1.3 (overleaf) provides a content-
oriented overview. In particular, the content and structure, as well as an abstract view
on the addressed research questions, the contributions and corresponding keywords
are illustrated in these two figures.
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Figure 1.2: Structure overview of this dissertation.
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Figure 1.3: Content overview of this dissertation.
2Enterprise Identity Management
In this chapter, we present further motivation on the topic and research questions
introduced in chapter 1 with the focus on Enterprise Identity and Access Management
(IAM) systems1. We discuss fundamentals of IAM systems and specify the research
questions that form the basis for the contributions presented in this and the following
chapter. Furthermore, we present related work with respect to the findings in the
area of IAM systems in enterprise environments.
The chapter is structured as follows. We start by introducing common terms, defini-
tions, and processes in the context of IAM systems. Afterwards, we present common
architectures of IAM systems. Additionally, we present essential requirements and
principles with respect to the implementation of components for today’s already exist-
ing IAM systems and introduce identity federations, which constitute an essential
architectural basis regarding the research questions addressed in this part of the thesis.
Next, we refine the research questions stated in Chapter 1 with a focus on enterprise
identity management. In particular, we state specific problems we investigate in detail
in the following Chapter 3. Finally, in the last section of this chapter, we present and
discuss related work. Parts of the contributions presented in this and the following
chapter have been previously published in [LNHJ10], [LSD10], and [Lab12].
1Note that the management of access attempts is inseparable from the processes the term identity
management subsumes. Therefore, IAM is just a more specific term for the term identity management
and, thus, both “identity management” and “IAM” are used synonymously in this dissertation.
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2.1 Terms, Deﬁnitions, and Processes
In the context of enterprise environments, the implementation of most IT services2
are commonly based on an organization-internally provided and locally adminis-
tered Identity and Access Management (IAM) system. In the following, we present
fundamentals with respect to IAM systems. We start by presenting several terms and
definitions that are common in the field of IAM.The definitions are mainly based on
the terminology introduced in the international standard ISO/IEC IS 24760-1:2011(E)
that is titled “Information technology – Security techniques – A framework for iden-
tity management – Part 1: Terminology and concepts” [ISO24760]. Afterwards, we
introduce common processes and functions an IAM system provides.
The mentioned international standard starts by defining an entity, i.e., an “item
inside or outside an information and communication technology system, such as
a person, an organization, a device, a subsystem, or a group of such items that has
recognizably distinct existence” [ISO24760]. Therefore, an entity constitutes the most
atomic structure of the identity-related terms. Based on the term entity, the following
terms, essential infrastructure components, and processes can be defined:
Terms and Deﬁnitions:
– Context: we refer to the current situation or process in which a user is acting as a
context, i.e., the combination of integrated services that are about to be accessed,
possibly interconnected other IAM components, and the user him-/herself.
– Attribute: “characteristic or property of an entity (...) that can be used to
describe its state, appearance, or other aspects” [ISO24760], i.e., a type of
information whose so-called attribute value describes an entity from a certain
perspective, e.g., a user’s date of birth or his/her address, or describes what
an entity has, e.g., the right to access a resource or a certain role within an
organization.
– Attribute value: the value a specific attribute takes in a certain context.
– Identity: the “technical” representation of an entity in a certain context is called
an identity and comprises a comprehensive “set of attributes” [ISO24760] that
describes this entity. Usually, an entity, e.g., a user, has not only one single
identity, but rather a set of identities that each represents this entity in a certain
context. To give an example, a student’s identity in the context of his/her uni-
versity comprises the set of attributes the university stored about the student
necessary tomanage his/her accounts and to administer his/her student achieve-
ments and course grades. This identity is different from his/her identity in the
context of, for instance, his/her Facebook account. Potentially these exemplary
identities can have some overlaps with respect to the individual attributes, but
2In the context of this dissertation, the term IT service comprises services that are accessible via
the Internet or an Intranet by the use of a computing device. For example, cloud services, OSNs, Apps
provided for mobile phones, etc. can be seen as IT services.
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also significant differences, e.g., the university might store the student’s ma-
triculation number and field of studies and Facebook, on the contrary, knows
about the student’s hobbies and other information that is not mapped to his/her
identity at his/her university, but spans his/her identity at Facebook.
– Identifier: On the basis of an identifier an entity can be distinguished from any
other entity that is represented in a certain context (derived from [ISO24760]).
– Identifier space (ID space): the ID space defines the range of values an identifier
can take.
– Identity information: describes a “set of values of attributes (...) optionally with
any associated metadata in an identity” [ISO24760], i.e. identity information
comprises pieces of PII and additional data concerning a specific identity and,
therefore, a specific entity.
– Credential: Whereas in [ISO24760] a credential is solely defined as the “repre-
sentation of an identity”, we further particularize a “credential”. In this thesis
credentials can be constituted by a combination of a user name and a password,
as well as by any other attribute with which an entity (e.g., an identity provider,
cf. Section 2.2.2) can identify and authenticate another entity (e.g., a user).
IAM Processes:
– Identification: The process to check “claimed or observed attributes” for “rec-
ognizing an entity” in a certain context3 (derived from [ISO24760]).
– Authentication: an authentication is defined as a “formalized process of veri-
fication (...) that, if successful, results in an authenticated identity (...) for an
entity” [ISO24760], i.e., the authentication ensures the credibility, or rather
the authenticity of an entity, which can be checked based on an unambiguous
identity and certain characteristics [Eck08].
– Authorization: the process of an authorization is based on an authenticated
identity and its attributes and comprises the decision whether or not access can
be granted for the respective user, who has been authenticated, for instance,
based on his/her credentials. The ISO/IEC IS 24760-1 states that an authoriza-
tion establishes “entitlements for the entity to access resources and interact with
services (...)” [ISO24760].
– Login: from the perspective of an entity, the login (aka. log in/Sign-on) de-
scribes the process that subsumes the authentication and authorization of an
entity, e.g., a user. We refer to a user who has passed the login process as a
logged in user. A special type of login constitutes the Single Sign-On (SSO). If
3Note that in [ISO24760] the term “domain” is used to describe a certain context. To avoid confusion
between domains in terms of separated organizations and domains in terms of separated IT services,
we refer to a combination of a service and its interconnected IAM components as a “context”.
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an IAM system provides SSO functionality, a user can access several services by
just a single login. A so-called identity provider (cf. Section 2.2.2) remembers
the user at the point in time he/she gets forwarded to the identity provider by a
service provider for not the first time in a specific period of time. If an identity
provider can verify that a user is already authenticated, it redirects back to the
service provider, claims the user has passed the authentication, and releases
demanded attributes (if necessary and compliant). The ISO/IEC IS 24760-1 also
defines an SSO across organizational borders. In this context, an SSO identity
constitutes an “identity (...) that includes a single identity assertion (...) that can
be verified (...) by a relying party (...) in multiple domains (...)” [ISO24760].
2.2 Flows of PII in Identity Management Systems
As already mentioned, many IT services rely on users’ PII, e.g., for performing au-
thorization decisions or even to provide the identity-related service itself. If identity-
related services are supported by organizational IAM systems, providers of those
services do not need to implement service-specific components to administer the
users’ identity information on their own. Instead, more or less centralized IAM com-
ponents take over the task of handling PII, i.e., the administration and management
of this data, as well as to make the data available for the identity-related services at the
point in time it is requested by the service or intended to be forwarded (also known
as provisioning processes). In this context, an IAM system implements rules, or rather
policies on top of which decisions can be made with respect to whether or not it is
compliant to make a specific piece of information available in a specific context and
time, e.g., for a specific IT service that requested the data. These policies are mainly
imposed by the law and, additionally, by data protection officers, the management,
and/or the board of directors of an organization, as well as by guidelines and directives
established within an organization. Due to the decentralized architectures of IAM
systems and the fact that IAM systems forward and, therefore, replicate data within
an IT infrastructure, a major challenge with respect to developing and operating IAM
systems is the consistency of information. In particular, it is an issue to ensure that
changes of a piece of information that is present at several different components of the
whole IAM system and interconnected IT services are applied to every existing copy
of the data (cf. [HDH10]). Furthermore, many organizations already deployed signifi-
cantly complex IAM systems that provide most of their IT services with PII. Hence,
no less challenging than the mentioned issues is the implementation of components
for IAM systems that can be deployed into already existing IT infrastructures without
the need to change large parts of the IAM system, as well as the IT services that are
interconnected with the IAM system to obtain users’ PII. Furthermore, it is necessary
that the operability and maintainability of the IAM system and interconnected IT
services is not negatively affected by newly deployed components (see Section 2.4 for
more details on the requirements regarding the implementation of IAM components).
In the following, we refer to identity-related services that are connected to an IAM
system as integrated services. IT architectures that divide the offering of IT services and
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Figure 2.1: Illustration of the hub character of a provisioning system.
the provisioning of PII into separated components are called integrated information
management systems, where information primarily (but not only) stands for PII.
In general, IAM systems can be divided into two categories that utilize different
strategies to deliver personal attributes, i.e., up-front provisioning services and IAM
services that forward PII on-demand. In the following, we shortly introduce both
of these strategies. However, in the remainder of this dissertation, we mainly focus
on on-demand provisioning systems.
2.2.1 Up-Front Provisioning Services
Up-front provisioning services provide an integrated service with demanded PII
by pushing it into a database, or any other (identity) store mostly at the point in
time the IAM system obtains the data from the organizational human resource (HR)
system or any other authoritative resource4. Due to the prompt provisioning of
obtained information, the identity information is immediately accessible by one
or more dedicated integrated services that are connected to the provisioned store,
regardless whether the user has already tried to access the service or not. This push-
strategy is common in many organizations (see also [SHH08] and [SHH09]). Up-
front strategies for provisioning are implemented by dedicated software that serves
as kind of a hub for PII and other information that is necessary for providing the IT
services. Figure 2.1 illustrates the hub character of a (up-front) provisioning system.
The locomotive hangar – in the background of the figure – represents the authoritative
HR system that is deployed to administer human resources, or rather constitutes the
authoritative resource for identity information. The hub has access to the HR system
and can forward the stored information to several identity stores. In turn, each of
the provisioned identity stores is accessible by dedicated IT services.
The processes, or rather flows of PII implemented within up-front provisioning
services are “a priori” defined and executed if certain pre-defined events occur. To
give an example, if an administration of an exemplary organization employs a new
4Authoritative resources are those systems that are in charge of (i.e., authoritative for) the content
of the identity information, or the attribute values, respectively.
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member of staff, the IAM processes recognize the new entry with the new employee’s
PII within the interconnected databases of the administration, take his/her data from
this database, convert the information (if necessary), and provide the appropriate
identity stores and, therefore, the respective IT services with the demanded pieces of
his/her PII as a basis to provide access to the services. Thus, flows of PII are intended
by definition, as long as the developers implemented the processes according to the
guidelines imposed by the organization and the law.
Up-front strategies of provisioning are necessary and as common as the on-demand
strategies introduced in the next section. However, because of the a priori definition
and a priori intended character of flows of PII, up-front services play only a minor
role in this dissertation. However, we shortly pick up those provisioning strategies in
chapter 6 to discuss parallels of IAM systems deployed in enterprise environments
and features provided for Online Social Network users.
2.2.2 On-demand Provisioning Services
In contrast to the introduced up-front provisioning approach, PII can also be pro-
vided at the point in time a user accesses a service. This strategy of provisioning is
referred to as on-demand forwarding of PII, or rather on-demand provisioning. Ser-
vices integrated within an on-demand provisioning system mainly request data at
the point in time a user tries to access the service. The IAM system decides whether
or not a user’s PII can be released and, if this is the case (e.g., if the implemented
rules permit the forwarding, if the forwarding is compliant with respect to the law,
and/or if the user gave his/her consent), the IAM system provides the demanded
information to the requesting service. Additionally, those “on-demanded approaches”
often provide an authentication service for users besides the possibility to deliver
personal attribute values, or rather pieces of PII to a service that is about to be accessed.
The component that authenticates a user and forwards his/her PII and potentially
other identity information to a requesting service is referred to as an identity provider
(see definition below). Identity providers constitute separated components that are
interconnected with local databases in which identity information is stored, as well
as with identity-related services that have to be provided with identity information.
In this dissertation, we mainly focus on these “on-demand” authentication and at-
tribute delivery services, i.e., the identity providers of such systems. In the following,
we introduce the four main components of an on-demand provisioning system in
detail. In Section 2.3.1, these components are mapped to the specification of the
Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) on top of which popular on-demand
provisioning IAM systems are built.
Architectural Components of On-demand Provisioning IAM Systems:
– Identity stores: identity stores are those databases that contain identity infor-
mation and are utilized to administer this data.
– Identity provider (IdP): an IdP is defined as an “entity (...) that makes available
identity information” [ISO24760]. Usually, the identity provider is intercon-
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nected with certain identity stores to verify credentials and to obtain identity
information that is to be forwarded to another entity, e.g., an IT service.5
– Service provider: a service provider is the implemented representation of the
so-called relying party, which is the “entity (...) that relies on the verification
(...) of identity information (...) for a particular entity” [ISO24760]. In this
context, a service provider has established a trust relationship to, for instance,
an identity provider, which, in turn, delivers identity information on which
the service provider can dispose whether to grant or deny access for a specific
authenticated entity.
– Discovery service: a discovery service spans a federation of organizations
and/or organizational units and often provides a manual selection possibil-
ity for identity providers in a certain federation (see Section 2.3.2 et seq. for a
more detailed introduction of federated identity management and common
components in such systems).
2.3 Identity Federations
Identity federations are interconnected organizations in terms of the interaction of
their IAM systems in order to provide cross-organizational access to IT services each
provided by one of the participating organization. The advantage of such federations
is constituted by the offer of cross-organizational SSO and logins for IT services
provided by other organizations by use of the account of the users’ credentials man-
aged by their own organization. In the following, we present parts of the Security
Assertion Markup Language (SAML) specification, which constitutes key elements
of on-demand provisioning IAM systems in general and identity federations in par-
ticular. Furthermore, we cover the topics Federated Identity Management (FIM) and
Authentication and Authorization Infrastructures (AAIs). Both topics are fundamental
for the investigations presented in this part of the thesis. Finally, we address the
current popularity of SAML-based AAIs and, based on ongoing research work, we
estimate the popularity of SAML in future IAM infrastructures.
2.3.1 Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML)
In the context of “on-demand approaches” that provide IT services with users’ at-
tributes, popular systems – particularly in the academia – are based on the specifi-
cation of the Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML)6. The two most popular
5Recently, the research community started to make use of the term Identity Service Provider (IdSP)
for this component (cf. [SKR12], [RMN+10] and http://openidentityexchange.org/what-is-a-trust-
framework). The fact that IdPs, or rather IdSPs do not provide identities but rather a service related to
identity information accessible by the IdP/IdSP led to this change of the term. However, the SAML
community still makes extensive use of the term IdP so that we also use this term in the following.
6http://saml.xml.org/ [Last downloaded 2013-05-28].
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Figure 2.2: Interaction between a SAML identity and service provider.
reference implementations of the SAML specification are Shibboleth7 and Simple-
SAMLphp8. In this dissertation, we mainly focus on Shibboleth as the probably most
frequently deployed SAML implementation. However, the SAML specification does
not only include definitions of the packages that have to be exchanged between compo-
nents for authentication and attribute delivery tasks, but also specifies the architecture
and design of the interconnected and collaborating components. The two decisive
components of a SAML-based infrastructure are the identity providers and the service
providers. An identity provider is interconnected with the local IAM system and able
to forward users’ credentials (for instance, combinations of user name and password)
to identity stores for verification. These components can also access users’ attributes
for forwarding to services, or rather service providers. A service provider represents a
facade deployed in front of an IT service and handles requests, the forwarding of users,
and the communication with identity providers. The following subsection shows the
interaction of these two components, when a user tries to access an IT service.
SAML Components and Workﬂow
Figure 2.2 shows the interaction of the components specified by the SAML standard,
such as it is implemented, for instance, by Shibboleth and SimpleSAMLphp. The facade
that is deployed at an IT service – called service provider – interrupts a request from a
user (step 1) and forwards the user to an identity provider (step 2). In turn, the identity
provider, which is interconnected to local identity stores, presents a login screen to the
user (step 3) and can forward users’ credentials to the interconnected identity stores
for verification. Furthermore, an identity provider has access to users’ attributes that
can be delivered to a service that is about to be used. At the identity provider side, the
user has to provide his/her credentials (step 4). If the verification of these credentials
results in a match at an interconnected identity store, the identity provider discloses
demanded attributes for the service and redirects the user to the respective service
provider (step 5). The service provider evaluates the released attributes and decides
whether to grant or deny access to the requested service and can also forward the
attributes retrieved from the identity provider to the service itself (step 6). In short, a
7http://shibboleth.net/ [Last downloaded 2013-05-28].
8http://simplesamlphp.org/ [Last downloaded 2013-05-28].
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service provider serves as a facade to encapsulate a specific service and the identity
provider presents the interface for authentication. Moreover, the service provider
handles the forwarding of users to an appropriate identity provider and evaluates
attribute values delivered by an identity provider. In turn, an identity provider handles
the authentication and release of attribute values according its configuration, i.e., an
administrator has to specify what attributes can/must be forwarded to a specific
service provider if a user is successfully authenticated, or rather if his/her provided
credentials could be positively verified by an interconnected identity store.
Shibboleth and SimpleSAMLphp additionally provide Single Sign-on functionality,
i.e., if an identity provider authenticated a user at his/her first attempt to access a
service, the user will be automatically authenticated for further service accesses that
are handled by this identity provider. As an add-on, administrators can install and
activate uApprove9 that presents a form for getting consent by the user if attributes
are going to be forwarded. This add-on is not mandatory, but useful to fulfill the
requirements of data protection acts, particularly, requirements imposed by the
German law and data protection act.
In summary, from the perspective of a user, the Shibboleth and SimpleSAMLphp
login procedure does not look different from common authentication processes. Only
the redirect to another website – i.e., the identity provider, or rather its frontend
that requests a user’s credentials – is unusual and requires instructions, or rather
explanations, for users because they might think about a phishing attack when they
get redirected to another website for login.
SAML Messages and Concepts
In the following, we describe how the SAML standard provides information about
the communication between the individual components. In particular, the SAML
standard defines the content and structure of so-called assertions. Assertions are the
essential parts of the messages send between identity and service providers. These
parts of the messages consist of information about whether or not a user could be
authenticated by the identity provider. Furthermore, assertions contain the attribute
values that are to be forwarded to the service provider on the basis of which autho-
rization decisions can be disposed. Besides the assertions, the SAML standard defines
further terms and structures that are shortly introduced in the following. The SAML
protocol defines the requests and responses itself, e.g., the forwarding of a user is
implemented as an authentication request that a service provider sends to an identity
provider. The specification of so-called SAML bindings contains the mapping of
SAML protocols to standard communication protocols. For instance, Shibboleth
implemented inter alia POST and REDIRECT bindings via HTTP [RFC2616] and
SOAP10. In turn, bindings are a sub-category of a profile, whereas a profile defines a set
of assertions, protocols, and bindings (cf. [Hughes2005]). A comprehensive overview
on XML-based security and identity and, particularly, a detailed introduction of
SAML can be found in [Mal05].
9http://www.switch.ch/aai/support/tools/uApprove.html [Last downloaded 2013-05-28].
10http://www.w3.org/TR/soap12-part1/ [Last downloaded 2013-05-28].
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2.3.2 Federated Identity and Access Management (FIM)
In recent years, more and more organizational units, or even multiple organizations
work together in terms of sharing services provided by one of the collaborating
partners. In this context, IAM systems can not only be deployed for the use within
organizational borders but also for cross-organizational collaborations, or rather
cross-organizational service access. We refer to those collaborations as federations of
participating organizations and to the IAM systems that provide cross-organizational
service access as Federated Identity and Access Management (FIM). Therefore, FIM
provides the basis for cross-organizational integration of IT services, i.e., a user U
can access an integrated service provided by an organization A by simply using the
account of his own organization (organization B), also known as the home organization
of user U. In other words, users of organization B can access services provided by
organization A by the use of their credentials registered at their home organization
B. The basis of such federated service access constitutes a trust relationship between
the collaborating organizations on top of which organization A trusts organization
B in authenticating a user and forwarding – if necessary – correct information, or
rather PII, about the authenticated user U.
An identity that is valid in a cross-organizational manner is called a federated
identity. The ISO/IEC IS 24760-1 defines a federated identity as an “identity (...) for
use in multiple domains (...), which together form an identity federation (...)”. In turn,
an identity federation is defined as the “agreement between two or more domains
(...) specifying how identity information (...) will be exchanged and managed for
cross-domain identification (...) purposes” [ISO24760].
In the context of FIM, it has to be stated that not only cross-organizational fed-
erations can be established. The more independent organizational units of a single
organization are structured and working, the more worth it might be to apply the
concept of a federation onto the inner-organizational structure. An IAM system
of such organizations can be seen as an in-house FIM (cf. [SHH08]). The authors
of [SHH09] show how this approach is implemented at the KIT.
However, the federation of services or, at least, a federation itself is subject to certain
risks, restrictions, and requirements. In a collaborative use of services PII will be
forwarded to collaborating organizations and, therefore, potentially leaves the orga-
nizational borders if a user tries to access a service that is not provided by his/her
home organization. Unintended flows of PII might be the consequence of federation
because of the circle of entities that could potentially get access to sensitive infor-
mation. Additionally, the larger the federations the more the participants have to
tackle the problem to prevent the federation from becoming too complex from the
perspective of a user. In particular, users often have to choose their home organiza-
tion (see Section 2.3.3 for further details) out of a list of organizations participating
in the federation. If therein not only the organizations are listed, but also several
organizational units or if certain individual identity stores are referenced the usability
of such a system might be significantly decreased compared to a federation that is
spanned carefully with respect to a usable cross-organizational offer of IT services.
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Figure 2.3: Federated IAM with SAML-based components.
2.3.3 Authentication and Authorization Infrastructures (AAIs)
Technical infrastructures that provide FIM functionality are known as Authentica-
tion and Authorization Infrastructures (AAI). In recent years, many countries built
their own AAI, at least, for the academia located in the respective country. In Ger-
many, the German Research Network (German: Deutsches Forschungsnetz, DFN)
provides the DFN-AAI for researchers working at German universities, libraries
and other institutions of higher education. The DFN-AAI – as well as many other
AAIs, particularly, those implemented for the academia – is based on the SAML
standard and its implementations.
Figure 2.3 illustrates the basic concept of a SAML-based AAI. Besides the identity
and service provider, which have been already introduced in the context of SAML,
the AAI components consist of the so-called discovery service. In Section 2.3.2, we
mentioned that users might have to choose their home organization when trying to
access a service provided by a different organization. The discovery service exactly
provides this capability and, therefore, spans the federation. In particular, an AAI
consists of multiple identity providers, multiple service providers, and a discovery
service. If a user tries to access a service (step 1 of the illustration) and several potential
identity providers are eligible for authenticating users for this service, the service
forwards the user to the discovery service of the federation (step 2). Then, the user gets
suggested with a list of potentially eligible identity providers (step 3) and can choose
one out of the presented list (4). Afterwards, the workflow is similar to the application
of SAML-based authentications in a local environment. The user is forwarded (via the
service provider) to the (chosen) identity provider (5). The identity provider presents
a login page (6) and the user provides his/her credentials (7). If the credentials can
be verified against one of the interconnected identity stores (not considered in this
visualization) the user will be redirected to the service provider (8), which can then
perform the authorization based on the attributes released by the identity provider
and can – if the authorization is successful – permit the access to the service.
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Figure 2.4: Exemplary structure of an AAI and its participating organizations.
Figure 2.4 shows the interaction of an exemplary AAI. In the middle of the figure,
we illustrate the Discovery Service, which is operated by the AAI provider, e.g., in
the case of Germany’s academic AAI, the DFN-AAI. Besides the AAI provider, the
figure contains three exemplary participating organizations that operate their own
identity provider and/or one or more service providers integrated into the AAI to
provide cross-organizational access.
In general, AAIs are essential for the problems stated in the following section. In
particular, the restrictions of AAIs imposed for participating organizations mainly
induce the problems addressed in the following. However, AAIs are not the core
of the solution and the solutions presented in Chapter 3 does not aim at improving
the AAI itself, but rather at improving the local components so that unintended
data flows can be avoided.
2.3.4 Current and Future Popularity of SAML-based AAIs
SAML-based AAIs are commonly deployed at academic institutions, for instance, to
provide access for researchers and students to work published by other researchers.
Furthermore, many universities already provide SAML-based logins to other IT ser-
vices provided for researchers and students, e.g., portals, e-mail web interfaces, etc..
Additionally, companies provide software that can be integrated into or intercon-
nected with SAML-based components, e.g., Microsoft’s Active Directory Federation
Services can be interconnected with Shibboleth identity providers to combine fed-
erations that are each built upon one of these technologies. However, not only the
academia deployed SAML-based IAM systems, but also companies that provide
cross-organizational access to their provided IT services. Furthermore, although
SAML-based AAIs are so far primarily designed to integrate web-based IT services,
researchers spend significant effort into work that enables SAML-based IAM sys-
tems for other types of IT services. In particular, AAIs might become increasingly
important in the future, not only because of the rising number of organizations par-
ticipating in one or more AAIs, but also because of the different types of services that
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can be integrated into those infrastructures. The studies introduced in the following
underpin the motivation to investigate SAML-based infrastructures with a focus on
potentially existing unintended flows of PII.
Currently, the universities of the state of Baden-Wu¨rttemberg, Germany, collaborate
in the project bwIDM11 that aims at developing a solution to integrate non web-based
IT service – such as high-performance computing, cloud, and grid services – into Shib-
boleth infrastructures (see also [SWS+12] (German) and [KLS+12]). In this project,
an innovative improvement of SAML-based infrastructures has been developed so
that aforementioned services can be integrated. In particular, a combination of a
customized PAM module, a registration service, and an LDAP facade has been in-
vented. This solution is based on the SAML profile Enhanced Client or Proxy (ECP)
(see [Hughes2005] for a detailed introduction of SAML profiles). Furthermore, other
researchers have integrated specific services into SAML-based infrastructures. For
instance, the integration of non web-based services constitutes also the aim of the
projectMoonshot [HNS10]. However, theMoonshot approach for federating non web-
based services differs from the bwIDM approach in terms of the fact that Moonshot is
mainly based on existing RADIUS infrastructures [RFC2865] and the Generic Secu-
rity Service Application Program Interface (GSS API) [RFC1508]. Only the release of
attributes is planned to be implemented on the basis of SAML, or rather Shibboleth
components. The authors of [VTCP12] invented another SAML-based IAM that aims
to integrate VISION clouds12 – a specific type of cloud service – into Shibboleth
federations. Shibboleth is also used by the community of grid computing13 to fed-
erate access to the grid infrastructures, e.g., [WBKS05], [SGJ+06], and [GGPW07].
Additionally, the authors of both [BFW10] and [MKMT11] introduced federation
approaches for specific grid communities. In these papers, Shibboleth is used to
issue so called short-lived X.501 certificates, with which users can access the grid
infrastructure. A customized Shibboleth identity provider is also used in the GridShib
project to issue attributes [BBF+06]. In summary, it is obvious that many inventions
have been introduced to enable different kinds of services for SAML and, particularly,
Shibboleth. Thus, it is likely that AAIs become more and more important for the
collaboration between organizations that share provided IT services – at least, in
the academia. Therefore, it is even more important to investigate potentially un-
intended data flows in such infrastructures. Whereas the collaborative features of
SAML-based implementations are based on state-of-the-art cryptographic methods
to ensure secure data flows, we identified a lack of studies that investigate data flows
– caused by the collaboration of organizations – that occur within the boundaries
of a single participating organization.
11http://www.bw-grid.de/bwservices/bwidm/ [Last downloaded 2013-05-28].
12http://www.visioncloud.eu/ [Last downloaded 2013-05-28].
13The authors of [FK99] define grid infrastructures as “a hardware and software infrastructure
that provides dependable, consistent, pervasive, and inexpensive access to high-end computational
capabilities”. In particular, a grid integrates several computing resources (independent of the location)
to get a large computing cluster. Programs that have to be executed, or rather computing tasks, are
called jobs (cf. high performance computing) and can travel from one specific grid computing resource
to another one.
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2.4 Principles and Requirements for IAM Components
In this part of the thesis, we introduce terms for the most important principles on
top of which the specific research questions – introduced in the next section – are
addressed. Before we define requirements closely related to this dissertation, we
introduce and discuss some of the general principles regarding IAM systems stated
by Kim Cameron (Architect of Identity, Microsoft Corporation). These principles be-
came known as “Kim Cameron’s Laws of Identity”14. Kim’s seven laws are meanwhile
referenced in many research and industry publications. In the following, we address
only those two laws that are most related to this dissertation. Kim’s first law addresses
“user control and consent”. In particular, he states that “technical identity systems
must only reveal information identifying a user with the user’s consent” [Cam05].
In principle, this accompanies with the German data protection act (German: Bun-
desdatenschutzgesetz, BDSG) that states the requirement of user’s consent in § 4 et
seq. BDSG. However, exceptional cases for the requirement for obtaining the users’
consent in the context of data collection and forwarding are also considered by the
German law (§ 4 et seq. BDSG). With that, in some circumstances the German law
permits the processing of data without users’ explicitly stated consent. However, in
any case a person has to be informed about the data processing by the responsible
institution that gathers his/her PII. Furthermore, this institution has to clarify the
purpose on which the processing is based (§ 4a BDSG). See also Section 4.1 for further
discussions on the BDSG with the focus on research on Online Social Networks.
Another of Kim Cameron’s “Laws of Identity” is titled “Minimal Disclosure for
a Constrained Use” and says that “the solution which discloses the least amount
of identifying information and best limits its use is the most stable long term so-
lution” [Cam05]. Thus, an IAM system that discloses as minimal information as
necessary is probably the system that can be operated for the longest period of time
because it will be less susceptible with respect to possibly upcoming restrictions, for
instance, regarding data protection. Moreover, the minimality of disclosure of PII
is a requirement stated by many laws. For instance, the German data protection act
prescribes this minimality in § 3a BDSG.
In the following, we introduce further principles that form essential requirements
for implementing components for IAM systems. These requirements form the basis
of the research presented in this part of the thesis.
The probably most important requirements are the deployability, operability, and
maintainability of modules that are to be integrated into existing IAM systems. Hence,
the improved modules for IAM systems presented in the next chapter do not only
aim at presenting something very innovative in the sense of the functionality of
the modules, but also and in particular the solutions fulfill the mentioned three
requirements that are introduced in detail in the following:
– Deployability: we define a solution as deployable if the effort for integration
into existing systems is reasonable and feasible even for an administrator.
14http://www.identityblog.com/stories/2005/05/13/TheLawsOfIdentity.pdf [Last downloaded 2013-
05-28].
26
2 Enterprise Identity Management
– Operability: we define a solution as operable if it fits into existing infrastruc-
tures, or even legacy systems, so that the processes implemented in those
systems have not to be changed in an unintended manner and the integration
does not require unreasonable efforts.
– Maintainability: a solution is maintainable if the changes of the legacy sys-
tems, or rather the existing infrastructure, does not induce that updates for the
respective system are no more deployable, i.e., if updates provided by the ven-
dor or manufacturer of a system (or infrastructure) can be deployed as before
the integration of the new solution, we classify a solution as maintainability
preserving.
In summary, a key requirement for designing a deployable, operable, and maintain-
able solution is constituted by the need that as few changes as possible are necessary
to integrate the components into the productive infrastructures, or even into legacy
systems, i.e., approaches that, for instance, do not require to change already deployed
code. Instead, a solution has to be designed in a modular manner so that – in the best
case – it can be integrated by just changing configurations of the existing productive
infrastructure. Furthermore, a new IAM component should not induce the need to
change existing and established processes of an organization. If a solutions fulfills
these requirements and, moreover, an administrator does not need to change the
whole configuration to integrate a new component, but just a few lines, we character-
ize such solution as “minimal invasive” with respect to the infrastructure in which
the solutions have to be integrated. However, the three introduced requirements
induce that designing a solution for avoiding unintended data flows constitutes a
non-trivial task. Whereas the prevention of flows of PII to non-authoritative resources
might be trivial in itself, the implementation of solutions that fit into the existing
infrastructures in a “minimal invasive” manner sets the basis for the real challenge
that is tackled in this part of the dissertation. Note that we sometimes make use
of the term “deployability” as a generic term that subsumes the triad “deployability,
operability, and maintainability”.
In the following, we introduce additional requirements that have to be considered
when designing solutions for avoiding unintended flows of PII. A requirement for an
improved concept of interconnecting identity providers with identity stores is to not
infiltrate the concept that is called “separation of concerns” with respect to the groups
of identities and the corresponding responsible departments. Large organizations sep-
arate the administration of identities because possibly no organizational unit can be
found that could be in the position to represent the authoritative department for any
identity information. For instance, at a university it might be problematic for a com-
puting center to administer the accounts of people who are only external customers
of the library. In turn, the library staff might be overcharged if the identities of every
employee have to be administered and, to give another example, a student account
should be administered by the central administration of the university because of the
sensitive data – such as course grades – that is attached to the identity information.
Therefore, the independence of administrative domains should be maintained by an
improved integration method for Shibboleth identity providers.
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Furthermore, sensitive data, such as passwords or password hashes, should not be
replicated in other identity stores than those that are authoritative for the respective
data. Not only security arguments underpin this requirement but also the increased
effort of updating data if it is replicated into additional databases.
In the following, we focus on the specific part of a SAML-based, or rather Shibboleth-
based identity provider that handles the interconnection with identity stores and state
corresponding requirements. Shibboleth implements the modular connection of
identity stores via the JAVA™ Authentication and Authorization Service (JAAS). JAAS
is implemented to be used for two purposes: authentication and authorization for
JAVA™-based components. The JAAS reference guide states that JAAS is dedicated
“to reliably and securely determine who is currently executing Java code, regardless
of whether the code is running as an application, an applet, a bean, or a servlet”.
Moreover, JAAS can ensure that users “have the access control rights (permissions)
required to do the actions performed”. Therefore, JAAS constitutes a feature to
authenticate and authorize users who are executing JAVA™ code. Since the release of
the J2SDK 1.4 it is integrated into the JAVA™ standard edition. In particular, JAAS
provides a possibility to interconnect identity stores with JAVA™-based components
so that the interconnection has not to be implemented by the JAVA™ component itself.
The concept underneath the JAAS feature is a pluggable component that “permits
applications to remain independent from underlying authentication techniques”,
i.e., the interconnected identity stores and, therefore, the mentioned authentication
techniques remain transparent from the perspective of the JAVA™ component.15 As
already mentioned, JAAS is integrated in and used by common identity provider
implementations, such as Shibboleth, to interconnect with identity stores. JAAS
supports interconnections with, for instance, directories based on the Lightweight
Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) [RFC4511] or even interfaces based on a Pluggable
Authentication Module (PAM) [Sam96]. However, in general, the way of integrating
identity stores via JAAS is very common and independent from SAML and Shibboleth,
i.e., JAAS is used for SAML components like for any other application that integrates
identity stores or any other database via JAAS. Therefore, a requirement for the
implementation of an improved integration concept based on JAAS is that the solution
can not only be used for Shibboleth but also for any other application that utilizes
JAAS. This requirement originates from the demand that we attempt to not breaking
already existing and commonly deployed concepts. Thatmeans, if we would not target
a solution that can be used in any other application that utilizes JAAS, we would fail
the requirement for being minimal invasive with respect to the concepts on top of
which an implementation of a Shibboleth identity provider is based.
A further challenge constitutes the specification of SAML itself that has to be con-
sidered when designing new approaches for avoiding unintended flows of PII, i.e.,
the compliance with respect to the widely used SAML specification constitutes an
additional requirement.
15http://docs.oracle.com/javase/6/docs/technotes/guides/security/jaas/JAASRefGuide.html [Last
downloaded 2013-05-28].
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Finally, a last requirement originates from a special circumstance in the academia.
The libraries of the universities (particularly, libraries of German universities) have to
be open for the public, i.e., every citizen can use the library as a so-called walk-in user.
Walk-in users also can use the IT infrastructure to search for books, journals, etc.
Otherwise, these users do not have an account like a student or employee. Therefore,
it is common to authenticate just the terminals in the library (instead of the user him-
/herself) for service requests with respect to, for instance, literature research. Hence,
the check of the IP address should be possible with the Shibboleth infrastructures that
authenticate users or terminals for access to literature services (see also [ORBL09]).
In summary, the following requirements have to be fulfilled by the concepts pre-
sented in the following:
– Design of deployable solutions that can be operated within existing systems
without additional effort and that preserve themaintainability of these existing
systems.
– “Minimal Disclosure for a Constrained Use” [Cam05].
– Preserving the independence of organizational units or even organizations
involved in providing an integrated IT service.
– No change of existing (technical and organizational) processes.
– No replication of passwords or other sensitive information into third databases.
– Automated and configurable identification of the appropriate identity store for
each of any user login.
– Maintain common concepts, such as the JAAS concept to interconnect identity
stores.
– Compliance with the SAML specification.
– Integration of additional authentication attributes, such as IP addresses.
2.5 Speciﬁc Research Questions
In the current section, we refine the research questions stated in chapter 1 with the
focus on Enterprise Identity Management and SAML-based IAM systems.
As early as 2005, Kemp wrote that “a common misconception concerning net-
work security is that the infrastructure is at considerable risk from external attack-
ers” [Kem05]. Furthermore, the author identified, for instance, the “abuse of trust” as
a potential attack. In the Internet Security Threat Report 2011, the company Symantec
state the following prognosis for the analysis of threats in 2012: “While external threats
will continue to multiply, the insider threat will also create headlines, as employees
act intentionally – and unintentionally – to leak or steal valuable data”16. In this
16http://www.symantec.com/threatreport/ [Last downloaded 2013-05-28].
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Figure 2.5: Frontend implementation and backend processes of a SAML-based identity
provider.
context, the company AlgoSec interviewed 182 IT security and operations experts
and state that “the greatest business security risks and challenges come from within
the organizational boundaries”17. In this whitepaper, AlgoSec also proclaims that
“Security is an inside job. As serious as threats may be from hackers and malware,
only one out of five respondents see external threats as their #1 risk. IT Security and
Operations departments are more focused on gaining visibility into their applications
and networks, improving processes that are time-consuming and error-prone, and
defending against internal threats”. Therefore, we assume that one of the biggest
threats come from inside an organization, i.e., from the people working with the
respective components or those who can get unintended access to PII processed by
these components. In the remainder of this part of the dissertation, we focus on
threats coming from inside an organization due to unintended flows of PII in general
and focus on the following research question in particular:
– Who can access what piece of information within a SAML-based IAM system
inside the organizational borders?
In turn, we consciously do not focus on the IT security of the systems in terms
of measures to head off external attackers trying to intrude the systems. This IT
security perspective is another field of research that is not an essential part of this
dissertation. The exclusion of external attacks allows a focus on unintended flows of
PII caused by the implementation of processes within today’s IAM systems in contrast
to security leaks that can be exploited by any internal and external attacker. In
particular, we focus on SAML-based IAM systems and on the current implementation
of processes of SAML-based identity providers connected to individual identity stores
as it is implemented in many organizations (cf. for instance, the number of German
17http://www.algosec.com/resources/files/Specials/Survey files/120404 Survey Report.pdf [Last
downloaded 2013-05-28].
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Figure 2.6: Principle approach to federate several identity stores, or rather their
interfaces (ifX) via SAML-based identity providers that are federated by a discovery
service.
organizations participating in the DFN-AAI18). Because of the fact that an identity
provider releases requested PII to its integrated services based on rules and policies
implemented at the identity provider, an identity provider constitutes one of the most
“vulnerable” components in a SAML-based infrastructure with respect to processes
whose implementation potentially induces unintended data flows.
As pointed out in Section 1.5, we divide the processes of an identity provider that
are focused in this thesis into two categories, i.e., parts implemented for the identity
provider backend and those implemented to provide a frontend. The backend of an
identity provider connects a SAML component to the local identity stores and ensures
the integration into the rest of the IAM infrastructure of the respective organization.
In contrast, the frontendmodules represent the user interface and all corresponding
workflows, i.e., providing an interface to the users that is necessary to, for instance,
type in their credentials. Figure 2.5 illustrates the partitioning of an identity provider
into the backend and frontend implementation. Whereas the backend implementation
(right side of the figure) comprises the processes that are based on the interconnection
with identity stores, the frontend implementation (left side of the figure) subsumes
any process that is related to the user interface and the input of users’ credentials.
In the following, we firstly state the specific research questions addressed in this the-
sis with a focus on the backend processes and, second, we introduce the research direc-
tion with respect to the frontend implementations of SAML-based identity providers.
However, the main objective of the approaches presented in this thesis applies to both
research directions, i.e., we provide simple and, therefore, deployable, operable, and
maintainable approaches for implementing IAM components that can be integrated
into existing SAML-based IAM infrastructures to avoid unintended data flows.
18https://www.aai.dfn.de/verzeichnis/teilnehmer/ [Last downloaded 2013-05-28].
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2.5.1 Unintended Data Flows Within the SAML Backend
In Figure 2.6, we illustrate the principle behind a federation based on identity providers
similar as introduced in Section 2.3.3. A discovery service spans a SAML-based
identity federation. The identity providers are interconnected with identity stores
(illustrated as cans), or rather with interfaces provided by these identity stores (if1,
if2, if3, and if4). Note that we abstract from existing service providers in this and
the following illustration.
If we now assume a heterogeneous organization, i.e., an organization in which
identity information is not stored in a single identity store, several identity providers
and a discovery service could span a federation that would constitute a solution to
provide access to services integrated in this federation for any user whose identity
information is administered by one of the integrated identity stores. In point of fact,
organizations tend to implement an identity store for each of any group of users who
potentially try to access provided IT services, e.g., a university often implements
separated stores for their students, employees, library guests, etc.. Therefore, many
organizations are heterogeneously structured with respect to the separation of identity
information in different identity stores. However, the users of those organizations
could login by just choosing the appropriate identity provider that is interconnected
with the identity store responsible for the users’ data and by providing their credentials.
For instance, a user, who has registered an account at the library of his/her academic
institution, can choose the identity provider of the library to perform a federated
login. A user with another account – for instance, an account at the computing center
– would choose another appropriate identity provider. Thus, such a heterogeneous
organization would implement an inner federation of their provided services and
identity stores by the use of several identity providers.
Referring back to Figure 2.4 shown in Section 2.3.3, we demonstrated how a cross-
organizational AAI is spanned by an AAI provider. Primarily, because of usability
reasons, AAI providers strive to keep the number of identity providers listed by the
discovery service as small as possible. One of the reasons for this constitutes the fact
that users have to pick and choose their identity provider from thewebsite presented by
a discovery service. If the number of identity providers listed by this website becomes
too large, the usability would significantly decrease. A further reason for allowing
only one identity provider per organization is the management overhead that might
increase with every additional participating identity provider from the perspective of
the AAI provider. Moreover, a single participating identity provider ensures loose
coupling of an organization and the AAI provider in the sense that organization-
internal processes stay transparent for the AAI provider. Therefore, it is not surprising
that a membership of an organization in a cross-organizational AAI often requires
that the organization only brings a single identity provider into the federation.
If we again assume a heterogeneously structured organization, which operates
several identity stores, an essential issue of implementing SAML-based IAM systems
becomes obvious. Because of the fact that hierarchies of identity federations are not
intended, not specified by the SAML specification, and, therefore, not implemented,
organizations with several identity stores have to interconnect these identity stores
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Figure 2.7: Conceptual gap between the perspectives and requirements of AAI
providers and individual organizations.
with a single identity provider that participates in the federation to still be able to
handle any login attempt by users whose data is administered by one of the existing
identity stores. Figure 2.7 demonstrates this conceptual gap. The upper part of the
figure shows the perspective of an AAI provider that imposes the requirement of a
single identity provider per organization. In contrast, the lower part of the figure
illustrates the perspective of a participating organization that is faced with the issue
of interconnecting several identity stores to a single identity provider. In summary,
the deployment of a single identity provider for an organization is problematic if an
organization consists of, for instance, several organizational units that administer and
manage “their” identities on their own and do not want to or are not able to delegate
the administration into the hands of a central organizational unit, e.g., a computing
center. Therefore, a conceptual gap between the requirements for being a member of
an AAI (single identity provider per participating organization) and the intents of
a SAML-based infrastructure regarding the necessary number of identity providers
within the boundaries of an organization is existent.
However, SAML implementations – such as Shibboleth – do provide a solution
for connecting more than one identity store to a single identity provider. Therefore,
the following research question arise:
– Does the implementation of IAM processes within SAML-based identity providers
for interconnecting several identity stores pose the risk of unintended data flows?
Figure 2.8 illustrates existing approaches for interconnecting an identity provider
with several identity stores. Basically, organizations have two different opportunities
for the necessary integration of their identity stores so far.
First, identity stores can be integrated by utilizing the JAVA™ Authentication and
Authorization Service. This opportunity constitutes an already built-in feature of
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Figure 2.8: Common concepts to interconnect a single Shibboleth identity provider
with the identity stores of an organization.
Shibboleth identity providers (see part A of Figure 2.8). With that, for each of every
identity store a JAAS module is configured and integrated into the identity provider
configuration. At the point in time a user provides his/her credentials at the login
page of an identity provider, the JAASmodules are then parsed in a sequential manner
until a match of user name and password is found in one of the connected identity
stores. That implies, the identity provider potentially forwards the user credentials
to more than a single interconnected identity store regardless of whether or not
the user is known by the provider of an identity store that receives the credentials.
This approach poses the risk of unintended data flows if providers of identity stores
get notice of the user name and password of a user whose account is not part of
their administered identities. In particular, if not the communication to the first
configured identity store induces a successful authentication, a user’s credentials have
been sent to, at least, one identity store that is not in charge of the respective user
and the provider of this identity store should not learn anything about this user –
neither the password nor the user name. Furthermore, besides the fact that a potential
communication to more than a single identity store is not necessary at all, this course
of action affects the time needed to decide whether or not a user can be authenticated.
Certainly, these are stronger arguments for organizations that consist of remarkably
independent organizational units, which, for instance, do not fully trust each other.
However, also for organizations with stable trust relationships between the individual
organizational units, a sequential processing of identity stores induces unnecessary
flows of possibly sensitive information and costs time during authentication, which
could, additionally, be annoying for users.
Part (B) of Figure 2.8 illustrates another option for interconnecting more than a
single identity store. This concept is based on a Meta or Virtual Directory19. With
that, the Meta/Virtual Directory constitutes the only identity store that is connected
to the identity provider. In turn, this identity store is connected to the “real” identity
19Meta Directories store data that is originally stored at several other databases that are intercon-
nected with the Meta Directory. The data is replicated within the Meta Directory and, therefore,
redundantly stored. In contrast, a Virtual Directory constitutes a facade in front of several databases
and provides a single interface to access the data stored in the interconnected resources. In this case,
the data is not redundantly replicated but passed on by the Virtual Directory to the requesting service.
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stores of the organization and provides an aggregated view on these stores. In other
words, a Meta/Virtual Directory serves as a facade for the existing, multiple identity
stores. Both the use of multiple JAAS modules and the connection via a Meta or
Virtual Directory is common in many organizations. However, also the Meta/Virtual
Directory solution has its drawbacks with respect to unintended data flows. Meta
and Virtual Directories provide an aggregated view on actually separated stores with
sensitive information about users. Such a component constitutes not only a single
point of failure but also provides – at least, for the responsible administrators – access
to a potentially large number of account information and, therefore, personal data.
In light of the assumption stated before that the origination of threats is most likely
to be expected from inside an organization, the use of Meta or Virtual Directories
also poses potential risks in terms of unintended flows of sensitive information.
In light of the situation that PII might be unintentionally accessible, we introduce
approaches that ensure that personal data, such as login credentials, can only be
forwarded to dedicated IT services integrated into an organization-internally imple-
mented IAM system so that non-essential and potentially unintended flows of PII
can be avoided. These solutions are deployable despite the restrictions AAI providers
impose. With these approaches we address the following specific research question:
– Is it possible to design approaches to implement deployable, operable, and main-
tainable improvements of interconnections of identity providers and identity stores
to avoid potentially unintended flows of PII?
2.5.2 Unintended Data Flows Caused by Frontend Implementations
For those users who have to authenticate at an identity provider, risks regarding
unintended data flows do not only exist because of the technical processes on top of
which such an IAM component is implemented. Another risk is posed by people who
can spy a user who is going to log in for a service. If the user has to type in his/her
credentials (e.g., user name and password) the spying person can potentially read the
user name and/or can get an idea of, for instance, the length of the corresponding
password. In this context, spying on users who are, for instance, typing a password
“in order to obtain their personal identification number, password, etc.” is the practice
that is also known as “shoulder surfing” (definition by the Oxford Dictionaries20).
Moreover, public computers (public terminals) pose additional risks. These open
terminals might be manipulated in certain terms so that an attacker can get access to
typed information, particularly, the user name and password. For instance, programs
can be installed that can read users’ input data for storing and/or forwarding this in-
formation to attacking third parties. For instance, so-called key-loggers are programs
that can save keyboard input data (and, therefore, also users’ credentials). Those
programs are acting in a fully transparent manner from the perspective of the user.
Many users often have to authenticate in insecure environments, e.g., students at the
lecture hall, and open terminals are extensively used, e.g., at internet cafes on vacation
or at the library of a user’s university. Therefore, the offer of just the “old fashion”
20http://oxforddictionaries.com [Last downloaded 2013-05-28].
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authentication method, i.e., the use of a combination of user name and password,
might be no longer state of the art. Alternative authentication methods can be useful,
particularly, if users have to authenticate in such “insecure” environments. Depending
on the situation of a user whowants to login to use an IT service, providing alternatives
to the login based on credentials that have to be typed in would be preferable. Hence,
providers of SAML-based infrastructures – like other providers – have to think about
alternative authentication methods and possibilities to provide those features.
In the context of alternative authenticationmethods, authentications with the help of
Quick Response (QR) codes [ISO18004] have been introduced, recently (e.g., [Kim12],
[BVDN12]). Additionally, Google spent some effort for evaluating QR codes for
authentication21. Moreover, the opportunity to use social media logins also became
very popular in the last decades. In particular, social media authentication methods
are used for services that can work with just uncertain information about a user (see
the second part of the next section for further details on alternative login methods).
Therefore, in the next chapter, we present modules for SAML-based IAM components
that allow the integration of alternative authentication techniques (e.g., QR code-
based or social media-based logins) into the frontend implementation.
However, so far, SAML-based identity providers are implemented to support just the
user name and password authentication, although the SAML specificationwould allow
alternative authentication methods. Therefore, the following research question arises:
– Can existing alternative authentication methods be integrated into SAML-based
identity providers to avoid unintended flows of PII due to the login based on
credentials that can be spied or logged by thirds?
Again, the design of improvements that can be implemented and integrated into
existing IAM systems aims at providing approaches that are deployable, operable, and
maintainable. This aim also constitutes the main issue of designing approaches to
integrate alternative login methods, i.e., finding a “minimal invasive” way to bring
the new functionality into existing infrastructure.
2.6 Related Work
In the first part of this section, we present related work with respect to improve-
ments of data flows of SAML-based components in light of the mentioned issue to
operate several identity stores by still fulfilling the requirements imposed by AAI
providers. The library of the University of Freiburg (Germany) applied a module
namedmyLogin22, which is implemented as an identity provider extension for Shibbo-
leth. Subsequently of choosing the home organization, or rather the identity provider
of the home organization by a user, he/she gets forwarded to another website provided
by the identity provider that is installed between the incoming redirect and the form
21http://www.h-online.com/security/news/item/Google-briefly-experiments-with-Sesame-
phone-based-login-1414311.html [Last downloaded 2013-05-28].
22https://mylogin.uni-freiburg.de [Last downloaded 2013-05-28].
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that asks for the users’ credentials. On this additional website, the user can pick and
choose his/her appropriate identity store at the university of Freiburg implemented as
choosing the corresponding organizational unit, e.g., the library, the computing center,
or the university hospital. Therefore, a user is able to choose the identity store that
administers the account with which a user wants to login. In particular, this module
has advantages for users with several accounts linked with different access rights and
registered at more than a single organizational unit. After successfully passing the
login the service provider that is about to be accessed retrieves those attributes that
are linked to the picked account. Therefore, withmyLogin an additional hierarchical
level was implemented. The main disadvantage of this solution is constituted by the
fact that a user has to pick and choose his/her home organization and, afterwards,
has to pick and choose the appropriate organizational unit, before he/she can login
for accessing the service. Furthermore, this invention is only deployable if users can
exactly map their accounts to an organizational unit. If users do not know who is
in charge of administering their accounts, such an additional interaction with the
identity provider would build another barrier, especially for inexpert users. In contrast
to myLogin, the solutions presented in this thesis can be integrated in a seamless,
or rather transparent manner from the perspective of the users, i.e., the introduced
modules do not require an additional interaction by the users and, therefore, might
constitute a more acceptable add-on for avoiding unintended data flows concerning
the demands of users who want to spend as less overhead for logging in as possible.
Another approach was taken by the authors of [WS11] to tackle the conceptual gap
between a single identity provider and several identity stores. In this paper, a solution
is introduced that can be deployed at an identity provider for gathering attribute
values from several secondary identity providers. However, the aim of the authors was
not to manage accounts separately administered within different identity stores. On
the contrary, they aim at introducing a concept of bringing attributes of a single user
together that are stored in different identity stores. In contrast, we aim at providing
solutions to handle authentications with accounts separately managed by different
identity stores. Furthermore, we do not want to install several identity providers. In-
stead, we implement a single identity provider that interconnects identity stores based
on a concept that separates different areas of administration for avoiding unintended
data flows in the direction of unauthorized identity stores.
As mentioned in the previous section, providing just the common way to authenti-
cate users, i.e., the authentication by combinations of user name and password, might
not be sufficient in the future. Because of the use of open terminals or the use of,
for instance, laptops or tablet computers in environments where others can spy on
monitors and keyboards require new and more secure ways to authenticate users. In
the related work, we can find many different approaches to authenticate users without
the use of user name and password combinations. Additionally, some IT service
providers provide authentication services, e.g., Facebook provides the Facebook Sin-
gle Sign-on that can be integrated in web applications due to authenticate users via
their Facebook account. However, those mechanisms have not yet been implemented
for the widely used SAML-based infrastructures. Accordingly, also no solution has
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(a) QR code as shown, for in-
stance, on the Internet or print
media.
(b) Structure elements high-
lighted within an exemplary QR
code (cf. [ISO18004]).
Figure 2.9: Example of a QR code (Version 9, i.e., a size of 53 modules per row).
been presented that provides a deployable, operable, and maintainable concept. In
the following, we present related work on alternative authentication methods that
could be useful for authentications in light of the mentioned situations. Furthermore,
we point to related papers that introduce concepts and implementations to integrate
those authentication methods into existing systems.
The international standard ISO/IEC 18004 specifies QR codes [ISO18004] on top
of which several authors have implemented an authentication system. QR codes are
2-dimensional bar codes that can be, for instance, “deciphered” by a smartphone, i.e.,
a common smartphone can install applications that can read a photo – taken with
the smartphone – of the bar code, e.g., the application barcoo23. A QR code, such
as shown in Figure 2.9a, consists of a 2-dimensional representation of the data and,
additionally, areas that structure the QR code itself and provides meta information.
In Subfigure 2.9b, we highlighted the structure elements of an exemplary QR code
symbol as specified in [ISO18004]. The blue areas highlight the “position detection
patterns”, whereas the yellow patterns are used for further alignment. The orange
patterns are “timing patterns” and appear as alternating black and white modules to
determine the coordinates of the symbol in order to be able to parse the single rows
of the QR code. The red and green lines are white spaces. The red line is known as
the “quiet zone” necessary to detect the borders of the symbol adequately. The green
line separates the position detection patterns from the rest of the symbol. Data that
is represented underneath the green overlay contains version information, whereas
the blue overlay marks areas of information on the format. The largest version of a
QR code (Version 40, i.e., a size of 177 modules per row) can represent 3,706 bytes
of data [ISO18004]. QR codes are, for instance, utilized by the authors of [BVDN12]
to authenticate users. The authors of this paper introduced a login that provides QR
codes containing, inter alia, session information instead of a form that requests a
user’s credentials. A photo of this QR code has to be taken by using the application
23http://www.barcoo.com/ [Last downloaded 2013-05-28].
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the authors implemented for smartphones. The smartphone is equipped with a secure
micro SD card24 that provides a tamperproof storage for key material. Based on
this key material (used for securing the communication) the smartphone interacts
with a service via the Internet connection of the phone. In turn, this service, which
can be seen as an identity provider, interacts with the website/service that a user
wants to access. If the identity provider receives valid information about the user
of the smartphone and information on the service that is about to be accessed and
corresponding session information, the identity provider informs the service about
the successful authentication of the user. In the following chapter, we present a
solution that aims at integrating this authentication method into a Shibboleth identity
provider, i.e., the Shibboleth identity provider serves as a service for which a user has
to be authenticated. However, QR codes are used for authentications by several other
organizations. Even Google25 spent some effort to evaluate possibilities to provide
QR code logins26. The university of Tu¨bingen (Germany) operates a QR code login
system for their students, i.e., called Ekaay 27 and founded a spin-off company that
sells this partially patented product. In summary, it is obvious that particularly QR
codes become popular in the field of novel authentication methods.
Additionally, the authentication via Online Social Network (OSN) accounts consti-
tutes an interesting opportunity for providing alternative login methods. Basically,
large OSNs, such as Facebook, provide an authentication service based on a user’s
credentials, i.e., the user name registered within the OSN and the corresponding
password. However, also more sophisticated authentications on top of data out of
OSNs are conceivable. To give an example, the authors of [YFB08] introduced a
technique to authenticate a user by presenting photos of his/her OSN friends and
other people and let him/her choose which of the photos show one or more of his/her
friends. Certainly, an authentication by using an OSN cannot completely ensure that
a user is no other person than the one he/she claims to be because of the fact that
faked accounts can easily be registered within OSNs (cf. Chapter 4). Furthermore,
attribute values retrieved from an OSN are mainly provided andmanaged by the users
themselves and, therefore, the correctness of the data cannot be ensured by the OSN.
However, for some use cases it might be feasible, or even valuable to integrate OSN
authentications into IAM system. For instance, if an authentication does not imply
access to potentially sensitive information, a login via an OSNmight be also sufficient.
Besides the upcoming of alternatives to user name-password authentications, first
studies have been published that aim at integrating novel authentication methods
into existing IAM systems. The authors of [ASM13] introduced a concept to integrate
InformationCards, i.e., authentications via sets of attributes certified by a trusted party
(e.g., Card Space [BSB07]28 andHiggins29), into Shibboleth. In particular, a solution is
24http://www.gd-sfs.com/ [Last downloaded 2013-05-28].
25http://google.com [Last downloaded 2013-05-28].
26http://www.h-online.com/security/news/item/Google-briefly-experiments-with-Sesame-
phone-based-login-1414311.html [Last downloaded 2013-05-28].
27http://www.ekaay.com/ [Last downloaded 2013-05-28] and [Kim12].
28http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa480189.aspx [Last downloaded 2013-05-28].
29http://www.eclipse.org/higgins/ [Last downloaded 2013-05-28].
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introduced that enables Shibboleth identity providers to interact with an “Information
Card-enabled relying party”, i.e., a service provider. The authors implemented a
browser extension that works with the mentioned Information Card approaches and
does not require (major) changes of the corresponding Information Card components
and the identity provider. However, we present solutions that can be integrated into
SAML identity providers so that users are not involved in the deployment process, for
instance, due to the need to install components at the local client. Furthermore, the
aim of the solutions presented in this dissertation is mainly at avoiding unintended
flows of PII and focus, inter alia, on integrating emerging technologies, whereas the
development of Information Card approaches are rather retrogressive or, in the case
of Microsoft’s Card Space even discontinued. Another work that aims at integrating
novel authentication methods into common IAM systems is presented by the author
of [Bec11]. In his master’s thesis, he introduced a proof-of-concept that integrates
QR code-based authentications via smartphones into an OpenID30 environment. In
contrast to this work, we, inter alia, aim at integrating QR code-based authentication
into SAML-based environments that are more commonly deployed in enterprise
environments, whereas OpenID is often used for services provided for personal use.
In summary, we showed that SAML-based IAM systems become increasingly pop-
ular, at least, because of the progressive integration of several types of IT services.
Furthermore, we showed that alternative authentication methods are emerging, so
that providers of IAM systems should be prepared for future demands of their users.
Finally, we presented first studies that aim at integrating novel authentication technolo-
gies into existing IAM systems. In the following chapter, we present improvements
of Shibboleth identity providers that, at first, aim at avoiding the mentioned kinds
of unintended flows of PII. Furthermore, the presented approaches provide future-
oriented solutions in terms of possibly emerging demands of users. Therefore, we
provide essential contributions for operating SAML-based IAM systems in a privacy
aware manner in the future.
30http://openid.net/ [Last downloaded 2013-05-28].
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Referring to the specific research questions and related work introduced in the previ-
ous chapter, the current chapter presents the main contributions in the area of avoid-
ing unintended flows of personally identifiable information (PII) within enterprise
identity and access management (IAM) systems. We demonstrated that implemen-
tations of SAML-based identity providers can induce flows of users’ credentials to
non-authoritative resources or third parties (1) if more than a single identity store is
interconnected with an identity provider (potentially unintended flows of PII in the
backend of SAML-based identity providers) and (2) if third parties can spy on or log
the input of users’ credentials (potentially unintended flows of PII induced by the cur-
rent implementation of an identity provider frontend). In the following, we separately
present the approaches with respect to backend and frontend improvements. First,
we show the components that can be integrated into SAML-based identity providers
to improve the flows of data within the backend of an identity provider. Additionally,
we show how these approaches have been deployed in a productive environment and
present key indicators for the actual usage of the components. Second, we introduce
concepts and a respective implementation – as a proof-of-concept – that allows to sug-
gest users of SAML-based identity providers with alternative authentication methods,
such as QR code or social media logins. Afterwards, we evaluate both the backend
and frontend approaches with respect to the principles and requirements regarding
the implementation of IAM components stated in Section 2.4. Finally, we discuss
and conclude the enterprise IAM part of this dissertation. Parts of the contributions
presented in this chapter have been previously published in [LSD10].
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Figure 3.1: The concept of the JAAS Dispatcher.
3.1 Approaches for Improving Backend Processes
In the current section, we introduce solutions to improve the data flows in the backend
of a Shibboleth identity provider (cf. the research questions stated in Section 2.5.1).
First, we introduce two different approaches to avoid unintended data flows in the
backend of a SAML-based identity provider. Afterwards, it is demonstrated how
the contributions are deployed within the productive IAM systems of the Karlsruhe
Institute of Technology (KIT). We give insights into the experiences we gained from
the productive application of the introduced IAMmodules and present key perfor-
mance indicators to demonstrate that the deployed modules are intensively used by
employees, students, guests, and partners of the KIT.
3.1.1 The JAAS Dispatcher Approach
In this part of the results section, we present an IAM component that we call the
JAAS Dispatcher1, i.e., an additional JAAS module that is integrated between the
identity provider and the existing JAAS modules. The JAAS Dispatcher itself can
be implemented as just another JAAS module, i.e., the JAAS Dispatcher adopts the
concept and design of JAAS modules regarding class structures, interfaces, etc.. How-
ever, in contrast to usual JAAS modules, the JAAS Dispatcher does not encapsulate
identity stores, but rather several other JAAS modules that, in turn, encapsulate the
identity stores. Thus, we propose an additional hierarchical level for the intercon-
nection of identity stores via a cascade of JAAS modules. The advantage of such a
solution is that – from the perspective of both the module of the identity provider
that connects the identity stores and the interconnected identity stores – no code
and nothing of the principle infrastructure has to be changed. Just the configuration
of the identity provider has to be adjusted to integrate the JAAS Dispatcher instead
of directly integrating several identity stores.
Figure 3.1 shows the concept of the JAAS Dispatcher. The figure illustrates the
adaptation of the concept of integrating identity stores by configuring JAAS modules
for each of every identity store that is to be integrated. As mentioned above, we retain
the concept of configuring JAAS modules for the implementation of the additional
1JAAS Dispatcher download: https://dsn.tm.kit.edu/3050.php [Last downloaded 2013-05-28].
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JAAS module, i.e., the JAAS Dispatcher. However, the JAAS Dispatcher encapsulates
the other (regular) JAASmodules and serves as kind of a hub for requests dedicated for
a specific identity store. In comparison to up-front provisioning systems introduced
in the previous chapter, the JAAS Dispatcher constitutes an equivalent component
to the provisioning software that decides which databases have to be provisioned
with which piece of PII, with the difference that the JAAS Dispatcher decides which
identity store is to be used to verify a user’s credentials at this point in time the
credentials are provided by the user via the authentication frontend. In contrast to
the existing concepts of interconnections introduced in Figure 2.8, the application of
the JAAS Dispatcher makes it possible that identity providers do not have to request
identity stores in a sequential manner (cf. part (A) of Figure 2.8). Furthermore, it
is not necessary to implement a redundant identity store that can be (ab-)used to
get a comprehensive view on actually distributed data in terms of a Meta or Virtual
Directory, which suggests an identity provider with just a single access point to every
identity store that is to be integrated (cf. part (B) of Figure 2.8).
However, the JAAS Dispatcher can decide which identity stores might be in charge
of the identity that is registered by the entity that provided the credentials. On the
basis of regular expressions this module limits the number of identity stores that have
to be requested with a user name and password a user provided. In the best case,
based on these regular expressions, which have to be configured by, for instance, an
administrator, the JAAS Dispatcher can explicitly determine the appropriate identity
store. At the KIT, this decision process is based on the range of the ID space and
the structure of the identifiers that are, fortunately, completely disjoint, i.e., no over-
lapping identifiers. For example, the identifier assigned by the Steinbuch Centre for
Computing (SCC) consists of two letters and four digits, which is distinguishable
from, for instance, the identifiers assigned by the library that consist of twelve digits
and no letters. However, if more than a single regular expression matches a provided
user name, the administrator can decide between two options: (1) the regular expres-
sion that matches at first determines the identity store that is requested and (2) every
identity store whose regular expression matches the user name will be requested by
the JAAS Dispatcher via the respective JAAS modules in a sequential manner.
If the JAAS Dispatcher can determine a JAAS module that is connected to the
appropriate identity store, a new so-called JAAS Context is built. This is a necessary
step to delegate the authentication to the JAAS module that is configured for the
appropriate identity store. For each of every JAAS module placed downstream from
the JAAS Dispatcher, a specific name space have to be defined and configured in the
file (login.config). The essential part of this configuration file is exemplary shown
in the following code listing:
ShibUserPassAuth {
edu.kit.scc.dei.JAAS.dispatcher.Dispatcher sufficient
regExp.0=".*@kit.edu" JAASContext.0="mail.kit.edu"
regExp.1="[a-zA-Z]{2}[0-9]{4}" JAASContext.1="scc.kit.edu"
regExp.2="[0-9]{12}" JAASContext.2="bib.kit.edu"
;
};
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After the “preamble” of the configuration snippet, the second line references the
namespace of the JAAS Dispatcher and tags the configuration with the command
“sufficient”, which is important to ensure that this part of the configuration is read
and executed. Each of the next lines consists of an identifier, a regular expression
and a namespace. The latter two values are read by the method initialize() of
the JAAS Dispatcher. The method login() builds the mentioned LoginContext and
delegates the login to this context and, therefore, to the appropriate JAAS module,
which is directly connected to an identity store. The invocation of the chosen JAAS
module is proceeded exactly as the invocation of the JAAS Dispatcher. Hence, the
identity provider invokes the dispatcher module and, in turn, the dispatcher module
invokes the appropriate JAAS module.
In the context of identity providers deployed within enterprise environments, the
JAAS Dispatcher avoids unintended flows of credentials to identity stores that are
not in charge of the corresponding identity. Moreover, the application of this im-
provement reduces the overhead induced by sequential communications between an
identity provider and identity stores. Furthermore, the JAAS Dispatcher approach
maintains the independence of configured identity stores that administer just a sub-
set of identities that can use the identity provider for authentications. Moreover,
providers of identity stores do not have to change their infrastructure as a basis to
deploy the JAAS Dispatcher at the identity provider. Additionally, it is not necessary
to replicate any of the identity information into another data base (cf. the Meta
Directory approach), e.g., no passwords have to be copied to another identity store.
In this context, a solution that requires to replicate passwords would, per se, not
be deployable in some of the current systems, because most identity stores archive
only hash values of the passwords to not provide a clear text view on this sensitive
information for, e.g., attacking third parties or their own administrators. Therefore,
some of the identity stores are not even able to replicate a password into another
database, particularly, if this database requires another algorithm used for hashing
the passwords than the one that is utilized by the identity store.
In general, the JAAS Dispatcher is implemented without breaking the principle JAAS
concept. It provides a JAAS interface for interconnecting an identity provider and an
interface to be connected to JAAS modules that, in turn, encapsulate identity stores.
Therefore, this solution for dispatching JAAS modules provides just an additional
hierarchical level between identity providers and identity stores and, hence, it is not
only applicable for Shibboleth identity providers, but also deployable within any
infrastructure that utilizes JAAS. Appendix A provides further information on how
easily the JAAS Dispatcher can be integrated into Shibboleth identity providers and
other components that are based on JAAS.
Since 2010, the JAAS Dispatcher is also integrated in and can be downloaded from
the official website of the DFN-AAI2.
2https://www.aai.dfn.de/dokumentation/identity-provider/tools/ [Last downloaded 2013-05-28].
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Figure 3.2: The concept of the Extended Login Handler.
3.1.2 The Extended Login Handler Approach
The second concept that we present in this thesis is called the Extended Login Handler
and aims also at improving interconnections between an identity provider and iden-
tity stores. However, in contrast to the JAAS Dispatcher, the Extended Login Handler
approach enables an identity provider to interconnect identity stores that provide
only proprietary interfaces that cannot be integrated with common JAAS modules.
Furthermore, this approachmakes it possible to include further (identity) information
in the decision on whether or not a user can be authenticated, i.e., with this approach
not only the user names and passwords can be used for authentication, but also, for in-
stance, the IP address or further attributes (cf. the requirements stated in Section 2.4).
The Extended Login Handler is a customized module that can be integrated into
the Shibboleth code itself in a modular manner (see the stars within Figure 3.2). In
particular, the Extended Login Handler replaces the common LoginHandler used in
Shibboleth infrastructures. Thus, the Extended Login Handler constitutes a modular
part of the identity provider itself (whereas the JAAS Dispatcher is an additional,
previously non-existent module).
However, the common implementation of the Shibboleth identity provider suggests
the JAAS modules only with user names and passwords typed in by a user. For this,
the LoginHandler of the identity provider utilizes the concept of a so-called Callback
Handler. By utilizing the common LoginHandler approach, further attributes cannot
be forwarded to the JAAS modules to become part of the authentication process.
In contrast, the (individually) implemented Extended Login Handler can provide
JAAS modules with any information that is known by the identity provider, e.g., a
user’s IP address. The inclusion of further attributes such as the IP address is an
important extension for identity stores that have to ensure that a user fulfills further
requirements, e.g., that he/she is located at a certain computer. As already mentioned,
for a specific group of library users (i.e., the guests of the library) it is obligatory to
check whether they are sitting at a computer at the library or elsewhere, e.g., at home.
The reason for this is constituted by the fact that the publishers admit the availability
of publications for those guest users only if they are using a library computer, i.e., a
computer provided inside the library (cf. Section 2.6 and, in particular, the referenced
paper [ORBL09]). Therefore, the Extended Login Handler allows not only to check
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whether credentials that a user has entered are valid or not, but also can involve
constraints into the decision process to answer the question whether or not to let the
user pass the authentication. Moreover, the Extended Login Handler can not only pass
additional attributes to interconnected JAAS modules but also can integrate further
identity stores that only provide proprietary interfaces.
From a technical perspective, the Extended Login Handler is implemented as a
replication and extension of the usernamePasswordLoginHandler3, which is the most
frequently implemented LoginHandler for Shibboleth identity providers. Then, we put
all replicated classes into the name space of the Extended Login Handler. Additionally,
we expanded the method authenticateUser of the class usernamePasswordLoginServlet
in order to fulfill the requirement regarding further attributes that have to be included
into the Callback Handler of a JAAS request. In particular, the method authentica-
teUser extracts the IP address of the user by the command request.getRemoteAddr.
If the appropriate identity store requires this information, or rather if the identity
provider detected that a guest of a library tries to get authenticated, the value returned
by this command is integrated into the following authentication process. Thereby, the
access of an identity store can be implemented by a JAAS module or, alternatively,
directly from the identity provider, or rather the Extended Login Handler. However,
the latter would compromise the modular character of the Shibboleth implementation
that is intended to encapsulate an identity store via a JAAS module.
Both the JAAS Dispatcher and the Extended Login Handler are compatible solu-
tions that can be integrated in parallel into the same Shibboleth identity provider.
Therefore, it is possible to keep the necessary changes of the common LoginHandler
very small, i.e., only the forwarding of, for instance, the IP address is included. The
part of selecting an appropriate identity store is then handled by a JAAS Dispatcher
or, alternatively, a consecutive processing of the identity stores via the configured
JAAS modules as it is the originally implemented way. However, whereas the JAAS
Dispatcher can be used for any application that utilizes JAAS to interconnect identity
stores, the Extended Login Handler can only be implemented in Shibboleth.
3.1.3 Productive Application of the Contributions
Themain objectives of the introduced improvements were to design components that
are deployable, operable, and maintainable. Deployability is an essential requirement
becausemost organizations are already operating IAM systems that cannot completely
be changed in a short period of time. Therefore, new components that have to be
implemented in the existing systems have to fit in these architectures without the need
of changing the whole infrastructure and its existing components. In other words,
the most essential requirement is that the new modules do not induce more than
just minimal changes of the existing components. Furthermore, if the new modules
are deployed, it is essential that the administrators can handle the system not worse
3Replicated classes: usernamePasswordLoginHandler, usernamePasswordLoginServlet, user
namePasswordLoginHandlerBeanDefinitionParser, usernamePasswordLoginHandlerFactoryBean,
and BaseSpringNamespaceHandler.
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Figure 3.3: Monthly logins via the Shibboleth identity provider of the KIT.
than before and that they are still able to deploy updates without any restrictions
caused by the newly integrated components. In summary, we aimed at designing
modules that fulfill not only the demands of the specifications and standard on top
of which the existing components were build, but also the requirements constituted
by the deployed systems and components themselves. In the following, we show
that the introduced concepts are valuable in terms of their deployability, operability,
and maintainability. In particular, we show how we implemented them into the
on-demand provisioning systems of the KIT.
The operative infrastructure for “on-demand provisioning” of the KIT, i.e., a Shibbo-
leth infrastructure, utilizes both the JAAS Dispatcher and the Extended Login Handler.
In particular, the KIT identity provider has integrated a JAAS Dispatcher module,
as well as an Extended Login Handler. For deploying one of the presented modules,
administrators only have to adapt the existing configuration of the SAML-based
identity provider of their organization, which constitutes a low overhead that might
be acceptable for avoiding unintended flows of PII. In fact, for integrating the intro-
duced modules only a single line of configuration has to be changed in each case.
For a productive use of the JAAS Dispatcher, an administrator must also configure
the regular expressions to decide which identity store, or rather JAAS module is to
be used for which type of identifier.
In the following, we show plots that demonstrate the amount of logins that are
handled by the KIT identity provider and, therefore, also by the JAAS Dispatcher, as
well as the Extended Login Handler4. Figure 3.3 shows the overall number of logins
for each month between March 2010 and February 2013. In January 2013, we detected
the so far largest number of logins, i.e., 239,949 logins per month. The increase of
4The statistics were gathered by and the plots were built in collaboration with Michael Simon. He
is in the role of the main administrator of the KIT Shibboleth infrastructure at the Steinbuch Centre
for Computing (SCC).
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Figure 3.4: Ratio of successful and unsuccessful logins.
the number of logins since March 2012 is caused by the integration of the ILIAS5
learning platform of the KIT into the Shibboleth infrastructure to authenticate users
by the KIT identity provider.
Figure 3.4 shows the success rate (gray/upper part of the bars) of logins, i.e., the
ratio of user credentials that could be assigned to an appropriated JAAS module by
the JAAS Dispatcher and resulted in a successful login, i.e., the combination of user
name and password could be verified by the chosen identity store. The black part of
the bars show the ratio of login attempts in which the respective user did a mistake
and typed in an incorrect or unknown user name or he/she typed in a non-valid
combination of user name and password. Obviously, the integration of the student
platform ILIAS induced a drop of unsuccessful logins. This might be explainable
because students have less accounts at the KIT because services the KIT provides
for students have an higher degree of integration, i.e., almost all of these IT service
can be accessed by utilizing just a single account. In contrast, KIT employees often
have registered several additional accounts in (not yet or consciously not integrated)
legacy systems that administer their own identity store, so that it is more probable
that employees choose the wrong account for a login attempt. However, the latter is
only speculative and the influence of other factors cannot be ruled out. For instance,
students’ (eventually better) error rate during typing in combinations of user name
and password could also be a reason for the decrease of unsuccessful logins.
However, in Figure 3.5, we demonstrate details on the number of logins in November
2012. In particular, we provide information on how often which JAAS module was
depicted by the JAAS Dispatcher. A user principal name (upn) is represented by an
e-mail address, whereas a sAMAccountName (sam) is a short login name provided
by the computing center of the KIT. Note that the name is only a dependence to the
attribute sAMAccountName that constitutes an obligatory attribute within Microsoft
5https://ilias.studium.kit.edu [Last downloaded 2013-05-28].
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Figure 3.5: Number of login attempts via the Shibboleth identity provider of the KIT
w.r.t. the JAAS module chosen by the JAAS Dispatcher (Nov. 2012).
Active Directories (AD). In the case of the KIT infrastructure, the sam-attribute is
mapped to the AD-attribute sAMAccountName, but this is not a necessity in general.
The JAAS module library users indicates the mentioned connection to the identity
store for library guests, which is based on the Extended Login Handler that provides
the JAAS modules with the IP address of the entity that attempts to log in. The
module shibboleth users encapsulates an identity store in which separated Shibboleth
accounts are administered, and the module external users encapsulates an identity
store that contains mostly employees of a company who implement services for the
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Figure 3.6: Number of logins for the most frequently used service providers via the
Shibboleth identity provider of the KIT (Nov. 2012).
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KIT. The category unknown indicates the number of login attempts that could not be
assigned to one of the configured JAAS modules. These faulty assignments are caused
by incorrectly entered user names and/or passwords, i.e., a user input contained
non-valid credentials. In contrast, at this point in time, faulty assignments caused
by the JAAS Dispatcher and/or the Extended Login Handler could not be found in
the log files since these modules have been deployed.
Figure 3.6 shows the most frequently used service providers of the KIT in November
2012. In this plot, the reason for the aforementioned increase of logins per month
becomes apparent. The service provider URL “https://ilias.studium.kit.edu/sp” repre-
sents the mentioned ILIAS platform for students. In November 2012, 178,621 logins
were performed by users to access this service provider.
In summary, we can state that the contributions introduced in this chapter of the
dissertation constitute not only deployable, but also operable solutions for avoiding
unintended flows of PII in enterprise environments. Furthermore, the longstanding
character of the infrastructure that has integrated the JAAS Dispatcher and the Ex-
tended Login Handler indicates that the infrastructure is as maintainable as before,
which is not very surprising in light of the fact that only a single line of configura-
tion has to be changed to integrate the modules. In point of fact, the administrators
deployed several individual updates for the identity provider since the deployment
of the JAAS Dispatcher and Extended Login Handler without the need to change
anything of both deployed modules.
3.2 Approaches for Extending Frontend Implementations
In light of the disadvantages regarding the frontend of SAML-based identity providers
(analyzed in Section 2.5.2), we discuss whether or not the SAML standard and its
implementations are able to apply novel authentication methods, which constitute
alternatives compared to common logins based on combinations of user names
and passwords. First, we analyze the login process of the probably most popular
SAML implementation, i.e., Shibboleth. Afterwards, we present the concept and
implementation of a flexible integration of alternative authentication methods into
SAML-based implementations of IAM systems – particularly, Shibboleth.
3.2.1 Analysis of Common Identity Provider Logins
For deploying alternative authentication methods without giving up the SAML speci-
fication, it is necessary to analyze the authentication process currently implemented
by Shibboleth and the guidelines imposed by the SAML standard. Figure 3.7 shows
an UML-like representation of the Shibboleth login process. Basically, the interface
LoginHandler is implemented by the abstract class LoginHandler, which in turn is
extended by the specific LoginHandler, i.e., the UsernamePasswordLoginHandler. The
dedicated LoginHandler invokes a servlet, i.e., in this case the UsernamePasswordLo-
ginServlet, which extends the HttpServlet and invokes the user interface (login.jsp)
that provides the user with an input form – or rather login screen – for obtaining a
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Figure 3.7: UML-like illustration of the login procedure as it is implemented within
the Shibboleth identity provider.
user name and the corresponding password. The user interface is implemented as a
JAVA™ Server Page6. With a user’s name and password the servlet can invoke the JAAS
modules integrated into the identity provider. The JAAS part handles the connection
to configured identity stores, such as shown in Section 3.1. In general, it is obvious
that the Shibboleth part that is in charge of the user authentication is implemented in
a very modular manner – like the other parts of the Shibboleth implementation that
also follows a very modular approach to implement the SAML standard.
In the following sections, we show the conceptual design of the integration of alter-
native authentication mechanisms into the introduced login procedure of Shibboleth.
Again, we aim at introducing a deployable, operable, and maintainable solution.
Therefore, the key requirement constitutes the seamless and modular integration of
the solutions into Shibboleth (minimal invasive integration), as well as the compli-
ance with the SAML standard. Furthermore, the solution itself has to be designed
as modular as possible and service providers should not be affected by the changes
because the processes that pose the risk of unintended data flows are solely operated
by the identity provider. An involvement of service providers, or rather the need to
change those components would lead to an inappropriate effort for integration.
3.2.2 Design and Implementation of the Integration Solution
Shibboleth provides the possibility to change the LoginHandler that is to be used
during authentication processes by changing just a single line of its configuration.
As introduced in the previous section, Shibboleth implements two dedicated classes
that handle the login processes, namely the classes UsernamePasswordLoginHandler
and the UsernamePasswordLoginServlet. Furthermore, the mentioned JAVA™ Server
Page is involved in the authentication process. It suggests the user with an interface
for submitting his/her credentials. Obviously, for a solution that aims at integrating
alternative authentication methods, it is necessary to adapt this user interface because
of the fact that no longer just the opportunity of an input of credentials has to be
6http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/java/javaee/jsp/index.html [Last downloaded 2013-05-28].
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Figure 3.8: Third party authentication via direct back channel communication.
provided by the interface, but also the necessary information for utilizing alternative
authentication methods. However, the user interface is implemented in just a single
file (login.jsp) that is simply interchangeable with another file that undertakes the
task of the communication with the user. Even without restarting the whole identity
provider this file can be changed by the administrator of a Shibboleth identity provider.
Therefore, user interfaces of alternative authentication methods are easily deployable
by just changing the file login.jsp.
On this basis, the question remains whether or not further classes have to be adapted
for providing alternative authentication methods. In fact, it is necessary to adapt
the LoginServlet to support other authentication methods instead or besides the
authentication via user name and password. Therefore, it has to be considered whether
or not customized LoginServlets can be integrated in a similar “minimal invasive”
manner compared to the integration of an adapted user interface. Certainly, this is
true because – as mentioned above – the authentication part is implemented in a
very modular manner and the modules that are to be used by the identity provider
are configured in a single configuration file.
Resulting Architecture of the Integration
So far, we provided an analysis of the common login process implemented by SAML-
based identity providers and presented necessary changes to integrate alternative
authentication methods at all. In the following, we present the architecture that
results from integrating alternative third party authentication methods based on
the technical concepts presented in the previous section. Figure 3.8 and Figure 3.9
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Figure 3.9: Third party authentication via indirect communication.
provide an abstract overview of the resulting architecture and, additionally, in each
of both figures, a process of login that can be implemented depending on the type
of authentication method.
In principle, the basic components, i.e., the service provider and the identity provider,
are still in place and the beginning of the workflow presented in Section 2.3.1 is
unchanged, i.e., the user tries to access a service that is encapsulated by a service
provider (step 1 of Figures 3.8 and 3.9), which forwards the user directly or via a
discovery service to an appropriate identity provider (step 2). However, at this point
in time the user is forwarded to the identity provider, this component switches its role
towards another service provider (step 3) that again hands over to another identity
provider, i.e., the third party identity provider (step 4). If the user can be successfully
authenticated by the third party identity provider the identity provider of the home
organization (i.e., the one that switched its role) receives a positive authentication
statement by the third party identity provider and – based on a trust relationship – it
handles this authentication statement just as the user would have been authenticated
by itself. Again, the rest of the workflow is unchanged, i.e., the user gets redirected by
the identity provider to the service provider where it is to be decided whether or not
to grant access to the actual service (step 9 of Figure 3.8 and step 8 of Figure 3.9.
The integration concept allows two different types of interaction between the third
party identity provider and the user him-/herself. First, the user can be authenticated
by the third party by the use of a back channel communication (see step 7 of Figure 3.8).
In this case, the identity provider of the home organization presents some data to
the user, e.g., a QR code containing, for instance, session identifiers. Then, the user
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can use this data to start a back channel authentication, for instance, via his/her
smartphone (see next section for an example of such a back channel authentication
that is also utilized for the proof-of-concept implementation presented later in this
chapter). If this back channel authentication is successful, the third party can inform
the home organization with a positive authentication statement. The second option
is to enable the user to directly communicate with the third party identity provider,
i.e., a communication integrated into the browser the user uses for accessing the
service (see Figure 3.9). In this case, the third party provider suggests the identity
provider of the home organization with a Pop-up, iframe, or something similar that
can be shown to the user by the home identity provider and be used to, for instance,
type in the authentication credentials.
Integration of Speciﬁc Alternative Authentication Methods
In the following, we go into detail how the Shibboleth authentication modules can be
adapted to provide specific alternative authentication methods. Recently, QR code-
based approaches for user authentications became popular – as shown in Section 2.6.
Those QR code-based mechanisms are mostly externalized back channel authenti-
cations, i.e., an instance that can communicate with the user’s smartphone can tell,
for instance, an identity provider whether or not a user has successfully passed the
login process (cf. Figure 3.8). For instance, in the case of the solution presented
in [BVDN12], a Web Service7 is provided by the implementation of this QR code
authentication. The identity provider obtains the QR code by this web service and,
then, can present this QR code to a user. The user takes a picture of it by utilizing
his/her smartphone that, in turn, runs an application that can communicate with
the instance of the QR code authentication service, i.e., the Web Service, based on a
secured channel. After the presentation of the QR code, the identity provider has to
request the web service periodically to check whether or not a user has been authenti-
cated and which user has been identified. Therefore, this solution is based on a kind
of “black box” approach in which a trust relationship between the identity provider
and the instance of the QR code authentication has to be established. Obviously, such
a black box approach can be integrated without changing much of the already existing
code of a LoginServlet. In fact, just the communication with the web service has to be
integrated. The JAAS part and, therefore, the interaction with several identity stores,
is no more necessary for performing QR code logins implemented in such a way.
However, it is likely that an organization does not want to establish further trust
relationships between its identity provider and third parties, such as third party
providers ofQR code authentications. In the following, we discusswhether it is feasible
to integrate the whole process of the QR code authentication into the identity provider.
7The W3C defines a web service as “a software system designed to support interoperable machine-
to-machine interaction over a network. It has an interface described in a machine-processable format
(specifically WSDL). Other systems interact with theWeb service in a manner prescribed by its descrip-
tion using SOAP messages, typically conveyed using HTTP with an XML serialization in conjunction
with other Web-related standards.” (http://www.w3.org/TR/ws-arch/#whatis [Last downloaded 2013-
05-28]).
54
3 Avoiding Unintended Data Flows in Enterprise Environments
The identity provider runs in the context of an application server, such as Apache
Tomcat8 or Jetty 79. An application server is designed to provide interfaces that can be
accessed by users via a URL [RFC1738] and a port. Therefore, the application server
can be configured to establish communication channels between a smartphone and
the identity provider, which is running on this server. Thus, it is feasible to integrate
this logic into the identity provider itself.
Besides authentication methods based on QR codes, the login via social media
accounts became very popular in recent years. The main advantage of social media
logins constitutes the fact that it also provides Single Sign-on and it is probably more
likely that users are already authenticated at their favorite social media service than,
for instance, at the Shibboleth-based SSO login of the service platform of their home
organization (probably less often used and shorter periods of valid authentications).
Once logged in into a social media site, such as Facebook, a user can use any service
that relies on the Facebook authentication without typing in user name and pass-
word again. Since users are more likely still logged in into Facebook – because of
the extensive use of the social media platforms (see Chapter 4 et seq.) –, such an
authentication might be more secure if a user is located in an insecure environment
just because it is more likely that a user do not has to type in his/her credentials
because he/she is still authenticated.
However, such possibility of authentication might be interesting for providers of
services that do not require to identify a user exactly as the person he/she pretends to
be. For instance, a more relaxed authentication might be feasible for forums where
users can only post some comments or communities that provide chats and other
services. In other words, for IT services that do not require the traceability of actions
of their users and a reliable mapping of accounts to particular persons a less reliable
authentication might be feasible. However, for integrating social media logins, such
as a Facebook login, into a Shibboleth identity provider, we show that also only the
login.jsp and the LoginServlet have to be changed. In particular, in the case of the
integration of a Facebook login, the authentication screen has to show a button that
links to a pop-upwindowprovided by Facebook (cf. Figure 3.9). In turn, this Facebook
pop-up window suggests the user with a login screen for the input of user name and
password if the user is not already logged in. If a user is still logged in the pop-up
window does not show up, or rather disappears immediately because of the already
logged in user and Facebook informs the identity provider about the successful login
and (optionally) releases certain attributes about the user who has been authenticated.
8http://tomcat.apache.org/ [Last downloaded 2013-05-28].
9http://jetty.codehaus.org [Last downloaded 2013-05-28].
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Proof-of-Concept Implementation
For proofing the introduced concepts, we implemented two specific integrations
of alternative authentication methods into Shibboleth. Furthermore, we show that
these solutions can be integrated without changing code or changing large parts of
the configurations. First, we integrated the QR-Code authentication introduced by
Boukayoua et al. [BVDN12]. Second, we integrated a Facebook login mechanism
into a Shibboleth identity provider.
For integrating the authentication via QR codes, we firstly adapted the frontend
implementation of the Shibboleth identity provider, i.e., the login.jsp. In particular, we
added the presentation of the QR code itself to this JavaScript-based file. Furthermore,
we implemented an automated refreshing of the login page of the identity provider.
This is necessary to checkwhether or not a user has been authenticated by the use of his
smartphone, with which he/she took a photo of the presented QR code. By reloading
the login page the identity provider triggers a request to theWeb Service to get a status
response whether or not a user has already successfully passed the authentication.
This request is implemented within the LoginHandler, the part of the identity provider
that is also adapted for implementing the Extended Login Handler. However, when the
Web Service responds with an indication of a successful authentication the adapted
LoginHandler hands over to the authorization part of the identity provider just like
it is implemented for the case that a user has successfully passed an authentication
via configured JAAS modules.
As it can be seen, we just had to customize the login.jsp that can be deployed by just
replacing the originally deployed login.jsp, which can even be done during runtime
of the identity provider. Furthermore, an administrator has to replace the existing
UsernamePasswordLoginHandler with the customized LoginHandler prepared for
QR code authentication via communications with a Web Service. This replacement
can, as already mentioned in the context of the backend improvements, be done
by changing just a single line of configuration of the identity provider. Due to the
fact that the configuration is retained during an update of the identity provider this
solution is not only easily deployable, but also the maintainability of the system is
kept. Its operability is given by the fact that no established processes (instead of the
authentication process itself) have to be changed for the integration of alternative
authentications via QR code-based IAM systems.
For integrating a social media login, in particular, a Facebook-based login, we
just had to adapt the same classes or files compared to the integration of QR code-
based authentications, i.e., the login.jsp and the existing LoginHandler. However, in
contrast to the QR code solution, the Facebook login does not require to implement
Web Service requests within the LoginHandler. Instead, the communication with
Facebook is handled by the JavaScript part of the identity provider, i.e., the login.jsp.
After integrating the Facebook login into this file, a user can click on the Button
labeled “Login with Facebook”. Afterwards, a pop-up window appears and, if the user
is not already logged in into Facebook, the user is suggested with an input form for
providing his/her Facebook credentials. If he/she is already logged in, the pop-up
window closes immediately after appearing. If the authentication was successful, the
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login.jsp hands over to the LoginHandler that is adapted due to receive the user name
of the user who has logged in via his/her Facebook account. The LoginHandler hands
this user name over to the authorization part of the identity provider, which has not
to be changed for integrating this alternative authentication method.
Because of the fact that no other component of an identity provider has to be
changed as for the Extended Login Handler presented in Section 3.1.2, the arguments
regarding the deployability, operability, andmaintainability stated before apply also for
the proof-of-concept integration of QR code-based and Facebook-based logins. Fur-
ther details on the implementation of the concepts introduced in this thesis can
be found in [Wer12].
Limitations and Security Concerns
Besides the advantages of alternative authentication methods, a lot of drawbacks have
to be considered if it has to be decided whether or not to deploy such loginmechanism
into an operative IAM infrastructure. The website of eKaay provides a comparison of
traditional credential-based logins with QR code logins10. In particular, the inventors
of eKaay state that a QR code-based authentication has advantages in light of the risk
of, for instance, shoulder surfing. Furthermore, attacks, such as “dictionary attacks” or
“social engineering”, pose less risks than induced by traditional logins via credentials.
However, the eKaay vendors also identified certain risks posed due to the fact that a
smartphone can be stolen by third parties that would be able to login by the use of
this stolen device if no further security mechanism, such as a PIN code, is required to
login. Moreover, a trojan can be installed on such a device, so that the authentication
can be manipulated to steal, for instance, the users session established by the use
of the QR code authentication. The potential attack that was also discussed at the
KIT and that constitutes the reason for not deploying QR code-based logins into the
productive IAM systems of the KIT is a potential man-in-the-middle attack, i.e., an
attacker could go to the login page, extract the presented QR code, put exactly this QR
code on his/her own page, and get users to try to authenticate via the attacker’s page
by the use of their smartphone QR code application. The authentication via such a
faked page would result in a successful login for the attacker if the user establishes the
backend channel to the Web Service, successfully passes the authentication process,
and, therefore, grants the access for the attacker who has originally been provided
with the particular QR code, which he/she foisted on the user.
A login via credentials that correspond to an organizational account is also often
preferable compared to a social media login. The reason for this constitutes the fact
that anybody can register for an Online Social Network (OSN) and, thus, the pieces
of information about the user, which are forwarded to a service, or rather an identity
provider by theOSN, is “insecure”, i.e., the data could be faked by the user becauseOSN
providers do not check the validity of any attribute provided by the users themselves.
In summary, although alternative authentication methods are deployable into to-
day’s SAML-based IAM systems under the requirements stated in Section 2.4 (see
Section 3.3 for a detailed discussion on how the introduced approaches fulfill the
10http://www.ekaay.com/security [Last downloaded 2013-05-28].
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stated requirements), the deployment of some types of alternative authentication
methods might imply certain drawbacks so that the classical authentication via user
names and passwords might be still preferable today. However, with the approaches
presented in this thesis, providers of SAML-based IAM systems are prepared for
future authentication methods that can now be integrated in an operative infras-
tructure at low effort and cost.
3.3 Evaluation of the Approaches
In this part of the thesis, we firstly introduced the approaches of the JAAS Dispatcher
and the Extended Login Handler. Both concepts aim at avoiding unintended data
flows within the backend of SAML-based identity providers. Furthermore, the JAAS
Dispatcher can be implemented within any identity services that connects identity
stores via JAAS modules. Additionally, we presented approaches to integrate alterna-
tive authentication mechanisms into SAML-based identity providers based on the
concept of the Extended Login Handler that has been introduced in the context of
backend improvements of data flows. However, in general, with these approaches,
we have shown that it is possible to implement improved authentication processes
(1) without changing much of the existing infrastructure, (2) without changing the
identity provider code, (3) without the need of a developer, i.e., an administrator is
able to add the improved modules due to configuration, and (4) without limiting the
maintainability of the systems, i.e., it needs no more effort to be operable compared
to the “native” implementation and updates can be installed despite the integrated
customized and, therefore, non-standard authentication modules. On the basis of the
presented proof-of-concepts, we provide evidence that the SAML standard can deal
with new authentication modules and the systems in which those modules have been
implemented can be deployed in productive environments without reducing themain-
tainability of the whole system. In the following, we check whether or not the list of
requirements stated in Section 2.4 can be fulfilled by the introduced approaches. After-
wards, we argue that the approaches constitute valuable findings for further research.
3.3.1 Fulﬁllment of the Requirements
Table 3.1 shows an overview of the requirements stated in Section 2.4 and an indication
regarding whether or not the individual components fulfill these requirements. We
have shown that the JAAS Dispatcher, as well as the Extended Login Handler are
deployed at the productive infrastructure of the KIT. Furthermore, we argued that
both modules have not hindered the deployment of updates or any other operational
process since the deployment of the components in 2010. Because of the fact that
both introduced integrations of alternative authentication methods are also based on
the concept of the Extended Login Handler, we take their deployability, operability,
and maintainability also for granted.
Referring to the remaining requirements, we can state that every approach follows
the principle of “minimal disclosure” of PII, i.e., the backend improvements avoid
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JAAS Extended QR code Social
Dispatcher Login integration Media
Requirement Handler Module
Deployability YES YES YES YES
Operability YES YES YES YES
Maintainability YES YES YES YES
Minimal disclosure YES YES YES YES
Independence of org. units YES YES –1 –1
No change of processes YES YES YES YES
No replication of passwords YES YES –1 –1
Automated/configurable
identity store determination YES YES –1 –1
Retain JAAS concepts YES NO2 –1 –1
Compliance with SAML YES YES YES YES
Integration of additional
authentication attributes NO3 YES YES YES
1 These requirements are not relevant for the respective approach.
2 If identity stores are directly connected.
3 If deployed without the Extended Login Handler.
Table 3.1: Evaluation of the introduced approaches w.r.t. the principles and require-
ments for the implementation SAML-based IAM components stated in Section 2.4.
potentially unintended flows of PII and, additionally, retain the common concepts
of existing modules for interconnecting identity stores. The frontend extensions
allow to provide alternative authentication methods in order to avoid spying and
logging of users’ credentials and, thus, also less PII will be disclosed by applying these
modules. Furthermore, the backend improvements preserve the independence of
organizational units, i.e., any organizational unit that operates an identity store has
not to hand over responsibilities with respect to identity information to, for instance,
centralized components. Note that these requirements are not relevant in the context
of providing alternative authentication methods. Additionally, all approaches fulfill
the requirement that established processes do not have to be changed for deploying the
introduced modules. Moreover, the JAAS Dispatcher and the Extended Login Handler
do not replicate or require to replicate passwords and determine appropriate identity
stores in an automated and configurable manner. The JAAS Dispatcher also retains
the principle JAAS concepts, i.e., since the JAAS Dispatcher is just an additional JAAS
module neither the identity provider nor the other JAAS modules have to be changed
to integrate the dispatching component. However, this requirement is not fulfilled
by the Extended Login Handler because it can directly connect interfaces of identity
stores and, therefore, would not integrate identity stores in a modular manner. The
requirements regarding the replication of passwords, the automated determination
of identity stores, and the retaining of JAAS concepts are also not relevant in the
context of alternative authentication methods. However, every introduced approach
is compliant with respect to the SAML specification, i.e., the approaches do not
bring concepts into the SAML-based IAM system that are not already included
and defined by the specification. Furthermore, three out of the four approaches
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support alternative or additional attributes to authenticate users. The Extended Login
Handler can include, for instance, the users’ IP addresses. The approaches to integrate
alternative authentication methods are per se able to perform authentications based
on alternatives to the classical combination of user name password. However, only
the JAAS Dispatcher is not able to evaluate further attributes, at least, if it is installed
solely, i.e., without the Extended Login Handler. In combination with this module,
it is possible to hand over additional attributes to a JAAS module for including this
attribute into the authentication decision.
3.3.2 Valuableness of the Findings for Further Research
From a research point of view, the findings presented in this chapter are demonstrably
valuable. In particular, the discussions on the topic itself, as well as the results signifi-
cantly influenced the ongoing research in this field. The universities of the state of
Baden-Wu¨rttemberg started the project bwIDM that aims at providing SAML-based
access to non web-based services. So far, SAML-based infrastructures are almost only
be used for web-based IT services. However, the demand for similar solutions with
respect to non web-based services, such as cloud, grid, and high performance comput-
ing infrastructures has been significantly grown in recent years. The experiences with
Shibboleth and, particularly, the knowledge on how to improve such systems without
violating the guidelines of the respective standards induced the mentioned project
bwIDM in which researcher try to adapt the existing SAML components for the non
web-based use case. Thereby, again the requirements deployability, operability, and
maintainability play a major role and the work presented in this thesis serves as a
fundamental basis to design components that fulfill these requirements.
3.4 Summary and Conclusions
In this chapter, we discussed Identity and Access Management systems in enterprise
environments and possibly existing unintended data flows. We introduced several
improvedmodules that are deployable for IAM systems based on (particularly, but not
only) the SAML implementation Shibboleth. First, we presented the JAAS Dispatcher
that avoids unintended flows of credentials within an organization and provides a
comfortable solution to fulfill the requirement of a single identity provider claimed by
providers of Authentication and Authorization Infrastructures, such as the Deutsches
Forschungsnetz (DFN) for the DFNAAI. Furthermore, this module reduces overhead
during authentication processes and, therefore, ensures less delay from the perspective
of users who have to be authenticated. Second, we presented the Extended Login
Handler that constitutes a SAML standard-compliant and also deployable module
to interconnect identity providers with proprietary interfaces of identity stores and
to implement more sophisticated authentication processes than just checking a user
name and password combination, e.g., considering users’ current location in terms
of their IP address. Third, we introduced a methodology to implement alternative
authentication methods so that users do not have to type in their credentials while
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located in an “insecure” environment where others can spy on the display and/or
keyboard that is used. Finally, we gave an overview on how we implemented two of
the three modules into the productive systems of the KIT and how frequently they
are used by the employees, students, guests, and partners of the KIT.
In general, we have shown that it is possible to improve the flows of data within
on-demand provisioning systems without violating the specifications of the corre-
sponding and accepted standards. We showed that (1) improvements are possible and
sometimes easy to reach, and (2) that corresponding implementations are deployable
with respect to the effort that has to be expended to integrate the modules into the
productive (legacy) systems. We have shown that the solutions are also operable
and maintainable with respect to the effort that have to be expended to keep the
modules up and running and to maintain the interaction of the new modules and
the existing infrastructure components.
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In the previous chapters, we analyzed specific and widely deployed enterprise IAM
systems due to identify and avoid unintended flows of personally identifiable informa-
tion (PII). However, users commonly consume a lot more services in their everyday
life than those provided by their (or any collaborating) organization. These services
are not intended to, for instance, ease the work of an employee, but rather are utilized
to keep in touch with other people, to express oneself, and to share and consume
content that might be of interest for others, e.g., messages, posts, comments, photos,
videos and more. We refer to the entirety of identity-related IT services that are
provided via the Internet for supporting the satisfaction of social needs as Social
Media. In this context, Social Media services that primarily provide a platform for
creating so-called user profiles for sharing information constitute a specific type of
Social Media services and are referred to as Online Social Networks (OSNs).
With the advent of Social Media and, in particular, OSNs, users got the opportunity
to easily communicate and share content with a large amount of others. Thereby, the
benefits for users accompanywith certain potential risks regarding privacy. In this part
of the dissertation, we focus on OSNs and potentially existing unintended flows of PII
caused by the combination of shared information via OSN user profiles and (possibly)
inadequately adjusted privacy settings, i.e., measures to define the “audience” of shared
information. In particular, we investigate howmuch of today’s shared information can
be accessed by the public, or rather by any logged in member of an OSN. Furthermore,
we analyze how all these members and, therefore, also attacking third parties can
potentially link information shared by a single user via different OSNs. Additionally,
we study correlations of information shared by users and their OSN friends. OSN
friends are users who are linked to another user as a representation of a whatever kind
of relationship, e.g., friendships, professional relationships, such as colleagues, online
acquaintances, etc.. Based on the study on the correlation of PII, we quantify the risk
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that third parties can infer users’ non-provided information based on the information
shared by their friends. Finally, we introduce concepts for avoiding unintended flows of
PII with respect to information shared via OSNs and third parties that can potentially
get access to this information, or even can infer PII.
In this chapter, we provide an introduction to OSNs and refinements of the research
questions stated in chapter 1. Furthermore, we present and discuss related work as a
basis for the results presented in the following chapters. This chapter is structured
as follows. First, we introduce OSNs in general and define corresponding terms.
Afterwards, we introduce the term privacy and demonstrate how members can adjust
their privacy settings within OSNs, i.e., users’ capability to decide who can access
which type and piece of shared information. Afterwards, we present the mentioned
refinements of the research questions and a selection of related work with respect to
the research findings presented in the following chapters. Parts of the contributions
presented in this and the following two chapters have been previously published
in [LDH11], [LTH11], [LH11], [Lab12], [TLH12], and [LWMH13].
4.1 Terms and Deﬁnitions
Before we present the specific research questions and related work, we introduceOSNs
in general, as well as essential terms and definitions. In the following, we introduce and
discuss definitions of OSNs. Subsequently, we present fundamental terms regarding
OSNs. Since we are discussing and investigating the interaction of users with the IT
system “OSN”, finally, we show how users setup “their part” of an OSN.
The authors of [BE07] define OSNs as follows: “We define social network sites as
web-based services that allow individuals to (1) construct a public or semi-public profile
within a bounded system, (2) articulate a list of other users with whom they share
a connection, and (3) view and traverse their list of connections and those made by
others within the system”. The Oxford Dictionary defines OSNs as “(1) a network of
social interactions and personal relationships” and “(2) a dedicated website or other
application that enables users to communicate with each other by posting information,
comments, messages, images, etc..”1. Thereby, the first definition tries to reflect the
users’ perspective and the latter focuses on the social graph2 that is constructed by
an OSN. However, both of these definitions have in common that they address a
direct connection to the Internet (particularly, the Web) and that OSNs are primarily
provided to share information.
However, before a user can share information, he/she has to register for the OSN
that is about to be used. With this registration process users set up a so-called OSN
profile. These OSN profiles constitute key elements of an OSN and are also referred to
as profile pages or user profiles. A profile page can be used to share information (e.g.,
PII) for any other member of the network or for a dedicated audience. Profile pages
1http://oxforddictionaries.com [Last downloaded 2013-05-28].
2The graph that results due to OSN friendships is called the social graph. The users are represented
by the nodes of the social graph and the edges represent the friendship relations. See [MMG+07] for a
detailed analysis of the structure of social graphs.
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are provided for sharing content elements, such as posts, comments, photos, videos,
etc.. These pieces of information can not only be shared via a user’s own profile page,
but also via profile pages of others. Additionally, other users’ profile pages can be
linked to a user profile in order to indicate a so-called OSN friendship. Therefore,
user profiles contain a list of other profiles. Whereas these lists of friends (also known
as friends lists) are often accessible by default for any logged in member, in most OSNs
users are provided with privacy settings with which the group of users who can see
the friends list can be restricted. Such restrictions can also be adjusted by users with
respect to the accessibility of content they share via their profile pages. An additional
feature provided by OSNs is the opportunity to discuss the content that is shared
by others and themselves. OSN users can comment on it or, for instance, can link
users, or rather profile pages, within shared photos and other content. In general, in
many OSNs – particularly in the most popular OSN Facebook – a user profile consists
of, at least, an information page, a favorites page, a friends list, a wall, a news feed,
a messaging area, and sometimes a chat. In the following, we introduce these and
further essential terms, or rather features provided by OSNs, in detail:
– User profile: a user profile represents a user within the OSN community, i.e.,
the profile consists of information that a user has shared. Furthermore, others,
such as OSN friends, can generate content in the context of a user’s profile in
terms of posts, comments, photos, etc.
– Information page: the information page is part of a user profile and can be
used to publish certain information about oneself, mostly in terms of PII that
discloses, for instance, where the user lives, his/her date of birth, or other
(possibly sensitive) information. Hence, on this page, users disclose PII that
often characterizes themselves in a more or less detailed manner.
– Friends list: a list of so-called friends (OSN friends) constitutes an essential
part of every OSN user profile. This list contains any other OSN member that
stands in a certain relation to the owner of the user profile, i.e., members who
are friends with the profile owner in real life, his/her family members, or just
other users he/she met via the Internet, or even via the OSN itself. We refer to
the profiles of a user’s OSN friends as friend profiles.
– Wall: the wall is a feature that is part of a user profile. Users, as well as their OSN
friends, or – depending on the users’ privacy settings – even any member of
the network can post comments, photos, videos, etc. on their wall. Information
that is shared via the users’ wall appears also on the news feed (see next item).
In Facebook, the wall is referred to as the timeline because of its chronological
order of shared content.
– News feed: the news feed aggregates information posted on users’ profiles
and, in particular, via their walls. Some OSNs weight any shared information
according to an often mostly unknown algorithm to predict its importance. For
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instance, Facebook makes use of the so-called Edgerank Algorithm3 that filters
content to show, for instance, information that initiated a lot of reaction by
other users on a higher position within a news feed than content that is more
or less unnoticed by others. Furthermore, OSNs offer companies an option to
pay for a more popular news feed position of their shared content. Cf. [DA12]
for an interview-based study on “what factors determine the attractiveness of
content shared via” OSNs that (potentially) appears on a user’s news feed.
– Likes (Google+4 analogue: 1+): Likes are provided to react on content shared
by another user without commenting on it on a textual basis. If a user is, for
instance, pleased by a user’s shared photo, appreciates a statement, or enjoyed
watching a shared video he/she can like the shared content to show others
his/her positive opinion on it.
– Like-Button (German analogue: ”Gefa¨llt mir“-Button): the Like-Button isthe feature that enables users to like shared content as introduced before. For
instance, Facebook integrated this button underneath any content sharedwithin
theOSN and, additionally, shows the number of users, as well as a list containing
those users’ profile names, who liked the content already.
– Apps: the most popular OSNs, such as Facebook, provide the opportunity for
third parties – e.g., companies – to implement their own applications based
on the OSN, i.e., a third party application (App) can be integrated into the
OSN and information shared by users can be forwarded to the App provider
from this point in time a user installs/uses an App for the first time. In turn,
via Apps third parties can not only provide additional OSN features, but also
can, for instance, get access to shared content or even users’ walls in order to
advertise their products. Apps are the features further addressed in Chapter 6.
See [NRG+09] for a detailed investigation of the network level interaction of
Facebook and integrated Apps, as well as corresponding flows of information.
– Editorial content: another type of content implemented by some OSNs is
constituted by a feature that, for instance, Facebook calls pages, i.e., more or less
commercial representations of companies, associations, clubs, or even famous
persons, such as musicians, actors, and moderators. In the case of Facebook,
those pages can be liked by users, which induces that information shared via
these pages appears on their news feed.
– Favorites page: a favorites page shows the pages, i.e., editorial content, a user
liked. In some OSNs, the favorites page is implemented as just a part of the
main profile page. Other OSNs structure this part of a profile within a separated
page that is linked by the main profile page (e.g., Facebook).
3Cf. http://blog.getpostrocket.com/2013/04/infographic-facebook-edgerank-102-understanding-
how-news-feed-stories-are-filtered/ [Last downloaded 2013-05-28].
4https://plus.google.com/ [Last downloaded 2013-05-28].
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– Messaging area: the messaging area constitutes kind of an e-mail service that
can be utilized to write a message to one or more other users. It differs from a
classical e-mail service in terms of the fact that only members of the network
can be reached. However, Facebook offers also the possibility to send a message
to a user’s Facebook e-mail service, i.e., they provide users with a classical e-mail
address in the form of their user name and the suffix “@facebook.com”.
– Chat: the chat provides users with an instant messaging service similar to other
chats provided via the Internet. In the chatting environment, a user can see
who of his/her OSN friends is currently also logged in to the OSN.
4.2 Flows of PII in Online Social Networks (OSNs)
Today, OSNs provide everyone an opportunity to “implement” a virtual self-projection
without any knowledge with respect to developing, hosting, and operating websites.
Layouts of profiles and their appearance are usually standardized to the greatest
possible extent. From the users’ perspective, publishing information about themselves
satisfies an individually distinctive urge for self-representation and OSNs provide an
easy-to-use opportunity to share data, particularly PII. However, resulting potentially
unintended flows of PII lead to privacy risks for the users.
OSNs are platforms mostly provided by a single company in a centralized manner5.
In this context, other researchers focus on the avoidance of flows of PII to an OSN
provider (cf. [BH11]). However, this dissertation primarily focuses on flows of PII to
attacking third parties in order to provide an adequate quantification of the privacy
risks regarding PII that can unintentionally flow to third parties and in order to
provide measures to avoid these data flows. Whereas the investigation of flows of
PII to OSN providers constitutes very important research, these data flows are more
obvious for the users of an OSN, i.e., most users might be aware of the fact that their
shared information is also accessible by the provider of the OSN. However, flows of
PII to third parties might be more often underestimated by the users because of the
fact that they are just simply not aware of the existence of these potential data flows.
The reason for this is that users cannot determine who has accessed their shared PII.
Instead, it is only possible to determine who could potentially access the information,
which makes it hard to consider any potentially accessing third party.
These privacy risks are further increased by the fact that any third party, even a
“casual attacker”, e.g., a (potential) boss, an insurance agent, a headhunter, etc., can reg-
ister for a user profile in order to get access to publicly shared information. Moreover,
in most cases, the OSN provider does not check whether the user is “real” or whether a
user registered a profile with faked information. Also the registration of profiles to get
access to information by a software occurs, i.e., crawlers and scrapers (see Section 5.1
5Decentralized, or rather user-centric OSNs are also existent (e.g., Diaspora,
http://diasporaproject.org/ [Last downloaded 2013-05-28]). However, the number of users is
significantly lower than those registered in commercial OSNs provided by a single company.
Furthermore, some decentralized OSNs are even in a preliminary stadium of development.
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for more details on crawlers and measures OSNs take to avoid automated access to
information shared by their users). However, the fact that potentially any third party
can register a profile and, therefore, can get access to users’ PII and other information
shared with any member of the network indicates that those pieces of PII are almost
public information. Moreover, the standardized layouts of today’s OSNs make it even
more easy to gather publicly shared information in an automatedmanner and the often
not sufficiently effective measures OSN providers take to avoid automated extraction
of users’ data by third parties form the basis for unintended flows of PII. Hence, the
following question is the basis of the investigations presented in this part of the thesis:
How extensive can shared PII be accessed in an unintended fashion and possibly be
(ab-)used by third parties so that it constitutes a privacy risk for OSN users?
4.3 Privacy and Privacy Protection
In the following, we address the term privacy and discuss implications of potentially
existing unintended flows of PII. Furthermore, we introduce and discuss current
settings OSN users can adjust to define who can access which type and piece of
information shared via OSNs, i.e., features that are called privacy settings.
The Oxford Dictionary defines privacy as “the state or condition of being free from
being observed or disturbed by other people”6. Therefore, particularly in the context of
OSNs, privacy designates a user’s right that his/her information (in particular, PII) is
kept in secret by users, as well as third parties that are provided with the information.
Furthermore, privacy means that information is only accessible by a comprehensible
group of users/third parties and that confidential information is not forwarded by
third parties without the user’s consent. If users are not able to determine who can
potentially get access to their PII, privacy is threatened.
In the early 90’s, privacy threats were still merely a problem with respect to the
potential leakage of credit card and social security numbers, as well as address in-
formation and telephone numbers that were of interest to, for instance, send spam
or call a person (cf. [Rot92]). However, with the advent of OSNs third parties rec-
ognized the monetary potential of PII shared by OSN users and new markets have
been developed, primarily in the area of advertisement. Furthermore, other third
parties, such as insurance companies, potential employers, or even ex-partners might
be interested in users’ PII. Therefore, any user’s privacy might be threatened today
if he/she shares PII or other information, for instance, via OSNs and cannot fully
understand who can actually access the data. Hence, an adequate awareness of these
risks has to be established if it is not already existent.
In the context of privacy, the ISO/IEC IS 24760-1 defines privacy-related terms.
We shortly introduce these terms in the following. The right of any user to deter-
mine whether or not information is allowed to be forwarded to a third party, for
instance, by an OSN provider, is referred to as “selective disclosure” and defined
as the “principle of identity management (...) that gives a person a measure of con-
6http://oxforddictionaries.com [Last downloaded 2013-05-28].
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trol over the identity information (...) that may be transferred to a third party, e.g.,
during authentication” [ISO24760]. In this context, the term “minimal disclosure”
subsumes the principle that only a minimum of PII is released to a requesting third
party, i.e., only those pieces of information that are “strictly required for a particular
purpose” [ISO24760]. Additionally, the standard introduces the terms “pseudonym”
and “anonymity”. A pseudonym contains sufficient identity information to bring a cer-
tain entity into the position to link this information to a “known identity”. In contrast,
anonymity requires that a link to a known identity cannot be established by any entity.
However, this does not prevent that the anonymous identities are distinguishable
from each other (derived from [ISO24760]). These two terms are important in the
context of the empirical studies presented in the following chapter. In particular, an
automated investigation of user profiles – such as it is performed for the empirical
investigations of this dissertation – requires to permanently store only anonymous
information that does not bring someone into the position of being able to determine
the “real” identity that corresponds to the statistical data. In the context of storing
data in an anonymous manner further terms have been established that describe
specific degrees of anonymity, e.g., k-anonymity [Swe02], l-diversity [MKGV06], and
t-closeness [LL07]. However, these terms are not significantly relevant for and used in
light of the research findings presented in the remainder of this thesis (see [FWCY10]
for a detailed introduction to these specific degrees of privacy). In the following, we ad-
dress the term privacy awareness and show how today’s OSN users can actually adjust
their privacy by the configuration of so-called privacy settings provided by the OSN.
4.3.1 Privacy Awareness
In this dissertation, we refer to privacy awareness as the term that describes the state
of education users reached with respect to the awareness that privacy constitutes an
important influential factor when it is to be decided whether or not to share a piece
of content. Furthermore, a fully privacy aware user knows about any potential flow of
shared information to third parties and behaves according to the potential risks, i.e.,
he/she adjusts privacy settings adequately according his/her privacy demands.
4.3.2 Privacy Settings
Privacy settings designate features provided by OSNs in order to enable users to
manage the audience of shared information, i.e., choosing who can get access to
which type and piece of shared information. At this point in time a user registers a
profile within an OSN, the privacy settings are adjusted to the default configuration.
Depending on the OSN, this default privacy settings can vary from a very restrictive
configuration with which shared information is only accessible by a user’s OSN friends
– or even only by the user him-/herself – to a very barely restrictive configuration with
which any user of the OSN – or even any Internet user – can access the information a
user shares. However, we can observe that privacy settings of the largest OSNs are not
very restrictive by default, i.e., if users do not adjust the privacy settings according
their privacy demands a lot of shared information can be accessed by a broad audience.
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Default Privacy Settings Can third party Apps
used by OSN friends
Attribute Accessibility potentially get access to
Attribute Default Configuration the attribute by default?1
friends list public2 YES
e-mail address friends NO
mobile phone number friends NO
other phone numbers friends NO
instant messaging friends NO
address friends NO
religious views friends and friends of friends NO
political views friends and friends of friends NO
date of birth friends and friends of friends YES
interested in/sexual orientation public2 NO
gender public2 –3
languages public2 –3
work/employer/company public2 YES
college public2 YES
high school public2 YES
relationship status public2 YES
family members public2 YES
current city public2 YES
hometown public2 YES
website public2 YES
likes public2 YES
posts/status updates4 public2 YES
posts by others5 friends –3
view posts by others6 friends and friends of friends –3
view posts with tag7 friends and friends of friends –3
photos/photo albums public2 YES
videos public2 YES
online status friends YES
search-ability8 everyone –
1 “People on Facebook who can see your info can bring it with themwhen they use apps. Thismakes their experience
better and more social. (...) control the categories of information that people can bring with them when they use
apps, games and websites.” [facebook.com]
2 At least, accessible for any logged in Facebook member.
3 Probably not.
4 “Who can see future posts?” [facebook.com]
5 “Who can add things to my timeline? Who can post on your timeline?” [facebook.com]
6 “Who can see what others post on your timeline?” [facebook.com]
7 “Who can see posts you’ve been tagged in on your timeline?” [facebook.com]
8 “Who can look you up using the e-mail address or phone number you provided?” [facebook.com]
Table 4.1: Facebook default privacy settings (Status: 2013-04-16).
In particular, even sensitive PII is often not protected if users do not change the default
privacy settings. To give an example, we review the current default privacy settings of
Facebook7. Table 4.1 shows which pieces of information will be available to which
group of others if the information is provided by a user and if the default privacy
7See http://mattmckeon.com/facebook-privacy/ for an overview of the “evolution” of Facebook’s
default privacy settings [Last downloaded 2013-05-28].
70
4 Online Social Networks
settings remain untouched by the user. It can be seen that some sensitive pieces of PII
can only be accessed by a user’s OSN friends, such as the e-mail or physical address, as
well as a user’s telephone numbers and further contact information. However, users
religious and political views, as well as their date of birth are accessible by their OSN
friends and the OSN friends of their friends if the default privacy settings have been
retained unchanged (with an average number of about 200 OSN friends in Facebook,
this configuration implies an average audience of up to 40,200 Facebook members,
depending on the overlap of the friends lists). Moreover, a lot of other pieces of PII are
publicly accessible by default, such as the users’ sexual orientation, relationship status,
and their current city to name just a few. Furthermore, posts and comments a user
and other users write on his/her timeline are publicly available by default. Not least,
the fact that users can be found within the OSN by any other member constitutes also
a default configuration of the Facebook privacy settings. In addition to the availability
of users’ PII to a possibly broad audience, also third parties can get access to PII shared
by an OSN user. In particular, not only third parties that provide additional services
(Apps) used by the users themselves can get access to their PII, but also third party
providers of Apps used by the users’ OSN friends. The last columnof Table 4.1 indicates
which pieces of a user’s PII can be accessed by third party providers of Apps used
by his/her OSN friends if the user retains the default privacy settings (in Chapter 6,
we pick up the problem regarding information flows from users via their friends to
providers of Apps). However, not only Facebook provides non-restrictive default
privacy settings. OSNs like Google+ or Xing provide very similar default settings,
e.g., Google+ provides public access by default for information on, for instance, the
users’ jobs, education, and current city and Xing makes cv information of their users
available for a large group of members. Furthermore, the participation in some OSNs,
such as Google+ and StudiVZ, requires to give consent that the OSN provider is
allowed to use (some of) the users’ PII for purposes with respect to marketing and
advertising. Whereas other privacy settings are adjustable according users’ demands,
the consent regarding advertising and marketing often is a must for participation.
In summary, privacy settings suggest users with the capability to intervene in poten-
tial flows of information. Some OSNs even provide very fine-grained measures to
restrict the audience of shared information. However, the partially barely restrictive
default privacy settings pre-configured by the OSNs accompanied with users’ current
motivation to adjust those settings might explain the mass of information still shared
publicly (cf. Section 5.2). In this context, Thaler and Sunstein discuss peoples’ attitude
to adhere to default settings [TS08]. The authors refer to [SZ88], in which the “status
quo bias of decision making” is investigated, and provide the following example: most
people retain the default settings of their mobile phone, i.e., the background picture,
the ring tone, the volume and frequency of the ring tone, etc., because of a certain
power of sluggishness induced by several reasons. Probably, this “status quo bias” can
also be transferred to the adjustments of default privacy settings within OSNs and,
therefore, users are lazy in adjusting these settings appropriately.
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4.4 Speciﬁc Research Questions
The authors of [ACF12] state that an essential contribution for developing new kinds
of privacy enhancing technologies is the concept and measure of risk. Therefore,
risk quantification constitutes the basis on top of which potentially effective privacy
tools can be designed. Hence, we analyze publicly shared PII, demonstrate how many
pieces of PII can actually be accessed by third parties (on average), and quantify
corresponding privacy risks. Furthermore, as another essential part of this disserta-
tion, we discuss whether or not and how it would be possible to bring users into the
position to understand potential flows of PII as a basis for adjusting privacy settings
in an adequate manner. Finally, we present a Facebook App that demonstrate users
their current situation regarding possibly unintended flows of PII. Initially, in the
current section, we start by further motivating the research on privacy risks induced
by publicly available PII in OSNs. Afterwards, we state the specific research questions
this part of the dissertation focuses on. As already mentioned, these specific research
questions are refinements of the research questions stated in Chapter 1.
On the one hand, in Section 1, we argued that users share a lot of PII via their OSN
profiles with an often broad audience8. However, on the other hand, in recent time,
privacy in OSNs has attracted a remarkable attention of the media, which is probably
one of the most influencing factors of the increase of users’ privacy awareness. To
give examples, “the daily press reported that several companies are crawling OSNs,
such as Facebook, to learn more about the private life of users in general, or of their
customers and job applicants, in particular. Some of these reports state that even
insurance companies try to gather accessible data of OSNs for risk assessments with re-
spect to specific customers or to acquire new customers9” [LWMH13]. The increased
privacy awareness is also confirmed by a German survey among teenagers that are
between twelve and 19 years old. This study is carried out on a yearly basis. In the
2012 survey, already 87% of the respondents stated that they make use of privacy
settings [JIM2012]. In the year 2010, only two thirds of the interviewed teenagers
stated that parts of their profiles and published information is only accessible for
users on their friends list [JIM2010]. In 2009, only 47% of the respondents stated
that they make use of privacy settings [JIM2009]. Krishnamurthy et al. showed
that only a quarter of Facebook users made use of privacy settings in 2008 [KW08].
Compared to the situation in 2005, when only about 1.2 % of OSN users restricted the
search-ability of their profiles and only 0.06% restricted the profile’s visibility [GA05],
it becomes obvious that privacy awareness has been increased since then. A further
demonstration of the change of user’s behavior in adjusting privacy settings is pre-
sented by the authors of [DJR12]. In 2010, they crawled a large sample of Facebook
users living in New York City and again analyzed the same sample of users 15 months
later. The results show that, for instance, 17.2 % of users out of the first sample did
not provide public access to their friends list, whereas in 2011 already about 50%
8In Section 5.2 we quantify today’s amount of PII publicly available in OSNs.
9E.g., http://socialbarrel.com/insurance-companies-watching-you-on-facebook/ [last downloaded
2013-05-28].
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of users configured the privacy settings so that their OSN friends or even no other
users can see the friends list (see Section 4.5.1 and, in particular, Table 4.2 for more
details on this and other studies). However, in light of the grown privacy awareness,
the question arise whether or not third parties are still able to gain information by
analyzing the public part of users’ OSN profiles.
Obviously, the adjustment of some privacy settings does not imply a consistently
adequate usage of these settings in any case. An indication of a still existing large
amount of PII that is publicly available is provided by the authors of [LGKM11]. They
demonstrated that de facto adjusted privacy settings are not congruent compared to
users’ expectations concerning privacy. In particular, the authors found a match of
users’ expectations and the actual behavior regarding the configuration of privacy
settings in only 37% of the analyzed cases. Additionally, we show that a significantly
large number of OSN members do not hide all of their shared information from
strangers, e.g., in 2011, more than 78% and, in 2012, still almost 62% of Facebook
members publicly shared, at least, one piece of PII that would be actually concealable.
Moreover, although Facebook acquired a remarkable market share in recent time,
many users are (still) member of one or more other OSNs despite the fact that they
might not actively participate in these OSNs. In turn, multiple OSN memberships in-
crease the number of communities in which PII is potentially (still) publicly provided
and could be accessed by third parties. Even worse, publicly shared PII can easily be
gathered in an automated manner because of the standardized layouts of OSN user
profiles (cf. [CPWF07]), i.e., third parties can easily develop software that is able to
parse a large amount of OSN profiles in a short period of time. Hence, accessible
PII might still pose remarkable privacy risks for users.
Therefore, in this part of the dissertation, we quantify privacy risks and discuss
measures to enforce privacy aware acting in OSNs. Thereby, we address the question
whether or not still sufficient PII is publicly shared so that users’ privacy might
be threatened by attacking third parties. We investigate this question from four
different perspectives, or rather in light of four fields of specific research questions,
introduced in the following.
4.4.1 Attribute Availability
The first part of the investigations in the area of OSNs focuses on the amount of PII
that is shared via OSN profiles and that is, additionally, made publicly accessible.
Therefore, we investigate whether or not OSN members are (still) unduly generous in
adjusting privacy settings and in sharing PII that can be accessed by any member of
the network, regardless whether or not an OSN friendship exists. Hence, we address
the following research question:
– Which pieces of PII are publicly accessible in how many user profiles of an OSN?
In this context, we provide extensive statistical data gathered by multiple individual
samplings. The corresponding findings provide evidence that still a lot of PII can
be accessed by the public, i.e., any third party who is able to register an account
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Figure 4.1: Illustration of the linkability of two profiles registered in different OSNs
by a single user and the potential gain in information for attacking third parties.
at the respective OSN. Furthermore, we show that some pieces of PII are publicly
provided by many users and some are rarely provided publicly. Moreover, we show
that the results differ from one OSN to another, so that the diversity of specific pieces
of PII that are accessible in many user profiles varies. The findings are presented in
Section 5.2 and the results constitute the statistical basis for the research questions
focused in the two following parts of OSN research.
4.4.2 Linkability
Asmentioned, the specific pieces of PII that are publicly provided inmany user profiles
of an OSN are not congruent to the most frequently provided pieces of PII of another
OSN.Therefore, we can observe a remarkable diversity of specific pieces of PII that are
often publicly shared. Based on this finding, we investigate whether or not third parties
can aggregate the different pieces of PII publicly provided by a single user in different
OSNs. In particular, we delve how third parties can assemble a comprehensive digital
image of an OSN member, despite the fact that he/she potentially has hidden, or not
even shared, some pieces of PII in one OSN, but made it publicly available in another
OSN. Thus, the focus is set on the possibilities to link PII published via several OSNs.
We refer to this potential threat as the “linkability” of a user’s OSN profiles10.
Figure 4.1 illustrates the linkability of two exemplary profiles out of different OSNs
registered by a single user x. In this figure, we illustrate third parties that can potentially
aggregate publicly available PII of both of an exemplary user’s profiles and are able to
build a more comprehensive digital image of the user than possible by just analyzing
one of his/her OSN profiles. If this constitutes a possible threat even if third parties do
not have to utilize large resources in terms of high computational power or have to ex-
ploit sufficient linking algorithms (cf. the introduction of the assumed attacker model
in Section 5.1.2), linkability poses a remarkable risk for users who registered profiles
in several OSNs and publicly provide different pieces of PII depending on the OSN.
10Besides linking information, third parties could exploit the knowledge about whether or not a
user has several OSN profiles, for instance, to clone his/her identity [BSBK09].
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We are fully aware of the fact that linking of OSN profiles can not only pose a
risk, but also can be utilized to support users, i.e., “linking of profiles could also be
used to reveal and demonstrate users their virtual appearance across social networks.
Bold and simple revealing of their linkability to users might help to motivate a more
careful and adequate adjustment of privacy settings” [LDH11] (cf. the discussions in
Chapter 6). Moreover, linking shared PII can be intended by users, e.g., “if users linked
their profiles on their own by use of services such as https://about.me/, the linkability
is implicitly given and intended by users” [LTH11]. However, an investigation of the
linkability quantifies the risk that different pieces of PII publicly shared by a single user
via different OSNs can be gathered and correlated. For those cases users’ profiles are
not per se linked by themselves, we investigate the risk with respect to the linkability
of users’ several OSN profiles in light of the following research questions. The results
of this particular investigation are presented in Section 5.3.
– Based on the observation that friends lists are often made public by OSNmembers,
we ask whether or not this or other publicly shared information is sufficient to
successfully link OSN user profiles. In other words, can third parties aggregate
information that has been shared via different OSNs by a single user?
– Is it possible to link profiles at low costs, i.e., can profiles be linked by third parties
without investing high computational effort or complex linking algorithms?
4.4.3 Attribute Prediction
In the following chapter, another potential privacy threat is investigated, i.e., the
risk that third parties can infer PII that a user has not even publicly provided via
his/her OSN profiles. In particular, if a user provides a public friends list (in fact,
more than 52% of Facebook users publicly share their list of friends11), we ask whether
or not third parties can infer the user’s non-provided PII based on the PII publicly
provided by his/her friends.
Figure 4.2 illustrates a very restrictive user with respect to publicly shared PII.
However, this exemplary user publicly provides his/her friends list and, in turn, his/her
OSN friends publicly provide some pieces of their PII. In such a situation, an attacking
third party could analyze the user’s friends list and the PII provided by theOSN friends
in order to predict pieces of PII of the owner of the friends list. We refer to the threat
regarding third parties that can infer users’ non-provided PII as attribute prediction.
However, attribute prediction only poses a privacy risk if the PII provided by users’
OSN friends strongly correlate with the users’ PII. In order to quantify the risk regard-
ing attribute prediction, we investigate the degree of correlation between PII shared
by OSN users and their friends. In general, a “phenomenon called homophily is the
basic reason for the fact that attribute values of OSN friends correlate. Homophily
11Besides the fact that more than a half of the members of the most popular OSNs provide public
access to their friends list, according to [JKJ13], a non-provided friends list can even be reconstructed
by, for instance, exploiting the posts on a user’s wall saying that the user is now friends with a certain
other user.
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Figure 4.2: Illustration of the privacy threat that PII can potentially be inferred by
attacking third parties.
means that people who are similar in interests and personal attributes more likely
become friends than those with different characteristics [MSLC01]. Recent studies
have shown that it is possible to predict, for instance, the gender (2008: [XZL08],
2009: [JM09]). Lewis et al. found correlations of provided favored books, movies,
and music [LGK11]. Some others introduced algorithms that can be (ab-)used to infer
PII (e.g., [GA11]). However, recent studies have also shown that the user awareness
regarding privacy significantly increased within the past years and users are more
restrictive in adjusting privacy settings (...). Hence, the risk regarding privacy leakage
might be decreased and it is unclear whether third parties are still able to predict the
value of any type of attribute in an OSN” [LWMH13]. Therefore, we quantify the
accuracies of predictions that can be reached by attacking third parties with respect
to individual pieces of PII. For this investigation, we assume again an attacker that
do not utilize high computational power or sophisticated algorithms to attack users’
privacy. On the contrary, we assume a more or less casual attacker who just takes
a peak on a user’s OSN friends, or rather their shared PII to predict, for instance,
where the user lives, his/her age, or other attributes.
In light of investigating the risk regarding attribute prediction and the mentioned
attacker model, we define the following specific research questions that are addressed
by the investigations presented in Section 5.4 of the next chapter:
– Which kind of PII can be inferred by third parties in the case the user has not
provided the respective information?
– Is it possible to infer users’ PII at low costs, i.e., can third parties predict attributes
without investing high computational effort or complex prediction algorithms?
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4.4.4 User Support for Avoiding Unintended Data Flows
The three previously addressed areas of research mainly focus on the quantification of
privacy risks regarding OSNs. In the following, the forth part of addressed research
questions in the field of OSNs is introduced.
In the following chapter, we show that privacy is at risk, in particular, if OSN users
publicly provide their list of friends. In particular, we show that (1) a lot of PII is still
publicly shared despite a demonstrably increased privacy awareness, (2) several OSN
profiles of a single user are linkable at low cost, and (3) attribute prediction poses a
risk if third parties analyze pieces of PII shared by a user’s OSN friends. In light of
these findings, we ask whether or not and how it would be possible to bring OSN
users into the position of being able to identify unintended flows of PII in terms of
determining any third party that can potentially get access to individual pieces of PII.
In particular, we introduce concepts to design a novel type of technical measures to
establish adequate mental models of the actual (potential) flows of PII and to support
users in performing their individual identity management, i.e., the management of
their PII in the context of OSNs. For proofing the concept of such a novel measure of
user support, we also introduce an implemented Facebook App that is based on this
concept (see Chapter 6). The underlying research questions are stated in the following:
– How can users be supported in identifying possibly unintended flows of PII and
in adjusting privacy settings in a more adequate manner than today?
– Would it be feasible to exploit a user’s linkability and his/her actual risk regarding
attribute predictions to show his/her current situation regarding privacy?
4.5 Related Work
In the following, we present and discuss related work with respect to the presented
four areas of OSN research this thesis focuses on. We start by introducing work
that is generally related to the studies presented in this dissertation. Subsequently,
we individually present specific related work regarding each of the four mentioned
areas of research questions.
The authors of [KHG+08] discuss that many users do not care about privacy, even
if OSNs provide privacy settings that can be adjusted and despite the fact that the
privacy awareness has demonstrably been increased during recent years. Probably,
users are reluctant regarding privacy aware behavior concerning OSNs because of the
urge for “satisfaction of the needs for belongingness and the esteem needs through
self-presentation, together with peer pressure” [KHG+08]. In this context, it is com-
mon that OSN users often state the “I’ve got nothing to hide”-argument. However,
Daniel J. Solove impressively discuss the weakness of this and related phrases [Sol07].
We argued that some OSN users might be overcharged in determining the actual
audience of PII that is to be shared. In 2010, Krishnamurthy pointed out the ignorance
of users regarding the adjustment of privacy settings in an appropriate manner and
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stated: “From an awareness point of view, the situation is pretty bad” [Kri10]. Even
worse, some users might even have difficulties to decide whether or not it is appro-
priate – concerning their own privacy demands – to share a specific piece of content
with their OSN friends. In this context, Dunbar’s number implies that humans are
cognitively able to keep in touch – in terms of stable social relationships – with only
150 others [Dun93]. Several articles and studies have shown that Dunbar’s number is
also applicable in the context of OSN friends12 [GPV11]13. In 2011, Facebook stated
that a user has, on average, 130 OSN friends. In Section 5.4, we show that today’s
Facebook users have an average number of more than 200 OSN friends and the most
recent JIM study states that the respondents between twelve and 19 years claimed
that they even have, on average, 272 friends on Facebook (cf. 2010: 159; 2011: 206
friends on average). Moreover, we found that the standard deviation of the number
of friends is remarkably high, e.g., in the latest study on Facebook profiles, we found
some user profiles with a friends list containing significantly more than 8,000 profiles.
These large lists of friends indicate that it might be impossible for some (or even
most) users to perform an adequate risk assessment as a basis for their individual
identity management, i.e., sharing of PII only with a dedicated audience as a result of
appropriate adjusted privacy settings. In this context, the authors of [KV10] define
the term “self-disclosure” as the “amount of information shared on a user’s profile
as well as in the process of communication with others”. In this dissertation, we
investigate the self-disclosure of OSN users as a basis for the subsequently presented
studies that quantify risks regarding privacy.
4.5.1 Related Work Regarding Publicly Available PII
In this part of the related work section, we introduce research that aims at quantifying
the self-disclosure of OSN users, i.e., how much PII users share via their OSN profiles.
In particular, at least since 2005, researchers investigate publicly available information
accessible via Facebook. In the course of time, users’ awareness has changed and,
therefore, the amount of publicly accessible PII decreases from study to study. In
the following, we introduce selected studies that investigated the availability of PII.
Based on the findings of the presented related work, we provide an overview of
the progress and change of the actual use of privacy settings in Table 4.2. These
results can, additionally, be compared to the contributions presented later in this
dissertation (cf. Section 5.2).
In 2005, Gross andAcquisti investigated Facebook profiles of 4,000CarnegieMellon
University students in order to determine the corresponding privacy settings those
users configured to hide sensitive information from third parties [GA05]. The authors
found that, at least, 80% of the analyzed profiles provided information that is sufficient
to identify the corresponding user. 89% of the users provided their full name on their
Facebook profile and 90% shared a photo of themselves. However, only about 1.2 %
12http://www.businessweek.com/printer/articles/90538-the-dunbar-number-from-the-guru-of-
social-networks [Last downloaded 2013-05-28].
13http://www.forbes.com/sites/tjmccue/2013/01/15/social-media-maximum-150-friends/ [Last
downloaded 2013-05-28].
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[GA05] [LES07] [DHP07]1 [BHI+08] [SKT09]1 [DJR12] [DJR12]
Attribute (survey) (survey) NYC 2010 NYC 2011
real name 89% n.a. 100% n.a. 55% n.a. n.a.
profile picture 91% n.a. 99% n.a. 66% n.a. n.a.
friends lists n.a. n.a. n.a. 86% 39% 82.7% 47.4%
Number of friends (avg.) 133 179 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
date of birth/age 88% 84% n.a. 87% 43% 1.5% 1.4%
gender 99.6% 94% n.a. 82% n.a. 58.9% 52.8%
hometown ca.72% 83% 93% n.a. n.a. 10.4% 24.0%
current residence 51% 45% n.a. n.a. n.a. 31.3% 36.5%
address 51% 14% n.a. n.a. 3% n.a. n.a.
e-mail n.a. 92% 94% n.a. 13% n.a. n.a.
(mobile) phone number 40% n.a. 38% n.a. 2% n.a. n.a.
instant messaging ca.78% 68% 71% n.a. 18% n.a. n.a.
website n.a. 29% n.a. n.a. 27% n.a. n.a.
university/(high) school 87% 87% 84% n.a. n.a. 13.4% 9.1%
relationship status 63% 79% 74% n.a. n.a. 11.3% 4.9%
sexual orientation ca.54% 51% 78% n.a. n.a. 7.7% 6.4%
political direction ca.53% 61% n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
interests/details ca.65% 78% n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
favorite music ca.66% 78% n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
favorite books ca.60% 67% n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
favorite movies ca.66% 80% n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
favorite TV shows n.a. 47% n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
1 These findings are based on a questionnaire/survey. The authors of [LGKM11] found that in most cases users’ expecta-
tions of adjusted privacy differs from their actual settings.
Table 4.2: Publicly available personally identifiable information in OSNs (unrestricted
access, mainly Facebook) – findings of the presented related work.
of the users restricted the search-ability of their profile, i.e., the possibility to find
a specific profile within the OSN based on, for instance, a user’s name. Moreover,
at this point in time only 0.06% of users have hidden their profile so that it is not
visible for other users than their OSN friends.
Lampe et al. investigated 38,407 Facebook profiles in 2007 (data gathered in April,
2006) [LES07]. At that time, Facebook was divided into sub-networks, e.g., universi-
ties had their own network and users interacted with other users within their own
network. However, the authors’ aim was to analyze which pieces of PII are actually
provided by the analyzed users in order to find potential correlations to the num-
ber of their OSN friends. Actually, Lampe et al. could only analyze 30,773 of the
profiles because 19% restricted the audience of their shared information so that no
data could be gathered from those users’ profiles, i.e., already 19% of users made
use of privacy settings. However, the other share of analyzed Facebook members
provided a lot of information via their profile pages, i.e., “On average, users complete
59% of the fields available to them, and in some fields display a significant amount
of information” [LES07]. In 2007, the authors of [DHP07] surveyed OSN users to
figure out how trust in the OSN providers and other users, as well as privacy con-
cerns affect the willingness to share information and to develop new relationships.
Details on their results regarding publicly available information can be found in
Table 4.2 (see column [DHP07]).
In 2008, the authors of [BHI+08] analyzed 7,919 Facebook profiles of Facebook’s
sub-network of the university of Michigan. This study aims at investigating whether
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or not users provide sufficient information to get context-aware spam, i.e., e-mails
that are tailored to a user’s characteristics and his/her PII. In their sampled data,
the authors found that 68% of profiles were visible to any other member of the
network. 86% of these profiles provided a public list of friends. In the same year,
Krishnamurthy and Wills published their study on privacy in OSNs [KW08]. They
analyzed several popular OSNs, such as Facebook, MySpace, and Twitter and found
that, on average, 72.4 % of Facebook users (between 55% and 90% depending on the
sub-network) let their profile viewable for any member of their sub-network and
79% of MySpace users retained the default configuration of provided privacy settings.
Based on a previously carried out sampling [KGA08], Krishnamurthy et al. also
analyzed how many Twitter users retained the default privacy settings of the OSN.
At this point in time, only 1 % of users changed the default configuration and, thus,
restricted the visibility of shared content. In 2009, Schrammel et al. published their
investigation of the “Information Disclosure Behaviour [sic] in Different Types of
Online Communities” [SKT09]. The study is based on a questionnaire and answers
of 856 respondents (mainly “from German speaking countries” [SKT09]) carried out
in 2008. See Table 4.2 for more details on their results.
Table 4.2 also contains the results presented by the authors of [DJR12] who repeatedly
sampled the same large sample of Facebook users living in New York City. They found
that privacy awareness of users has even been increased during the 15 month between
the two last samplings. The attribute availability of the analyzed pieces of PII is shown
in the table. These and the provided results of previous studies can be compared to the
findings we present in the following chapter. In particular, Table 4.2 can be compared
to Table 5.1 that shows the results of a sample we gathered in 2011, as well as to Table 5.2
that provides a comparison of profile analyses based on the 2011 sample and a sample
gathered in 2012 (see Section 5.2 of the following chapter). By comparing the findings
of previous studies and the results we provide, it becomes even more obvious that
privacy awareness has been increased during recent years. However, for some pieces of
PII, we can also observe a contrary “evolution” of privacy awareness, e.g., the attribute
hometown was provided by 10.4% of users in 2010 and by already 23.3 % of users in
2012, which might induce increased risks regarding privacy leakages. Inter alia, we
address this particular threat by the findings presented in the following chapter.
The authors of [KW10a] analyzed the technical opportunities on top of which third
parties can extract PII out of OSN profiles, in 2010. They analyzed twelve individual
OSNs and show, inter alia, that in ten of these OSNs users’ list of OSN friends are
publicly accessible by default. In a follow-up study of these authors, they analyzed
13 OSNs that provide mobile access [KW10b]. The authors show that in six mobile
OSNs the list of friends are always publicly accessible. In another six of the analyzed
OSNs the friends lists are, at least, publicly available if users retain the default privacy
settings pre-configured by the OSN provider. Just a single OSN restricted the access to
friends lists by default. In this dissertation, we show that still most users of Facebook
and other OSNs share a public friends list, which constitutes one of the key threats
investigated in the following chapter.
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4.5.2 Related Work Regarding Linkability Risks
Referring to the specific research questions stated in the context of the potentially
existing linkability of several OSN profiles of a single user, we introduce selected
related work in the following. Mislove et al. showed that not only the number of
registered users in Facebook is growing, but also the number of users of other OSNs,
such as Flickr14 [MKG+08]. Therefore, it might be worth for attacking third parties to
bring information together that is shared by a single user via different OSNs because
the individually shared content might reveal different pieces of PII. On the contrary,
Torkjazi et al. analyzed 360,000 MySpace profiles and report that the interest of
users regarding the use of a specific OSN gets into a downturn after its (in this case,
exponential) growth [TRW09]. They found that 41% of the analyzed profile IDs
(randomly chosen from the MySpace ID space) belong to profiles that have already
been deleted. However, the authors also show that 75% of users with public profiles
have not been logged in to MySpace for more than 100 days. Thus, many users tend
to do not delete OSN profiles that are no more in use and, hence, at one time publicly
shared PII is often still accessible for any third party.
Even worse, if third parties can link users’ OSN profiles, they might get access to
sufficient information to link the gathered information to a particular person. In this
context, as early as 2000, researchers found that 87% of U.S. citizens can be uniquely
identified by just three attributes: their gender, zip code, and date of birth [Swe00]. In
2006, these findings have been revisited and almost completely confirmed by Philippe
Golle [Gol06]. Therefore, the linkability of users’ OSN profiles poses a risk if different
information is shared via different OSN profiles and, in particular, if users keep their
“old” OSN profiles and publicly shared PII online.
The authors of [LM05] state that some users registered profiles in several OSNs.
However, they estimate an overlap of only 15 % between two web-based OSNs. In 2007,
a study carried out by the company compete.com demonstrates that 64% of Facebook
users also have registered a profile at MySpace, whereas only 20% of MySpace users
also registered a Facebook profile15. In the same year, the company Rapleaf 16 reported
that 43 % of users of the OSN Hi517 are also registered at MySpace and that “Facebook
users tend to use 2.9 major social networking sites on average”18. Motoyama and
Varghese identified criteria in terms of attributes that are sufficient to re-identify a user
of one OSN in another [MV09]. For their study, they sampled 68,277 user profiles
out of the OSNs Facebook and MySpace. However, they observed that only 25.2%
of Facebook members overlapped in MySpace and 27.56% vice versa. The authors
explain the different values of overlap compared to the compete.com study due to the
increase of the number of Facebook users that possibly did not register a MySpace
14http://www.flickr.com/ [Last downloaded 2013-05-28].
15http://blog.compete.com/2007/11/12/connecting-the-social-graph-member-overlap-at-
opensocial-and-facebook [Last donwloaded 2013-04-02].
16http://www.rapleaf.com/ [Last downloaded 2013-05-28].
17http://www.hi5.com/ [Last downloaded 2013-05-28].
18http://readwrite.com/2007/11/12/opensocial and facebook statistics [Last downloaded 2013-05-
28].
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account because of its decreased popularity. Furthermore, Motoyama and Varghese
demonstrate that 44% of the users whose profiles have been analyzed and who are
registered in both OSNs configured their privacy settings similarly. The other share
adjusted their individual privacy settings differently depending on the OSN. This
indicates that in some OSNs a user potentially shares information that is not publicly
provided within another OSN, so that linking of his/her profiles might be worth
for learning more about the user. In fact, at least, for 52% of users attacking third
parties can gain information by linking their OSN profiles. However, the authors also
report that friends lists of Facebook and MySpace profiles of a single user just rarely
overlap. We show in this dissertation that, in many cases, this little overlap constitutes
a sufficient basis to link profiles without exploiting additional information.
Zafarani and Liu also introduced a methodology to link profiles [ZL09]. The investi-
gated strategy aims at the revelation of users’ registered names across several OSNs, i.e.,
they demonstrate that and how a user name registered in one OSN can be exploited
to find user names of the same person used in other communities, such as OSNs.
Another approach to link OSN profiles is introduced by the authors of [VHS09]. Their
matching approach is based on representations of users’ individual types of content
shared via a profile page as vectors. A similarity score calculated between two vectors
indicates matches. The authors applied the introduced algorithm to find overlaps of
Facebook and StudiVZ and achieved a 83% success rate. In [RCD10], the authors
presented a framework to link profiles based on a weighting of attributes performed
manually or even automatically. Furthermore, they implemented string and semantic
metrics to calculate the similarity of attribute values and applied aggregation functions
to decide whether or not a profile belongs to the same user. The authors tested their
approach in an environment of automatically generated OSN user profiles.
In contrast to these studies, we exploit the network of friends (users’ friends lists)
to investigate the profile linkability. Whereas some types of attributes are provided
in just very few profiles (cf. next chapter) and, in general, users share very diverse
information via their profile pages, in popular OSNs more than a half of the users
share their friends list. In contrast to the other pieces of information users share (or do
not share), a friends list is a well-structured attribute that can easily be parsed even for
attacking third parties that do not utilize sophisticated linking algorithms. Therefore,
analyzing friends lists might be the first choice of a “casual attacker” in order to
establish links between profiles of a single targeted user (see Section 5.1.2 for further
details on the attacker model assumed for the studies presented in this dissertation).
Another study that also exploits the friendship connections of users for linking profiles
constitutes the work of Veldman [Vel09]. In particular, she introduce a two phase
approach for linking profiles19. In the first phase, the shared content of potentially
matching profiles out of two OSNs is compared, which results in a candidate list.
Profiles contained in this list are compared with respect to their “network”, i.e., a
user’s OSN friends. Whereas the second step is very similar to the linking approach
we present in this thesis, her algorithm (only) refines the results by comparing OSN
friends. In contrast, we just analyze the friends lists in order to establish links between
19http://doc.utwente.nl/68263/ [Last downloaded 2013-05-28].
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OSN profiles of a particular user, which is a significantly less sophisticated approach
in light of investigating “low cost” linkability.
Wondracek et al. demonstrate the linkability of a person to his/her OSN profile(s)
based on so-called group memberships. In particular, they “show that information
about the group memberships of a user (i.e., the groups of a social network to which a
user belongs) is often sufficient to uniquely identify this user, or, at least, to significantly
reduce the set of possible candidates” [WHKK10]. In contrast to linking several OSN
profiles to each other, they try to identify one of a user’s OSN profiles at this point
in time he/she visits a (maliscious) website. Thereby, they exploit common methods
to steal users’ browser history and the fact that the set of group memberships of a
user can function as kind of a fingerprint. A similar investigation has been carried
out by Krishnamurthy et al. [KW10a]. The authors of this paper show how website
providers can get knowledge of users’ OSN profiles, or rather PII that is shared via
these profiles. It has been shown that third parties can establish a link between a
particular person and his/her shared PII, or even his/her OSN profiles. In contrast, we
investigate the linkability of several profiles a single user registered in different OSNs,
i.e., we aim at quantifying the risk that third parties can gather individually shared
information due to compile a comprehensive digital image of a person. Thereby, we
assume a more or less casual attacking third party that do not utilize large computing
resources or sophisticated linking algorithms, such as, for instance, identifications
by face recognition techniques (cf. [SZD08]).
The related papers introduced in the following have been published more or less
contemporaneously or even subsequently compared to the submission and publication
of the paper that contains the results we present in this dissertation, i.e., [LTH11].
However, this definitively does not imply an out-dated character of the findings we
gained. The authors of [PCKM11] demonstrate an approach to link a user’s profiles
based on the user name used for the OSN profiles. In particular, it is shown that the
entropy of a user name affects the probability of successful linking based on just this
attribute. The approach either utilizes an estimation of the uniqueness of a user name
used in several OSNs or links different identifiers. The fact that information about a
user can also be gathered by just searching the Internet based on some (eventually
insensitive) seed information is shown by the authors of [YLL+12]. In [BKP+12]
and [MTW+12], the linkability of OSN user profiles is investigated as well. In contrast
to the attacker we assume, these authors utilize a much more sophisticated approach
for linking a user’s profiles. For instance, the authors of [BKP+12] introduce a so-
called “Joint Link-Attribute approach” to identify profiles of a single user across
different OSNs, i.e., a graph-based algorithm. Thereby, they explicitly state that
linkability constitutes (primarily) an advantage, at least, from the perspective of
online marketers, but also for the users, for instance, in terms of improved automated
merging of contacts on a mobile phone. However, from the perspective of a user, or
rather from a privacy perspective, it might be not in the interest of users that, for
instance, online marketers are provided with advantages to carry out their business
and, therefore, such an “improvement” might also constitute a privacy threat for
users. The authors of [JK12] published another investigation on the linkability of
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OSN profiles that is, inter alia, based on the results we published in 2011 [LTH11]. In
contrast to exploit only the friends list of users, such as we investigated the linkability,
the authors exploit also the profile itself and content that is shared. They tested their
system to find overlaps between Facebook and Twitter. Based on a sample of 543
Twitter profiles randomly selected out of a larger sample (about 500,000 profiles)
the authors achieved an accuracy of 40.5 % by finding the corresponding Facebook
profiles. Recently, the authors published another paper that explains their “identity
search algorithm” in detail [JKJ13]. Certainly, such an integrated approach can result
in a better accuracy than just exploiting the friends lists to link profiles, such as utilized
for the investigations we present in this thesis. However, in every presented OSN
study, we aim at assuming the “weakest” attacker that is imaginable and, thus, we
provide lower bounds on, for instance, the accuracies of profile linking attacks. We are
fully aware of the fact that the more side information an attacker can access the more
precise he/she can link a user’s OSN profiles. In turn, accessing and processing more
content implies the need for more computing resources and the application of more
sophisticated algorithms than a more casual attacker could apply. In 2013, the authors
of [GLP+13] introduced a study that assumes an attacker “with moderate resources”,
i.e., an attacker who has access to just a few computers and the ability to rent some
cloud resources. In contrast to this paper, we assume an any more casual attacker. In
fact, the linking of user profiles based on provided friends lists can even be performed
in a “manual” manner, i.e., with a simple algorithm executed by a single computer or
even (without any computer-aided executed algorithm) by the attacker him-/herself.
However, for linking OSN profiles, the authors of [GLP+13] exploit users’ posts, or
rather corresponding meta-information, such as the geo-locations and timestamps
that are available for any post in some OSNs. Furthermore, they analyze how a post is
written, i.e., “the user’s writing style as captured by language models”. In the context of
low cost linkability, the authors of [CSS12] also present a “cheap and efficient” approach
for mapping OSN profiles. The authors filter Twitter posts in order to identify posts
induced by an action within another OSN, such as Youtube20. Afterwards, explicit
links to the content shared via the other OSNs are extracted and, finally, uniquely
identifiable profile information provides the link to the corresponding user at the
other OSN in order to anrich the data shared via Twitter with further information
provided in the other OSN.The authors of [CGNP12] present a model that “elucidates
potential linkages between data” that is, for instance, shared via OSNs and show that
it is sometimes remarkably easy how data can be gathered from different sources. The
latter two papers referenced the linkability paper we published in 2011 [LTH11].
In this section, we presented related work regarding profile linking attacks or ap-
proaches to consciously link users’ OSN profiles. In the following, we present related
work regarding attacks that aim at inferring users’ non-provided attribute values, or
rather PII, for instance, based on information shared by others.
20https://www.youtube.com/ [Last downloaded 2013-05-28].
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4.5.3 Related Work Regarding Attribute Prediction Risks
The authors of [MSLC01] demonstrate how the following old saying can be applied to
social networks: “Birds of a feather flock together”. The idea of this saying goes back
to a quote by Democritus – an ancient Greek philosopher (c.460 B.C.E.) – who said:
“Creatures flock together with their kind, doves with doves, cranes with cranes and so
on”21. According to [MSLC01], already Aristotle and Plato took up this saying. In the
year 360 B.C.E., Plato stated that “similarity begets friendship” [tbRB68] and, in 350
B.C.E., Aristotle wrote “love those who are like themselves” [tbHR34]. In 2001, in this
context, Domingos et al. demonstrated that friends in a network potentially share
similar interests and characteristics [DR01]. Moreover, the authors show that social
network friends are so similar that they can even influence a user’s decisions regarding
whether or not to buy a product. The company Anderson Analytics underpinned the
similarity hypothesis by carrying out a survey. This survey revealed that only 10% of
the respondents would accept any random OSN friendship request (i.e., potentially
requests of dissimilar users). In contrast, 45 % of users only connect their profiles with
those of family members and friends of their “real life” and another 18 % state that they
would only connect with users they have met in “real life”22. Therefore, we can assume
that the similarity of people induces not only friendships in general, but also and in
particular in OSNs. However, the similarity of OSN friends can constitute the basis for
inferring attributes that are actually not publicly shared by a user. To give an example,
Brown et al. showed that 24.1 % of their sample of Facebook users are vulnerable for
shared-hometown-attacks, i.e., a third party can send context-aware spam to this user
by, for instance, utilizing his/her hometown. In this thesis, we show that a prediction
of a user’s non-provided hometown can be performed by third parties with an even
significantly higher accuracy. Moreover, if sufficient information can be accurately
inferred, third parties might be even more able to identify a particular person (cf.
the study of [Swe00] that demonstrated that just three pieces of PII are sufficient to
identify a particular person). In the following, we present related research in which
the risk for inferring users’ PII by third parties is investigated.
In 2006, He et al. utilized a Bayesian network approach “to model the causal
relations among people in social networks” [HCL06]. Based on this model, the
authors investigated the risk that third parties might be able to infer users’ non-
provided attributes due to PII shared by their OSN friends. The authors also state
that only the selective hiding of OSN friendships has the potential to result in a
non-threatening situation regarding privacy. The authors of [XZL08] studied the
risk that third parties can infer users’ non-provided pieces of PII also based on a
Bayesian network approach. In this paper, the main focus is set on the prediction
of the attribute gender. However, the authors also state that their algorithm can be
used for predicting other pieces of PII. In 2009, Zheleva and Getoor demonstrated
that attribute prediction poses still a risk for OSN users([ZG08], [ZG09]). Based
on the list of OSN friends, as well as group memberships, the authors show eight
21http://ezinearticles.com/?id=1401521 [Last downloaded 2013-05-28].
22http://adage.com/article/digital/social-media-anderson-analytics-reveals-users-habits/137792/
[Last downloaded 2013-05-28].
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attacks – utilizing different classifiers and features – that can potentially threaten
users’ privacy. They map the problem to a relational classification problem, i.e.,
classifying data out of a relational data set, and evaluate the proposed attacks on
data sets sampled from four different OSNs. Whereas we investigate the attribute
prediction primarily based on friends lists, the authors, additionally, exploit the group
memberships to increase the accuracy of prediction. However, we show in this thesis
that just the analysis of pieces of PII shared by a user’s friends are in some cases
sufficient to infer non-provided PII of the user him-/herself. In this context, Jernigan
and Mistree state that “public information about one’s coworkers, friends, family,
and acquaintances, as well as one’s associations with them, implicitly reveals private
information” [JM09]. In particular the authors investigated whether or not the gender
and sexual orientation of OSN users are inferable by third parties. They analyzed
6,077 Facebook profiles associated with an MIT-related sub-network sampled by the
use of a software named Arachne to show that third parties can infer users’ sexual
orientation. 167,000 Facebook profiles are investigated by Lindamood et al. [LHKT09]
in order to demonstrate the potential risk regarding attribute prediction. The authors
exploit the social graph and present an inference attack that outperforms traditional
Bayes and Links algorithms. A very similar approach to this and the study we present
is utilized by the authors of [MVGD10]. In contrast to the findings presented in this
thesis, they gathered profiles only from two selected sub-networks of Facebook (4,000
student profiles and 63,000 profiles from another network) and used a profile that is
also member of a targeted sub-network, which induce more accessible information
(e.g., an accessible friends list in any case) than available for an ordinary third party
that is just a member of the OSN but potentially not of the same sub-network than
the targeted user. Furthermore, the authors exploit specific sections of the social
graph, i.e., they detect communities within a list of friends that have a higher degree
of interconnection and, thus, shared information of members of these communities
indicate non-provided information more adequately. Instead, we just concentrate on
the information shared by a user’s OSN friends as a whole regardless of the degree
of interconnection of specific groups of a user’s friends. This constitutes the basis
to investigate whether or not also a casual attacker can infer PII, i.e., an attacker
that do not have large computing resources at one’s disposal or is able to exploit
sophisticated prediction algorithms, such as an algorithm to perform community
detection within a friends list. As a result of the assumption of such a casual attacker,
“we demonstrate quantifications of risk based on the minimal knowledge a third party
can get from OSN profiles and, thus, present a ‘lower bound’ on how much PII can
be predicted in OSNs” [LWMH13].
In 2010, Facebook researchers published that users’ non-provided location can
be predicted by analyzing the location of corresponding OSN friends because the
likelihood of friendships increases with shorter distances, i.e., users interconnect
more often with other users who live in their proximity. The authors show that “the
likelihood of friendships drops monotonically as a function of distance” [BSM10].
Furthermore, they predict the maximum-likelihood location of a user based on
his/her Facebook friends. The authors found that in 67.5 % of the analyzed cases 16
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or more friends live in a 25 miles or less distance to the user whose location is to
be predicted. The aim of this study is very similar compared to the investigation of
location prediction presented in the following chapter. However, instead of using data
only accessible for Facebook itself, we study the risk regarding attribute prediction
based on PII that is publicly available. Based on this attacker model, we observed
that in about 56% of the cases the city of the analyzed users exactly equals the most
frequently provided city within a friends list. Thus, we demonstrate that even a third
party is able to predict users’ location, or rather current city based on PII publicly
shared by their Facebook friends.
A completely different approach that enables to infer user’s PII is investigated by Rao
et al. [RYSG10]. Based on an algorithmic approach that targets semantic information,
the authors analyzed users’ posts on Twitter in order to “classify latent user attributes”.
On the contrary, we focus on investigating the similarity of users’ shared pieces of PII.
In [GA11], also an algorithmic approach is introduced to infer PII. The author states
that “all liaisons are dangerous when all your friends are known to us” [GA11] and
presents a study in which a novel graph labeling algorithm is applied to infer PII. He
also used data shared on Twitter to test the algorithm. Instead of using Twitter data,
we quantify the risks regarding attribute prediction based on an extensive sample
of 1.3 million Facebook profiles. Furthermore, as mentioned before, we investigate
privacy risks, such as the attribute prediction based on a model that assumes a third
party that tries to attack at low cost.
The fact that some pieces of PII can be inferred is also shown by the authors
of [LGK11] who indicate that provided favorites, such as favored books, movies, and
music, can be inferred by third parties. Their results show that among the 100 most
popular preferences, correlations of attribute values can be detected within a group of
OSN friends regardless of the fact that 64% of observed favorites are provided by just a
single profile. In contrast, we focus not only on favorite attributes, but also on PII that
might be more sensitive and, in general, cover a broader set of potentially inferable
pieces of PII. The authors of [SKB12] present an attack to infer users’ links, i.e., their
friendship connections, and their location. However, also these authors utilized a
sophisticated approach for predicting PII, i.e., an individually implemented algorithm.
In 2011, the authors of [AAF11] demonstrated that also third party providers of
Facebook Apps can get access to sufficient information to infer non-provided pieces
of PII. Additionally, they propose a scheme that can be used for risk assessment.
In [GTM+12], the risk of attribute prediction was investigated based on algorithms
that are adapted with a so-called social-attribute network model and data gathered
from the OSN Google+. The risk of hometown predictions based on geotagged
photos posted via Flickr profiles is investigated in [JKS12]. However, these studies
differ from the investigations we present in terms of the approach and the source
of information exploited to predict PII.
Recently, Chaabane et al. exploit interests stated on Facebook, or rather users’ Likes
to predict specific pieces of PII, i.e., users’ gender, country, relationship status, and
age [CAK12]. Based on the Likes, the authors selected specific communities of users –
those who liked semantically identical content – and inferred users’ non-provided
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pieces of PII based on information shared by the selected portion of users. Because
of the possibility that such a selection of specific users might not be feasible for the
casual attacker because he/she would have to crawl the largest data set possible, we
concentrate on exploiting the information as it is shared by the users’ friends, which
can even be analyzed in a non-automated manner. In 2012, Blenn et al. published an
investigation of the attribute prediction risk based on a large sample of users of an
OSN mainly provided for users from the Netherlands, i.e., Hyves.nl23 [BDSVM12].
Similar to the study on possible attribute predictions presented in this dissertation,
the authors focus on whether or not and how accurate the age and location attributes
can be inferred by third parties. Furthermore, they demonstrate the accuracies of
inferring, at least, a nearby area of a user’s actual location. However, the findings are
based on a sample of a less popular OSN compared to Facebook that we analyze in
the following chapter. Furthermore, the authors quantify the risk in a less detailed
manner compared to the results we provide. The authors of [CAK12] also state that
the age is inferable despite the fact that just a few users share this attribute. Similar
to the results we present in this thesis, the authors demonstrate that it is possible to
infer, at least, an age range that probably apply to a user. Based on their algorithm,
they observed a success rate, or rather accuracy of predictions of up to 58% for
the youngest users. By utilizing a much simpler approach, we give evidence that
this specific prediction accuracy can be reached, on average, for any user regardless
his/her actual age. We also show that the most accurate predictions can be observed
for predicting younger users’ age. In fact, we calculated a prediction accuracy of
up to 94%. Another study that investigated the accuracies of attribute predictions
is presented in [KSG13]. The authors analyzed Likes provided by 58,466 volunteers
acquired via a Facebook App (on average, 170 Likes per user). The authors show that
some potentially sensitive pieces of PII, such as users’ sexual orientation, ethnicity,
religious and political views, etc. can be inferred at a remarkable high accuracy. To
give an example, on the basis of about 250 provided Likes, the authors could predict
the user’s age at an accuracy of 75%. However, as already mentioned, we focus on
attribute predictions based on publicly shared PII of users’ friends in light of the
assumed model of a more or less casual attacker.
In summary, we investigate which pieces of PII can be inferred by analyzing at-
tributes shared by one’s OSN friends if a friends list is publicly shared. In this context,
the authors of [TWX+11] show that third parties can even obtain friends lists if users’
do not share this information publicly, i.e., based on a reverse lookup via others’
friends lists and the non-congruent privacy settings of OSN members the list of
friends of a user can be reconstructed. However, if a friends list can be accessed
or reconstructed, the attacker gets access to information publicly shared by a user’s
OSN friends. We quantify the risks that – just based on this knowledge – third par-
ties can infer a user’s non-provided information. Thereby, we utilize only simple
string comparisons to “simulate” a casual attacker that cannot exploit sophisticated
algorithms and large computing resources.
23http://hyves.nl/ [Last downloaded 2013-05-28].
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4.5.4 Related Work Regarding Privacy Enhancing Applications
In this part of the related work section, we focus on research papers that introduce
privacy applications and discuss their potential to support users in deciding whether
or not to publicly share pieces of PII, as well as to monitor who can get access, or
already accessed shared information. “As early as 2004, Acquisti wrote that only
the combination of the aspects technology and risk awareness has the potential of
successfully solving the privacy problem whereas any of these aspects alone will most
probably fail [Acq04]. Recently, Krishnamurthy wrote, ‘From an awareness point of
view, the situation is pretty bad’ [Kri10]” [LTH11]. In the following chapter, we show
that the content shared via OSNs ranges from insignificant information to remarkably
sensitive PII.Therefore, we assume that just providing privacy settings is not sufficient
to encourage people to use such settings adequately.
In the following, we discuss relatedwork regarding user support that aims at bringing
users into the position to consider potentially existing (unintended) data flows induced
by participating in OSNs. In the context of several research projects, such as the
projects PRIME24 and PrimeLife25 that are funded by the European Union (EU),
privacy tools have been introduced that can be deployed in order to support users in
controlling who can access which type and piece of information, i.e., keeping track
of any party that is able to access a user’s PII. “As early as 2005, in the context of the
PRIME project, the authors of [BRP05] assessed the idea of a system that supports
users in preserving their privacy. Inter alia, in [BPL+11], the privacy-enhanced social
network site Clique is introduced. This site provides users with the capability of
segregating the audience of PII that is to be shared. It also provides options to define
the accessibility of shared PII in a fine-grained manner. The authors of [FHHW11]
investigated a user interface called Data Track to support people in maintaining an
overview of their provided PII. In 2009, XML co-developer Eve Maler26 presented a
similar mock-up (called CopMonkey) at the European Identity Conference (EIC)27.
CopMonkey represents a system that serves as a tool for assessing the given privacy
status of a user” [Lab12]. In [LXH09], an approach is presented to conceal shared
PII and only provide access to a selected group of other users. By providing fake
information and encrypted data, the actual information is shielded from others that
are not intended to get the information. The authors of [FL10] developed effective
ways of managing friend lists by applying community detection on the social graph
for predicting the intended adjustment of privacy settings in order to support users
in managing their privacy. They provide a wizard-based approach to support users in
adjusting their privacy settingsmore appropriately. To give another example, members
of the EU-funded research project digital.me implement tools to provide users with
an aggregated overview of pieces of PII shared with certain services, such as OSNs.
The project aims at introducing a centralization of the management of PII shared
in/with different services (cf. [SGH+11], [BRS+12], and [CSRH12]). To give particular
24https://www.prime-project.eu/ [Last downloaded 2013-05-28].
25http://www.primelife.eu/ [Last downloaded 2013-05-28].
26http://www.xmlgrrl.com [Last downloaded 2013-05-28].
27https://www.id-conf.com/ [Last downloaded 2013-05-28].
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examples, the authors of [BRS+12] developed a prototype that gathers data from OSN
profiles and a corresponding algorithm that matches multiple OSN profiles to one
person. In [CSRH12], the authors further aim at integratingmultiple OSNprofiles into
one single profile in order to increase usability. However, in contrast to the focus on
usability (which could also enhance privacy), we concentrate on how to demonstrate
potential privacy leaks (the users might not be aware of) to the users themselves.
Further approaches to enhance privacy in OSN-related communication is presented
in the context of the EU-funded project PICOS28, i.e., privacy enhancements for
mobile communities, such as mobile OSNs. In this context, the authors of [KBT+10]
“outline the approach of the PICOS project” and motivate the necessity of privacy
enhancing technologies in terms of appropriate identity management capabilities for
users of mobile communities. One of the architectures proposed in the context of
the PICOS project is published in [KCTR11]. This particular work aims at preserving
privacy in OSNs without loosing the ability for advertisers to carry out their business.
A more detailed view on the architectural structure of the approach, as well as its
implementation is provided in [TKH+11].
Proactive privacy support is also addressed in the field of research on user-centricity
[BSCGS07]. In particular, “authentication and authorization frameworks of projects,
such as the Kantara Initiative UMA29, OAuth30, and OpenID31, to name just a few,
often include a proactive informationmanagement component, which can be adjusted
to deny or allow third parties access to the PII requested (...) However, the implications
of granting permission to access personal data are often not clear to users” [Lab12].
Therefore, such privacy features can only provide an overview of the pieces of PII
shared in a certain context.
Whereas the introduced related work mainly aim at providing information about
who has potentially access to PII that is to be shared, a reactive monitoring of the
actual flows of PII is often not primarily focused. In fact, most publishedwork presents
measures and tools to proactively support users in managing their PII, i.e., support
in deciding whether or not to share PII in a certain context before the data is shared
and support in maintaining an overview of shared PII. However, this is only one
perspective of, at least, three perspectives that are important to effectively assist users
in managing flows of PII. The other two perspectives are (1) the necessity to be able
to monitor the proliferation of PII, i.e., (reactive) capabilities to determine who has
access to shared PII at a certain point in time, and (2) the disclosure of privacy risks
induced by the current situation of a particular user with respect to his/her shared
information and regarding third parties that can potentially access this data.
Referring to (1), some work has already been published that addressed this issue.
For instance, the tool Data Track introduced in the context of the project PrimeLife
provides users with capabilities to monitor the actual pieces of PII stored by a certain
provider of a service. Furthermore, in the context of PICOS, the need for “control
28http://www.picos-project.eu/ [Last downloaded 2013-05-28].
29http://kantarainitiative.org/ [Last downloaded 2013-05-28].
30http://oauth.net/ [Last downloaded 2013-05-28].
31http://openid.net/ [Last downloaded 2013-05-28].
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over usage and proliferation of PII” was stated as a major issue accompanied with the
implementation ofOSNs that preserve users’ privacy [Wei09]. The authors of [HPH11]
also introduce an approach to enhance privacy by supporting users in a reactive
manner. In particular, they introduce a tool to bring users into the position to access
parts of service log files in order to figure out whether or not shared PII was forwarded
by the respective provider to another third party. However, unintended data flows
are not only induced by communication processes between users and services, but
also due to the analysis of users’ shared PII by third parties that might be able to,
additionally, even link this PII to a particular person. Therefore, information flows
are not limited to the disclosure of PII to a certain service provider.
In Chapter 6 of this dissertation, wemainly address the second aforementioned issue
(2), i.e., we introduce concepts to design privacy tools that demonstrate users their
current situation regarding privacy and potential privacy threats. This demonstration
of potential risks provides an individual view on (possibly unintended) flows of PII as
a basis to adjust privacy settings adequately according to a user’s own privacy demands.
We argue that privacy tools should aim at systematically adapt users’ mental models
of possible data flows towards adequate perceptions of potential receivers of shared
information and corresponding privacy risks. Certainly, also the demonstration of
privacy risks is not a new idea. To give examples, the tools Take this Lollipop32 or
Wolfram Alpha Personal Analytics for Facebook33 aim at drawing the users’ attention to
certain privacy risks. However, referring to the related research work presented in this
section, we argue that today’s research has not sufficiently addressed the conceptual
basis of privacy tools that can effectively sharpen users’ mental models of flows of PII.
In particular, the mentioned tools that demonstrate privacy risks do not strictly follow
a well-reasoned strategy, or rather are not built upon a well-designed methodological
basis. In Chapter 6, we contribute exactly this fundamental strategy as groundwork on
top of which promisingly effective privacy tools can be implemented that demonstrate
potential flows of PII and corresponding privacy risks.
32http://www.takethislollipop.com/ [Last downloaded 2013-05-28].
33http://www.wolframalpha.com/facebook/ [Last downloaded 2013-05-28].
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This chapter presents the contributions that have been compiled by large-scale em-
pirical studies on OSN user profiles. In particular, we address the previously stated
research questions with respect to (1) the amount of publicly available pieces of per-
sonally identifiable information (PII), (2) the risk that several profiles of a single user
can be linked and shared PII be aggregated by attacking third parties, and (3) the risk
that non-provided PII can be inferred based on information provided by users’ OSN
friends. We argue that this empirical “risk quantification” lay an essential foundation
for more effective privacy enhancing technologies with which OSN users can be
provided in the near future. As already mentioned, in [ACF12], the authors identified
that the concept and measure of risk is a central point of the model, on top of which
privacy tools have to be designed. It has also been demonstrated that novel privacy
applications are necessary to further establish risk awareness with respect to privacy
and to demonstrate privacy implications of shared PII and PII that is to be shared.
The forth field of OSN research introduced in the previous chapter targets exactly
this discussion on novel concepts to support users in monitoring and control of the
flows of their PII. However, this particular field of OSN research is elaborated within
Chapter 6, whereas the current chapter focuses on the empirical risk quantification.
Before we present the results of these empirical studies, we introduce the methodol-
ogy of the corresponding investigations. First, we provide a detailed discussion on
how research on OSN profiles can be performed in a compliant manner with respect
to, for instance, the German law. This is an essential contribution in light of the fact
that even the investigation of potential risks could threaten users’ privacy regardless of
the actual “positive”, or rather non-malicious intent of the work. Second, we introduce
the already mentioned attacker model in detail. Afterwards, we present the technical
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methodology utilized to analyze OSN users’ publicly shared PII and point out mea-
sures today’s OSNs take to avoid automated processing of user profiles and shared
information. In summary, we introduce the conceptual basis of compliant and privacy
preserving analysis of users’ publicly available PII in OSNs. Subsequently to the intro-
duction of the methodology, we present results of three empirical studies carried out
at different points in time. For each of these studies, we implemented an individual
analysis software that was utilized to investigate publicly available PII shared by thou-
sands of randomly chosen OSN user profiles. Parts of the contributions presented in
this chapter have been previously published in [LDH11], [LTH11], and [LWMH13].
5.1 Automated Analysis of Online Social Network Proﬁles
For the studies presented in this chapter, we previously analyze the legal situation
with respect to carrying out statistical sampling of users’ OSN profiles and empirical
investigations of their publicly shared PII. This preceding investigation is based on
the German law and, particularly, the German Data Protection Act, because compli-
ance regarding privacy regulations is a must in the context of large-scale empirical
studies of OSNs. Based on discussions with members of the Center for Applied Legal
Studies (Zentrum fu¨r Angewandte Rechtswissenschaft, ZAR) at the KIT, we developed
a concept to implement fully automated analysis software that samples and analyzes
user’s profiles in a both privacy preserving and compliant manner. In this section,
additionally, the attacker model, on top of which the software is implemented, is
introduced. Finally, we present the conceptual basis of the analysis software devel-
oped for the studies and give insights into the implementations. Furthermore, we
analyze which countermeasures today’s OSN providers take to prevent crawling of
information shared by their customers, i.e., the OSN members.
5.1.1 Compliance w.r.t. the German Law and Data Protection Act
The German constitution (in particular, Art.2 Section 1 in conjunction with Art.1
Section 1, GG) and the German National Data Protection Act (BDSG) together con-
stitute the basis for German peoples’ rights regarding data protection, i.e., privacy
and self-determination regarding their own PII. Thereby, the term “purpose” is es-
sential for processing PII. Without a purpose, which has to be communicated to and
approved by the owner of the data, a third party has no right to process personal
data unless the law explicitly permits the processing. The requirement of designated
purposes is, for instance, regulated in §4.3 and §4a.1 BDSG. This also means that
only the users themselves can give their consent for processing their personal data
if the processing is not explicitly permitted by law.
The purpose of sharing information viaOSNprofiles is unambiguously to participate
within the respective OSN.The users do not provide content for further processing of
the data by third parties. Several OSNs explicitly prohibit the extraction of personal
data automatically performed by, for instance, a crawler software. In this context, we
stated the following in a previous paper: “According to our analysis of BDSG, it is
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not possible to legitimize any extraction, processing, and archiving of users’ profiles
and contained personal data without a previously stated agreement of any affected
user (permission facts). Neither §40 (BDSG) is applicable, which regularizes the
processing and use of personal data by research institutions, because it is required that
the research institution gathers the data from users on its own, nor the investigation of
extracted OSN data is included in the category of market and public opinion research
purposes, which are separately regulated in §28 (BDSG).” [LDH11]
However, in contrast to the extraction of PII publicly provided by OSN users and
to process this data, we were only interested in statistical data. In particular, we
investigated whether or not certain attributes, i.e., pieces of PII, are publicly provided
by a user, regardless of the actual value of this attribute. Furthermore, we investigated
interdependencies of attribute values, for instance, between attributes provided by
different profiles of a user or by a user and his/her OSN friends. Again, in this case, the
main focus was to gather statistical data and not the raw attribute values themselves,
despite the fact that we compared the actual values. Therefore, we did not need
to extract attribute values from the analyzed OSN profiles and store them within
a database. On the contrary, the raw data was only necessary at this point in time
the statistical data was calculated. Therefore, the main requirement imposed by and
derived from the German law is to implement an analysis software that keeps the time
as short as possible in which the actual attribute values are analyzed. Furthermore,
the software has to discard analyzed attribute values immediately after calculating the
statistical data. Moreover, the software has to keep the raw data transiently in main
memory for the shortest possible period of time in which the statistical data can be
calculated, which constitutes the crucial point for acting in a compliant manner. Due
to such short-time processing of data, the analysis of users’ PII and the analysis of
merely statistical data can be completely separately performed. Therefore, the time
span in which the raw data is kept in main memory and analyzed by the software
separates two domains of jurisdiction, i.e., the handling of PII by the OSN, which
is/should be permitted by the users themselves, and the processing of statistical data.
These very short time spans are referred to as “logical seconds” [Win00]. However, the
time span in which the statistical data is calculated on the basis of the raw data can only
be seen as a “logical second” if it is ensured that (1) the statistical data cannot be used to
find out which profiles have been analyzed to calculate the respective statistical values
and (2) it is not possible to access the raw analyzed information by any natural person.
Thus, for actually acting compliant with respect to the German law, the implemen-
tation of the analysis software has to fulfill the following requirements. First, raw data
is only processed during a so-called “logical second”, i.e., the shortest possible time
span in which data is only present in the main memory of the machine that runs
the analysis software. Second, the raw data cannot be accessed by anyone during the
analysis process, and, finally, the statistical data calculated on the raw information do
not allow any reference back to a “real” OSN profile, i.e., “nobody is able to recover
personal attributes or profile information with a distinct link to a natural person or
an OSN profile at runtime of the analysis software as well as afterwards. Hence, all
processing steps in the analysis software have to be executed automatically.” [LDH11]
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5.1.2 Attacker Model
Referring to the related work presented in Section 4.5, it becomes obvious that most
studies in the field of research on privacy risks of OSNs do not assume an attacker
model of low complexity. The authors of the presented related work have often
chosen a very complex model that represents the attacking third party (see, for in-
stance, [BSBK09]). Thereby, they can estimate how much information can be gained
by third parties from a user’s OSN profile or any other information extracted from
OSNs, i.e., these studies provide findings on themaximum of information that can
be gained from information shared by OSN members.
In the studies presented in this dissertation, we assume a contrary attacker model.
In particular, we assume a more or less “casual attacker”, i.e., an attacker that could be
one’s (potential) boss, ex-partner, insurance agent, or just the (wo-)man at the cinema
counter who saw a customer’s name on his/her credit card. These casual attackers do
not have access to large computing resources and are not able to utilize sophisticated
algorithms to threaten users’ privacy. Furthermore, we assume an attacker who do
not exploit side-information, i.e., data stored in his/her own databases or, at least,
information that can be found by just googling a person. Hence, a casual attacker
tries to gather and infer information about the targeted person by comparing his/her
several OSN profiles and the profiles of his/her OSN friends.
Thereby, we assume an attacker who analyzes each of any attribute that can be
publicly provided by OSN members (initially) semantically separated from other
attributes. With that, we consciously do not include relations between several shared
attributes. In particular, an attacker that behaves according to the model acts as
follows: he/she tries to gather and infer users’ PII primarily based on users’ friends
lists if this information is publicly provided (remember, more than a half of the users of
the most popular OSNs publicly provide their friends list). Furthermore, the attacking
third party can act like an ordinary OSN user, i.e., it has access to any information
publicly shared. Thereby, the attacker is not connected to any other member of the
OSN in terms of an OSN friendship. With that, (1) we do not have to involve other
users into the studies in terms of annoying them with friendship requests and (2) the
results are not influenced by possibly differing access rights of OSN friends, friends-
of-friends, and other users. Furthermore, the attacker do not utilize sophisticated
algorithms to gather and infer users’ PII. Instead, only simple string comparisons are
used to demonstrate the linkability and risk of attribute prediction.
Therefore, the “risk quantification is consciously based on minimal knowledge a
third party can extract from OSN profiles. Thus, the findings present a ‘lower bound’
on how much information is predictable (at low cost), i.e., we present results of the
analysis of a large set of statistical data and focus on those probabilities that can be
extracted from the data with a minimum of semantic interpretation or combination
of findings” [LWMH13]. Although the main focus of the studies presented in this
thesis is on a semantically separated investigation of publicly shared attributes in
order to quantify privacy risks, we also go a step further and discuss the potential
of correlations of several types of attributes and demonstrate examples for this, e.g.,
how student users behave different from other users.
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However, quantifying lower bounds constitutes an essential contribution to pro-
vide a basis to be able to compare the studies presented in this thesis among each
other, as well as to compare future measurement studies with the findings presented
in this dissertation. Therefore, on this basis, the findings constitute a reference for
former and future empirical studies on publicly available information within OSNs
and corresponding privacy risks. Moreover, the findings can serve as a reference
for impact analyses of future privacy enhancing technologies. Thus, choosing such
a less complex attacker model prevents from too artificial results in terms of de-
tected risks or other findings that can potentially occur only if several conditions
are fulfilled. In turn, assuming a more sophisticated attacker model does not com-
pletely ensure the repeatability of the experiments because OSN providers develop
their services further and deploy unpredictable changes. However, repeatability is
an essential requirement in light of the fact that the findings should be comparable
to former and, in particular, future quantification of users’ privacy awareness and
users’ handling of the IT system OSN.
Although many studies have been published that investigate similar risks regarding
OSNs, to the best of our knowledge, this dissertation and the correspondingly pub-
lished papers are the first research work that aims at assuming such a low cost attacker
in order to calculate the lower bounds on what and how many pieces of PII can be
gathered and inferred. As mentioned above, this is indispensable knowledge when,
for instance, the impact of future privacy tools have to be determined.
5.1.3 Methods of Proﬁle Sampling
Certainly, it is not possible to analyze a whole OSN by crawling all of its profiles in
reasonable time and reasonable effort. Therefore, in order to analyze privacy risks
induced by publicly available PII, it is necessary to sample a subset of OSN profiles
in the most possible uniform manner. In general, several options exist to sample
profiles out of OSNs. Because of the fact that OSN profiles with the corresponding
friendship connections can be seen as, or rather transferred to a graph (i.e., the social
graph) known algorithms that are applicable for graph traversals are also applicable
to sample OSN profiles. In particular, many studies implement a breadth-first search
(BFS), which goes back to the work of Moore [Moo59] and also Lee’s research [Lee61]
(cf. also [NW01] as an example of applying BFS to crawl websites). In the context of
samplingOSN profiles, several authorsmade use of the BFS approach, e.g., the authors
of [MMG+07], [JM09], [WBS+09], and [MVGD10]. The principle of sampling OSN
profiles based on a BFS constitutes the selection of, at least, one profile that is used as a
seed. Starting from this profile, the profiles listed in the corresponding friends lists are
added to the profiles that are to be sampled. In the next steps, the profiles listed in the
friends lists of the profiles of the seed’s friends list are selected and so on and so forth.
The authors of [KMT10] state that most probably BFS is a popular approach because
it is a “textbook technique” that is easy to implement. However, they demonstrate
that a BFS, as well as other related techniques applied to an OSN do not result in a
uniform sample, or rather result in a biased sample. Related sampling techniques are
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the depth-first search, the forest fire approach, i.e., like BFS but with a randomization
that decides whether or not to include a certain node/profile, the snowball sampling
technique, i.e., an approach based on BFS, but only a certain number of neighbors are
included in the sample, as well as random walk, which constitutes also a specialization
of the BFS approach in terms of that only a single randomly chosen neighbor of the
current node is included into the sample and it is not excluded that a profile is sampled
several times. However, a sample of OSN profiles gathered by the utilization of a BFS
or similar approaches is biased towards nodes with high degrees (see also [BCDF06],
[YLW10] and [CDMF+11]), i.e., the algorithm just samples profiles within a certain
sub-community and the probability to leave this sub-community is too low to get
a uniform sample. In turn, the reason for this sub-communities constitutes the
structure of OSNs in which sub-communities are highly interconnected and between
sub-communities just a few links exist. In other words, it is more likely to sample
nodes/profiles with a larger number of connections/friendships than sampling nodes
with a small number of edges. The authors of [KMT10] showed in a previous study
that a BFS induces a sample with an average node degree that is 3.5 times higher than
data that is sampled based on a ground-truth method [GKBM10].
A sampling method that is considered as a “ground-truth” approach (cf. [KMT10]),
which is, for instance, also utilized in [GKBM10], constitutes the acceptance-rejec-
tion sampling [LG08] (also known as UNIFORM sampling [CDMF+11]). Thereby,
profiles are sampled uniformly in the OSN’s ID space, i.e., the range of identifiers
used by the OSN provider to refer to the individual profiles. An analysis software that
implements an acceptance-rejection sampling randomly picks an identifier out of the
ID space of the OSN and tries to open a profile that belongs to the chosen identifier.
To give a more technical example, a user’s Facebook profile can be accessed by the
use of the Facebook URL [RFC1738] plus the corresponding identifier of a profile,
i.e., https://www.facebook.com/<identifier>1. If an HTTP [RFC2616] request based
on the randomly chosen identifier results in a responded user profile, the profile
is included into the sample. Otherwise, in case no profile can be found with the
chosen identifier, a new identifier is randomly picked out of the ID space of the OSN.
We make use of this method of sampling for the study on the quantification of the
risk regarding attribute predictions.
For carrying out the empirical investigation on the profile linkability, we imple-
mented a different sampling that is based on searches of randomly chosen names. To
recap the aim of this particular study, we compare profiles out of different OSNs that
potentially belong to the same user to find potential measures that can be utilized by
attacking third parties to link a particular user’s profiles. Therefore, we have to sample
profiles that have something in common, i.e., in the case of the investigations presented
in this dissertation, the same or similar user name used to register the OSN profiles.
This approach of sampling is based on a random selection of names that are used to
1Facebook identifies profiles not only by identifiers, but also by “Usernames”, i.e., a freely
selectable string value. However, by the use of, for instance, the HTTP-based Graph API
(https://graph.facebook.com/<Username>?fields=id) or the provided explorer on top of this API
(https://developers.facebook.com/tools/explorer) the actual identifier can be obtained.
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perform search requests to the OSNs that are to be analyzed. However, depending on
the data basis from which the analysis software randomly picks and chooses search
strings, e.g., user names, the resulting sample is more or less (consciously) biased. In
fact, it is not uniformly sampled within the ID space of an OSN. However, this does
not constitute a problem for the investigation of similarities of specific users’ profiles.
See Section 5.3.1 for a more detailed introduction of the utilized technique of sampling.
5.1.4 Implementation of Analysis Software
The algorithm of each software implemented to carry out the studies presented in this
thesis follows a commonprocedure of analyzing user profiles out ofOSNs: the software
opens the login page of the OSN and provides credentials of a previously registered
OSN profile (cf. the approach, for instance, used in [XHLZ12]). Afterwards, the
software receives Cookies from theOSN, is logged in and can act like any ordinary user
who makes use of his/her browser. Hence, HTTP requests, such as those performed
by a user’s browser, have to be implemented to be able to parse users’ OSN profiles.
In general, developers can implement the requests by themselves or, alternatively, can
make use of browser controls, such as provided by the C# integrated development
environment (IDE), i.e., an adaptation of an actual browser that can be controlled
by implementing, for instance, mouse clicks and gestures.
As alreadymentioned, this approach is very common in the community of empirical
OSN research. To give more examples, the authors of [JM09] make use of a software
called Arachne to analyze Facebook. This software performs also a login, receives
the cookies necessary to stay logged in and to communicate with the OSN, and
downloads the targeted pages. The authors of [MVGD10] make use of a profile
registered by a student of a certain university to automatically log into Facebook in
order to analyze other users’ profiles. In the context of utilizing analysis software
to automatically sample OSN profiles, we state the same as, for instance, written by
the authors of [CAK12], i.e., in light of legal and ethical restrictions regarding the
analysis of OSN profiles, we have considered not to send too many requests to the
analyzed OSNs to prevent a “Denial of Service” behavior of the analysis software
and, furthermore, we also anonymized the statistical data permanently stored after
analyzing the OSN profiles. In fact, we did not extract users’ publicly shared data.
Hence, the users’ raw data is not accessible by any person who has access to the
statistical data and users’ privacy was/is not threatened by any of the investigations.
For the investigation of the risks regarding attribute predictions, we analyzed a large
sample of OSN profiles. Since such large-scale empirical investigation would take
much time if performed from a single machine, we out-sourced the analysis software
to a cloud. In particular, we rent virtual machines from Amazon EC22 and deployed
the analysis software onto these machines (machines with the deployed analysis
software are referred to as agents). Therefore, we were able to analyze OSN profiles in
parallel, similar to approaches utilized by other authors (cf., for instance, [GKBM10]
or the multi-threaded crawler approach introduced in [DJR12]). Compared to the
2http://aws.amazon.com/ec2/ [Last downloaded 2013-05-28].
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approach for parallel crawling introduced in [CPWF07], i.e., a master agent triggers
crawls of individual OSN profiles at a certain crawling agent out of the available agents,
we make use of a slightly different approach. In particular, we divided the ID space
into ten uniform portions and each of ten agents randomly picks and chooses IDs
out of the assigned part of the whole ID space. With that, we save the overhead of
implementing and running a master agent. After the last agent parsed all profiles to
be sampled, we gathered the statistical data stored locally at the individual agents in
a central data base to perform the analysis on top of the data. Due to the way the
individual analysis software acts and due to the out-sourcing of virtual machines that
run the software, for the studies presented in this dissertation, we analyzed more than
1.5 million OSN profiles in total in a compliant manner.
5.1.5 Measures to Avoid Automated Proﬁle Analyses
Today’s OSN providers implemented a series of countermeasures with respect to
crawler/scraper software. However, the implementation of such countermeasures
constitutes a difficult task, because third parties try to emulate users’ behavior, or
rather the technical behavior of the users’ browser utilized to participate within an
OSN. Therefore, distinguishing actual users and software that crawls the OSN is the
challenge OSN providers have to tackle with.
“It is obvious, the better a crawler emulates the behavior of a human being and a
browser, the more difficult it is to detect such intruding software. Hence, crawlers
use previously registered accounts and determine parameters such as initialization
vectors and valid session identifiers to login into OSNs. Additionally, to stay logged
in crawlers have implemented a handling for cookies. The data will be extracted via
parsing of HTML pages and identifying the information bymeans of tags or keywords
inside the HTML code. Such keywords are commonly static and self-explanatory.
OSNs implemented several countermeasures to thwart and prevent crawling. If
an alleged browser tries to get responses more and faster than ordinary users would
try, CAPTCHAs are presented before the requested content is replied. CAPTCHAs
are pictures with distorted letters that a user has to type in to be able to carry on
surfing. CAPTCHAs are a common possibility to disturb crawling attacks, but an
OSN has to weigh the safeness of its users and the potentially decreasing usability
with respect to the amount of occurrences of CAPTCHAs. Into the bargain, today’s
CAPTCHA-challenges are breakable by software, too [ZYL+10]. Apart from that, a
fix delay between sent HTTP-requests is often sufficient sophistication to prevent the
occurrence of CAPTCHAs. Since only a valid e-mail address and some not further
validated personal information is needed to create an OSN account, any time a profile
is yet blocked by a CAPTCHA the software is able to register a new account and
re-login into the OSN. This is also effective if OSNs are blocking further browsing for
24 hours after a fix amount of HTTP-gets within a fix amount of time. However, as
long as these measures can be circumvented by re-login with another account, it is
only a low extra effort for attackers to implement a bypass inside their crawlers.
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Beyond these countermeasures, switches between standard websites (www...) and
sites for mobile devices support crawlers to avoid JavaScript (and its variations like
AJAX) that are more difficult to emulate. Usually, the mobile pages that any common
OSN provide are solely based on native HTML code and if the software is logged in
into one of these alternatives the access to the other one is also open. It is obvious
that such and other countermeasures are not sufficient to completely avoid automated
data extraction.” [LDH11]
Recently, Facebook tried to invent a feature that might represent a big hurdle for
many third parties that try to register accounts, or rather profiles based on faked data,
i.e., a new user has to provide his/her mobile phone number during registration and
the number is validated by a code sent via SMS. This is a promising opportunity to
avoid fake profiles. However, it does not constitute an insurmountable hurdle for
attacking third parties and automated gathering of users’ PII and, actually, Facebook
reversed the deployment shortly after its implementation. In general, the detection of
malicious activity constitutes a trade-off between usability and efficiency since false
negative detections of alleged crawlers could annoy the OSN users.
5.2 Attribute Availability
In the following, statistical data is presented that has been gathered by two different
runs of OSN analysis. The runs were performed between January and March 2011, as
well as between July and August 2012. First, we show the results of the run performed
at the beginning of 2011. In this run, we did not only analyze Facebook profiles, but
also profiles of the OSNs StudiVZ, MySpace, and XING. In particular, we present
statistical data based on 110,088 analyzed Facebook profiles, 43,615 StudiVZ profiles,
25,035 MySpace profiles, and 10,088 XING profiles. First, we compare the results
gathered from these four networks among each other. Second, we discuss the diversity
of information publicly provided via the analyzed OSNs. With this investigation, we
show that the number of profiles that share specific pieces of PII varies dependent
on the OSN. Based on this finding, we assume that for attacking third parties a
gain in information can be achieved by linking several OSN profiles registered in
different OSNs by the same particular person. Subsequently to the comparison of
publicly available PII in different OSNs, the availability of attributes in users’ profiles
is contrasted to the amount of PII shared by users’ OSN friends that are findings based
on the second run of analysis, which is performed on a sample of almost 1.3 million
Facebook profiles. Finally, a comparison of the results of the empirical studies and a
summary of the results regarding the availability of attributes in OSNs is provided.
Note that PII and other information published via chats or walls are not considered
in the analyses performed for achieving the results presented in this dissertation,
i.e., we always analyzed only publicly available information provided on Facebook’s
information and favorites pages or the respective pages of user profiles of other OSNs.
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Category Attribute StudiVZ Facebook MySpace Xing
General
name 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
no further information available 7% 22% 20% n.a.
friends lists 48.13% 59.45% 67.04% 40.98%
Number
of...
...friends (avg.) 67 141 21 44
...friends (std. deviation) 74.01 216.32 75.47 85.39
...friends (max.) 918 5499 2058 2878
Personal
graduation/title 5.51% -1 -1 69.03%
date of birth (dob)/age 64.00% (dob) 0.84% (dob) 32.06% (age) 0%
zodiac sign 10.51% -1 20.72% -1
gender 71.06% 49.92% 32.06% -1
Contact
hometown 23.74% 8.77% 6.49% -1
current residence/region 48.46% 10.32% 32.04% (100%)2
homeland or current country 18.69% n.a. 28.78% (100%)2
address 0% 0.11% -1 0%
e-mail -1 0.62% -1 0%
mobile phone number -1 1.19% -1 0%
Job
company/occupation 5.75% 9.63% 4.91% (100%)2
type of job 7.85% n.a. n.a. (100%)2
income -1 -1 2.21% -1
Higher edu-
cation
university 51.67% 8.83% n.a. n.a.
field of study or study path 11.21% n.a. n.a. n.a.
languages 10.04% -1 -1 n.a.
general education/cv 23.71% 2.81% 6.35% n.a.
current school -1 16.00% n.a. -1
Oneself and
relations
about myself 16.33% n.a. 6.22% -1
relationship status 26.51% 13.12% n.a. -1
status message 49.85% n.a. 20.72% -1
physique -1 -1 6.93% -1
parentage -1 n.a. 6.02% -1
children -1 -1 7.61% -1
Views and
attitudes
sexual orientation -1 8.16% 7.77% -1
interests/looking for... 31.41% 8.89% 8.92% -1
political direction 18.42% 0.33% -1 -1
religious views -1 0.46% 4.96% -1
smoking and imbibing -1 -1 5.52% -1
Hobbies
interests/details 25.44% 8.50% 20.72% n.a.
clubs/activities/groups 16.57% 14.29% 0.77% n.a.
Favorites
favorite citation 21.00% 4.78% -1 -1
favorite music 26.02% 16.75% 6.84% -1
favorite books 19.32% 5.88% 5.20% -1
favorite movies 22.04% 10.47% 5.90% -1
favorite TV shows -1 12.73% 5.51% -1
1 This attribute does not appear in the respective OSN profile by default.
2 It is mandatory that this attribute is publicly available.
Table 5.1: Publicly available PII – Data collected in 2011 [LTH11]
5.2.1 Attribute Availability Concerning Four Popular OSNs
Table 5.1 shows the percentage of the sampled profiles that publicly provided a specific
piece of PII for each of the four analyzed OSNs. Additionally, numbers that charac-
102
5 Large-Scale Empirical Investigations of Online Social Networks
terizes the sample itself are presented, such as the average friends list size. Referring
to the attacker model introduced in Section 5.1.2, the given numbers represent the
percentage of sampled profiles that provided a specific attribute for any logged in user,
i.e., without any additional access restrictions due to, for instance, adjustments of the
default privacy settings. The analyzed attributes are divided into certain categories
that indicate the type of information represented by the attribute. The categories
are provided in the first column of the table.
The category general includes the availability of the users’ names and their friends
lists. Whereas the names were publicly available in every analyzed OSN, the friends
lists were left open for public access by about a half of all members whose profiles
were analyzed by the software. The availability of these two attributes constitutes the
basis for the detailed analysis of privacy risks. Additionally, the first category indicates
the ratio of analyzed profiles, in which the access to every piece of information
was restricted or even the respective attributes were not provided at all, i.e., only
information that cannot be concealed by the user were accessible in those analyzed
profiles. In Facebook and MySpace, only about 20% of users completely hided their
shared PII from strangers or unknown third parties. Moreover, in StudiVZ only in
about 7 % of the analyzed profiles no actually concealable attribute was accessible.
The second category is labeled with number of... and provides insights on the sizes of
publicly available friends lists. In this category, it can be seen that StudiVZ, MySpace,
and XING profiles had an average number of 21 to 67 friends listed as connected to the
analyzed profile. However, Facebook showed an average number of already 141 friends
per profile. Besides the average size of the friends lists, this category indicates the
standard deviation and the maximum number of friends in the analyzed friends lists.
The category personal subsumes identity information that is almost never changing,
such as the title, date/year of birth, and the gender. Whereas in XING3 almost 70%
of profiles contained information about a user’s graduation and/or title, in StudiVZ
only 5.51 % of users reveal this piece of PII and the other OSNs did not show this
attribute at all. In StudiVZ and MySpace about 10 and 20% shared their zodiac sign.
However, this attribute, as well as the attribute gender, which is provided in many
of the analyzed profiles, could also be inferred by third parties just by analyzing the
date of birth and, for instance, the name of a user, respectively. The date of birth is
provided in 64% of all analyzed StudiVZ profiles, which is surprising if considered
that, on the contrary, only 0.84% of profiles sampled from Facebook have disclosed
this information in 2011. This detected diversity of the availability of some pieces of
PII leads to the investigation of the risks regarding the linkability of a user’s OSN
3Note that “Xing allows four levels of privacy. Users can choose whether their provided data can
be seen by direct friends only or by friends and their friends. They can also adjust the settings to
less restrictive levels with which friends of friends have access to shared information, up to a 4 level
indirection. Since the crawler does neither have a direct nor indirect connection to any crawled profile,
only the name, the title and in almost 60% of all profiles the friends lists could be analyzed. Other
attributes remained hidden. However, the more friends an account owns, the higher is the probability
of having access to further information, because many users still use the ‘level four’ setting mentioned
above. It is straightforward that such connection chains are large enough to get access to many ‘level
four’ restricted data in light of the well-known six-degree separation experiment [TMTM69]” [LTH11].
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profiles. If profiles are easily linkable and, for instance, 64% of StudiVZ members
publicly share their date of birth, for those users it would make only minor sense to
hide this attribute in Facebook. However, we further discuss this topic in Section 5.3.
The category contact includes the attributes hometown and homeland, the current
city/residence and the current country, the address, e-mail address, and the mobile
phone number. At the time the sample was gathered, about a half of the StudiVZ
users publicly provided their current city, whereas only about 10% of Facebook users
shared this information with any logged in user. In the remainder of this section,
we show that this availability has changed over time. However, the hometown and
homeland were the most frequently publicly provided attributes in StudiVZ as well.
About one-third of MySpace users also publicly shared the current city, but only about
6.5 % of them shared the attribute hometown. The analyzed Facebook users shared
the hometown in about 9% of all cases. In XING, the release of the attributes current
city and current country is mandatory. Despite the fact that the other attributes of
this category are very sensitive information and three of four analyzed OSNs does not
reveal the corresponding attribute values by default, up to more than one percent of
Facebook users publicly share their address, information about their e-mail contact,
and their mobile phone number.
The categories job and higher education subsume information about users’ occupa-
tion and educational background. Most of the attributes gathered in these categories
were publicly provided by less than 11.5 % of the analyzed user profiles. However,
publicly sharing of information about a user’s employer and his/her type of job is
mandatory in XING and, therefore, at 100%. In StudiVZ more than 51% of ana-
lyzed profiles provided the current or former university and about a quarter of users
revealed further information on their educational background.
The category oneself and relations represents attributes related to a user’s family
and relationships, as well as information about the physical shape and current frame
of mind. Remarkably, a half of all StudiVZ profiles permitted access to the users’
status messages, which can contain very sensitive information if considered that
users post status messages when they are, for instance, traveling so that their flat
is temporarily unoccupied.
The three latter categories – views and attitudes, hobbies, and favorites – subsume
attributes that characterizes the individual user concerning things he/she is often
doing or thinking, e.g., a user’s political, religious, and sexual orientations, as well as
interests and favorites with respect to different objects. Whereas only a few MySpace
users revealed attributes associated to these categories, the data shows that each of
the analyzed attributes were provided by, at least, about a fifth of the StudiVZ profiles.
5.2.2 Attribute Diversity from OSN to OSN
On the one hand, the presented statistical data gives an impression on what kind of
data was still publicly available (in 2011) regarding the four analyzed OSNs and that
some pieces of information are publicly provided by many of the respective users.
On the other hand, it is remarkable that the availability of information differs from
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Figure 5.1: Ratio of the 6,404 analyzed friends lists that contained a minimum of x
friend profiles that shared the specific attribute [LWMH13].
OSN to OSN, e.g., 64% of the analyzed StudiVZ profiles revealed their date of birth,
whereas less than one percent of Facebook members publicly shared this particular
attribute. However, not only the analysis of the attribute date of birth resulted in diverse
findings, but also the analysis with respect to the attributes current city, hometown,
university, cv, relationship status, and some other attributes. In Section 5.3, we discuss
that the diversity of available information induces significant privacy risks if users’
several OSN profiles can be linked by third parties. The reason for this constitutes
the fact that linked profiles, in which different information about a user is provided,
result in the risk that third parties can gather a comprehensive digital image of a
user, whereas the user actually decided for each of any OSN he/she participate which
kind of information he/she discloses in the respective context. Therefore, users might
be not aware that information shared in one OSN and data published in another
context can be linked by third parties.
5.2.3 Attribute Availability Concerning Users’ Friends Lists
In this section, we present parts of the findings with respect to the investigation of
almost 1.3 million Facebook profiles that we analyzed in the mid of 2012. In particular,
we show how much information is publicly available for third parties that analyze the
friends lists of a targeted user. The corresponding findings induced the investigation
on predictable attributes presented in Section 5.4.
The plot shown in Figure 5.1 indicates the ratio of analyzed friends lists (y-axis) that
contained, at least, x user profiles that publicly provided a specific attribute, i.e., an
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analyzed attribute is publicly provided by, at least, x OSN friends of a user in y∗ 100%
of the analyzed friends lists. For instance, it is indicated “that in about 31 % of the
analyzed friends lists a minimum of 175 friends provided the attribute gender, the
attributemiscellaneous is in 20% of the friends lists provided by 200 or more friend
profiles. Each of 20% of the analyzed friends lists contained aminimum of 150 profiles
that provided the attribute favorite music” [LWMH13]. This plot demonstrates that
for some attributes, on average, a lot of profiles can be found within a friends list
of a user that share this attribute. In turn, this forms the basis for attacking third
parties that try to predict an attribute that is not publicly shared by a user, but by
many of his/her friends. Therefore, the risk regarding attribute prediction is estimated
as high if many friend profiles provide access to an attribute that is not shared by
the owner of the friends list. However, this is not true for attribute values that do
not correlate among OSN friends and the owner of the friends list. In particular, the
stronger the correlation the more accurate can a potential prediction be estimated
and the less OSN friends are needed to be analyzed by an attacking third party to
infer non-provided attribute values.
5.2.4 Comparison of the Statistical Data
In Table 5.2, we compare the statistical results gathered by the two empirical studies
that form the basis of the research findings presented in this thesis. In the first
two columns of the table, the attribute availability is shown as it is measured at the
beginning of 2011. The next two columns present the same results but based on the
study carried out in 2012. Since the results of the analysis of randomly sampled profiles
remarkably differ from the results concerning profiles of users’ friends, we present
another two columns that represent the attribute availability within profiles of OSN
friends of the randomly sampled user profiles that have also been analyzed in the
2012 study. These additional two columns are important in light of the investigation
of the risk regarding potential attribute predictions because this attack is based on
information a user’s OSN friends publicly share.
The left column of each of the three parts of this table represent the overall results,
i.e., students and other users, whereas the right columns (gray background) show the
results concerning only those profiles that could be explicitly identified as profiles
of students (indicated by a publicly provided university). However, since we cannot
rule out that some of the analyzed profiles are profiles of students that we cannot
identify as such (because no university is publicly provided), we cannot provide
data on only non-student users. Therefore, it has to be considered that the results
of the analyses of students’ profiles are slightly biased in terms of that we consider
only those profiles that have, at least, publicly provided their university, which is
an actually concealable attribute, and, thus, the corresponding users might not the
ones that are completely privacy aware.
However, first we compare the left columns among each other. The most interesting
results can be found by comparing the first and the third column, i.e., the statistical
data gathered by the analysis of randomly sampled profiles. In 2011, only 22% of
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2011 2011 2012 2012 2012 2012
student
randomly randomly friends of friends of
sampled sampled randomly randomly
Attribute profiles students profiles students sampled p. sampled p.
name 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
no further information 22% 0.27% 37.84%1 1.53%2 14.20%3 0.39%4
friends lists 59.45% 88% 52.19% 80.71% 64.30% 82.00%
# of friends (avg.) 141 149 219.56 285.27 716.96 795.08
# of friends (std. dev.) 216.32 206.9 323.31 378.55 865.46 897.24
# of friends (max.) 5499 4,807 3,817 3,817 8,398 8,092
date of birth 0.84% 0.14% 2.29% 4.83% 5.32% 7.78%
year of birth n.a. n.a. 1.54% 3.61% 3.19% 4.84%
gender 49.92% 78.72% 85.78% 91.81% 82.00% 85.38%
hometown 8.77% 23.55% 23.20% 44.92% 38.33% 54.64%
current city 10.32% 25.17% 27.00% 52.69% 44.70% 62.44%
address 0.11% 0.35% 0.31% 0.55% 0.88% 1.19%
e-mail 0.62% 1.30% 0.10% 0.04% 0.34% 0.49%
company/occupation 9.63% 46.76% 18.37% 55.17% 28.13% 58.01%
university 8.83% 100% 19.40% 100% 28.72% 100%
current school 16.00% 77.34% 25.53% 74.71% 36.15% 77.03%
about myself n.a. 8.84% 10.31% 23.24% 16.47% 27.35%
relationship status 13.12% 35.43% 13.38% 28.24% 21.66% 34.87%
sexual orientation 8.16% 20.88% 14.79% 31.26% 18.96% 31.75%
interests/details 8.50% 18.84% 5.93%1 13.28%2 14.77%3 22.92%4
clubs/activities/groups 14.29% 34.55% 8.90%1 20.01%2 24.19%3 35.03%4
favorite citation 4.78% 14.92% 2.58% 6.01% 3.44% 6.26%
favorite music 16.75% 37.80% 18.58%1 38.25%2 42.29%3 57.42%4
favorite books 5.88% 18.09% 9.59%1 22.96%2 19.49%3 30.58%4
favorite movies 10.47% 26.35% 12.90%1 29.63%2 28.61%3 41.73%4
favorite TV shows 12.73% 32.24% 14.32%1 31.29%2 33.22%3 46.59%4
Number of analyzed
Facebook profiles 110,088 9,203 12,270 2,380 1,280,827 367,814
(19,628) (21,694) (3741,926) (4208,627)
Table 5.2: Publicly available PII in Facebook (unrestricted access) – comparison of
the data samples gathered in 2011 and 2012.
profiles were completely closed, i.e., no further information than attributes that are
not concealable was provided. In contrast, already about 38% of users completely
restricted the audience of their shared information in 2012. This finding underpins
the increasing privacy awareness of OSN users mentioned in the previous chapters.
Referring to the students’ profiles, we can only observe about 0.3 % of profiles in 2011
and only 1.5 % in 2012 that do not provide any further information public except their
university and the information that is not concealable at all by the use of privacy
settings. Also more than 85% of all analyzed friend profiles provide public access
to, at least, one piece of actually concealable information.
For the availability of public friends lists, we can observe a decrease from almost
60% to slightly more than 52%. However, more than a half of users still publicly
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provide their friends list. Moreover, the analyzed profiles of students indicate that
this group of users seems to be even less restrictive regarding the accessibility of
their friends lists. In particular, more than 80% of users who provided a university
also shared their friends list in 2012 (88% in 2011). Therefore, linking users’ profiles
based on friends lists might still pose a risk for users with several OSN profiles in
which different pieces of PII are publicly shared.
Whereas in 2011 a friends list contained an average number of 141 friend profiles,
until the sampling in 2012, the number increased to more than 200 friend profiles.
Students tend to have even more friends on their friends list4. The maximum number
of friends detected within the data has also been grown to more than 8,000 profiles.
However, it has to be considered that Facebook still limited the maximum number of
friends in 2011. In general, we can state that the detectable increase of the number of
friends per user result in a higher risk that users’ non-provided information can be
inferred by analyzing users’ OSN friends, or rather their publicly shared information
because probably more friends can be found that publicly provide the attribute that
an attacking third parties is about to infer.
By comparing the data gathered in 2011 with the 2012 sample, it becomes obvious that
some attributes were less frequently provided publicly in 2012. However, the availabil-
ity of a significant number of other attributes has been increased within the about 1.5
years between the two samplings. Pieces of PII, such as the gender, hometown, current
city, further address information, information on users’ jobs and even on the users’
sexual orientation, etc., were more likely publicly accessible in the profiles sampled
in 2012. In contrast, the availability of some other attributes, such as the users’ rela-
tionship status and their favorite music, remained more or less unchanged. However,
against the observable increase of privacy awareness, the comparison of the studies
show that some attributes are even more likely accessible for any third party than in
2011, which further motivates the research on risks regarding publicly available PII.
Furthermore, it can be seen that those profiles that can be identified as students’
profiles publicly provide some attributes more likely compared to the sample of all ran-
domly chosen user profiles. To give an example, the hometown was publicly provided
by almost 9% (about 23% in 2012) of ordinary users, whereas the students provide
this attribute in about 24% (about 45% in 2012) of the cases. In turn, this situation
indicates that probably a prediction of students’ non-provided attributes based on
attributes provided by their friends might be more accurate than for other users.
5.2.5 Summary and Conclusions
We showed that still many OSN users are unduly generous in sharing PII. We demon-
strated that not only in Facebook users share, on average, a lot of information, but also
via other OSNs. Furthermore, we discussed the diversity of the set of attributes that is
4The remarkable difference between the average number of friends of a randomly sampled user
profile and the sample of friends’ profiles is explainable due to the fact that a user with more friends is
also more likely interconnected with an analyzed randomly sampled user. Thus, we can observe the
effect of a non-uniform sampling, which is the case for analyzed friend profiles because these profiles
are not randomly sampled itself.
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publicly provided with respect to the OSN. Afterwards, we demonstrated that it is very
likely that, at least, one OSN friend of a user publicly provides a specific piece of PII.
This finding indicates that attribute prediction might still pose a risk if the attribute
values additionally correlate. Finally, we compared the results of two samplings, i.e., a
sample gathered in 2011 and data sampled in 2012. Thereby, we demonstrated that
users’ privacy awareness has been increased with respect to some pieces of attributes.
However, some other attributes are still publicly provided in 2012 as in the sample of
2011. In particular, the users’ friends lists are still provided by more than a half of all
the randomly sampled users and students provide public access to their friends list in
more than 80% of the cases. In general, privacy awareness has been increased during
the about 1.5 years between the studies in terms of that, for instance, the number of
profiles increased that completely restricted the access to PII to a dedicated audience.
However, compared to the situation in 2011, some attributes are publicly provided
by more analyzed profiles in the second sample, e.g., the hometown and the current
city, which are both investigated in the context of this thesis and, in particular, in
light of the investigation of the risk of attribute prediction.
5.3 Linkability of OSN Proﬁles
In this section, we present the results of the investigation of the profile linkability. In
particular, we analyze whether or not and how profiles of different OSNs registered
by a single user can be linked by a third party at low cost, i.e., at low computational
power, low implementation effort, and low sophistication of utilized algorithms. We
already discussed in Chapter 4 and the previous sections of the current chapter that
linking of profiles might be worthwhile for attacking third parties because of the
gain in knowledge about a particular person that can be estimated. This gain is
caused by the fact that users tend to not synchronize their privacy settings adjusted
in different OSNs. Thus, different information might be publicly available in different
OSN profiles of a single user.
In a broad sense, potentially many pieces of PII shared via a user’s OSN profiles
might be adequate to link the profiles. To give examples, a semantic analysis of the
user’s status messages could be exploited, or a face recognition software that can
identify a user on a picture, e.g., this approach could be applied to the profile pictures
used within the OSN profiles. Furthermore, other pieces of PII can be compared with
each other to find correlations. However, since we are searching for the easiest and
most often promising way to link a user’s profiles, we hypothesize that comparisons of
the lists of friends reveal profiles that correspond to a particular user and constitutes
an attack that can be successfully performed at low cost.
Depending on the OSN, friends lists are publicly provided by 40% up to 67% of all
analyzed profiles. Furthermore, comparisons of friends listed within a friends list only
require simple string comparisons, which can even be done without computational
support. In this context, we show that even known overlap metrics have not to be
applied to compare the friends lists, i.e., we do not have to calculate, for instance,
the Jaccard index that includes the number of friends into the calculation [Jac12].
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On the contrary, we show that the number of friends can play only an insignificant
role in sufficiently determining whether or not OSN profiles belong to the same
user. In the following, we demonstrate that and how links between several OSN
profiles of a single person can be established by third parties that have only access
to publicly shared friends lists.
5.3.1 Sampling and Statistical Basis
The sample gathered for investigating the linkability of users’ OSN profiles is carried
out as described in the following. We implemented a JAVA™-based analysis software
that fulfills the requirements stated in Section 5.1 and is implemented on top of the
concepts also presented before. In particular, the software generates pairs of randomly
chosen first and last names out of a large list of popular German names. Afterwards,
the software performs search requests within the four analyzed OSNs by the use of a
picked name pair. Therefore, the software samples profiles out of the four OSNs that
potentially belong to a particular user. The potential belonging to a particular user is
simply caused by the fact that the profiles are registered with equal names5. As a next
step, the analysis software automatically compares each of the sampled profiles of each
of the four OSNs with every profile found in the three other OSNs that are registered
with the same user name. The statistical data calculated during these comparisons is
stored in a local data base and the raw data of analyzed user profiles, i.e., the friends
lists and attribute values itself, are discarded subsequently to the comparisons.
For the investigation of the linkability risks, we sampled OSN profiles and gathered
statistical data by two different runs of the analysis software. First, we sampled about
50,000 Facebook profiles and about 15,000 StudiVZprofiles and compared the publicly
provided friends lists in order to get a feeling of “what is possible” with respect to
profile linking based on names listed in an OSN friends list6. In the second study,
we sampled 110,088 Facebook, 43,615 StudiVZ, 25,035 MySpace, and 10,088 XING
profiles and compared the profiles among each other, i.e., we compared the friends list
of a profile out of an OSN with the friends lists of every potentially matching profile
sampled from the other OSNs. This procedure was done for every profile and every
OSN, so that we got data of comparisons of, for instance, Facebook and StudiVZ
profiles and vice versa, MySpace and Xing profiles and vice versa, StudiVZ and Xing
profiles and vice versa, etc. (in total, 12 combinations of comparisons). In summary,
by this second run of the analysis software, we analyzed more than 180,000 OSN
profiles and performed more than 7,000,000 comparisons of pairs of profiles. In the
following, we present the results of both the preliminary and the comprehensive study
in detail. Beforehand, the methodology of comparing friends lists is introduced.
5Note that we also sampled profiles with just similar names and observed the same findings
compared to the investigation of profiles with equal names.
6Note that this data sample is not considered in the previous Section 5.2.
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Figure 5.2: Exemplary comparison of two friends lists [LTH11].
5.3.2 Methodology of Proﬁle Comparisons
The analysis software is implemented to compare friends lists in a fully automated
manner based on the methodology presented in the following. The software divides
each of the sampled friends lists in a list of entries. Each entry represents a user
name that appears as an OSN friend within a sampled friends list. Subsequently, the
software picks two of these lists that correspond to profiles that potentially belong
to the same user (same/similar name) and calculates the number of those entries
that appear in both friends lists. We refer to the number of friends’ names that are
present in both compared friends lists as the overlap of two friends lists. For instance,
the overlap of friends lists F1 and F2 can be seen as F1 ∩ F2. Figure 5.2 shows an
exemplary overlap of two compared friends lists. In this case, the friends list of
OSN A contained six entries and the one extracted from a profile found in OSN B
contains seven entries. Four names appear in both of these two friends lists and,
therefore, the overlap is equal to four.
Maximum Overlap Metric
Based on this comparison concept, the software calculates the overlap of each of
the friends lists of one OSN and the friends lists of another OSN extracted out of
profiles that potentially belong to the same user. Therefore, for each of the sampled
OSN profiles p of OSN A, we performed a number of np comparisons, where np is
the number of friends lists sampled from another OSN B that are publicly provided
within profiles that might belong to the same user as the user of profile p. We refer to
the comparisons of one friends lists with a set of other friends lists as a comparison
set. Figure 5.3 illustrates the comparison set concept. Figure 5.3a shows a single
comparison set, i.e., the comparisons performed with respect to a single profile
sampled fromoneOSN.A comparison set can also be seen as a 1:n comparison because
one single friends list is compared with n friends lists of another OSN. Figure 5.3b
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Figure 5.3: Illustration of the comparison set concept [LTH11].
shows k comparison sets that cover all comparisons performed between profiles found
in two OSNs based on the same search request (here, “John Sample”). Therefore, we
show in this figure k 1:n comparison sets. “For example, suppose we search for a
person named ‘John Sample’ in two OSNs, OSN A and OSN B. Assume that the
search returns 200 profiles in OSN A and 100 profiles in OSN B with the name ‘John
Sample’. To identify the same user of a specific profile p of OSN A within the 100
profiles of OSN B, we firstly compare the friends list of the profile p with all 100
friends lists of users named ‘John Sample’ fromOSN B.These 100 comparisons form a
comparison set (cs) consisting of 100 single comparisons (1:100, compare Figure 5.3a).
To check each of the 200 profiles found in OSN A, the comparison procedure has to
be executed for each of the 200 found profiles, resulting in 200 cs of 100 comparisons
each (compare Figure 5.3b)” [LTH11], i.e., 20,000 individual comparisons in total.
We define the overlap o by the function o(cs), where cs represents a comparison set:
o(cs), cs ∈ {comparisoni ∣1 ≤ i ≤ n}
With this function, we can express the maximum overlap that can be found within
a single comparison set as max(o(cs)). In particular, max(o(cs)) is the maximum
number of equal entries that can be found by comparisons of the friends lists of a
single comparison set. We assume that a maximum overlap within a comparison set,
i.e., the friends lists that corresponds to max(o(cs)), most likely indicates amatch
of two compared profiles, i.e., profiles that belong to the same particular user. If
just a single comparison of a comparison set results in max(o(cs)), we refer to the
respective comparison as the target comparison in the remainder of this part of the
thesis. In other words, the function f (max(o(cs))) represents the number of those
comparisons of a single comparison set that resulted in the maximum overlap. There-
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Figure 5.4: Histogram of detected comparison overlaps for an exemplary (1:12) com-
parison set cs [LTH11].
fore, if f (max(o(cs))) equals one, we found a target comparison, which even more
indicates that the corresponding two profiles might belong to the same particular user.
In the context of this methodology of comparisons, a 1:n comparison set can also be
visualized as a histogram. In Figure 5.4, we show an exemplary histogram of a compar-
ison set with twelve single comparisons. In particular, such a histogram represents the
comparisons of a single profile’s friends list found with a search request r within OSN
A and every friends list of the profiles found in OSN B by the use of r. In the illustrated
example, we have detected a maximum overlap of 27. Furthermore, the comparison
that resulted in this maximum overlap constitutes a target comparison because no
other comparison could be found that resulted in the same overlap. Expressed as
formulas, max(o(cs)) = 27 and f (max(o(cs))) = 1.
Distinction Distance Metric
Besides the metric maximum overlap and the occurrence of a target comparison,
Figure 5.4 illustrates another important metric for comparing entries of friends lists,
i.e., the distinction distance. The distinction distance d measures the gap between
the value of the maximum overlap and the value of the next lower overlap. In the
exemplary visualized case, d equals max(o(cs)) − 3 because three is the maximum
overlap of the remaining comparisons, i.e, all comparisons of a comparison set except
the one that resulted in the maximum overlap. Hence, d quantifies how distinct
the maximum overlap and, therefore, the target comparison stands apart from all
other detected overlaps. In this context, the metric distinction distance describes the
discriminative power of the maximum overlap.
The distinction distance is a crucial metric when to decide whether or not profiles
potentially belong to the same user. With this metric, we can express the unambigu-
ousness of the indication that is provided by the occurrence of a single comparison
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Figure 5.5: Exemplary aggregated max-overlaps graph (maximum number of maxi-
mum overlaps) [LTH11].
that resulted in a maximum overlap. Referring back to the example illustrated in
Figure 5.4, d remarkably distinguishes the maximum overlap from all other com-
parisons, which increases the probability that the two compared friends lists are
owned by the same user.
Analysis of the Gathered Statistical Data
With a focus on comparisons that result in a maximum overlap, we are, particularly,
interested in whether or not a detected maximum overlap constitutes also a target
comparison and how distinct the overlap stands apart from other detected overlaps
within the same comparison set. In the following, we introduce the concept of the
further analysis that is based on both introduced metrics.
We start by an aggregation of the histograms that result from the different com-
parison sets. In particular, we take the peak that indicates the maximum overlap of
each histogram that represents a single comparison set (for instance, in Figure 5.4 the
peak at an x-value of 27) and aggregate those peaks in a single histogram. Thereby,
we only aggregate comparison sets that resulted due to comparisons of single profiles
of a specific OSN A and all potentially matching profiles of a specific OSN B. To give
an example, one of the aggregated histograms only shows the comparison sets that
are based on comparisons between several single Facebook profiles with potentially
matching StudiVZ profiles. For this approach of analysis, it is further important
that we aggregate peaks of maximum overlaps at the same x-value by plotting just
the highest peak of all peaks. With that, we can observe what was the maximum
occurrence of a maximum overlap within, at least, one of the respective comparison
sets, i.e., a y-value of one indicates that maximum overlaps at a certain x-values only
occurred at a maximum of one time per comparison set. In turn, a y-value larger
than one indicates that in, at least, one of the respective comparison sets more than a
single comparison resulted in the maximum overlap of this comparison set.
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“An exemplary plot of such a graph is shown in Figure 5.5. For this diagram assume
five comparison sets csi , i = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} for which the maximum overlaps are as
follows: max(o(cs1)) = 3,max(o(cs2)) = 7,max(o(cs3)) = 12,max(o(cs4)) = 12 as
well, and max(o(cs5)) = 17. Assume that the maximum overlap of three is detected
in two single comparisons in the first comparison set cs1” (i.e., f (max(o(cs1))) = 2).
“The corresponding aggregated graph shows four peaks, as seen in Figure 5.5. Three of
these peaks indicate a maximum overlap with a maximum number of one because in
each of the corresponding four cs these values are not detected or just detected in one
single comparison. Note that the peaks indicate themaximum number of a maximum
overlap and do not indicate the number of cs with a specific determined maximum
overlap. In this example, only one comparison within each of two corresponding
comparison sets existed whose overlap matched the maximum overlap of 12. In
contrast, the peak at three has a y-value of two because we assumed that thismaximum
overlap is found two times in cs1 so that the maximum number of such specific
maximum overlap three is two. We refer to such graphs as aggregated max-overlaps
graphs, i.e., graphs in which the maximum overlap of every cs is plotted against its
maximum number within every cs” [LTH11].
In addition to the aggregated maximum overlaps, according the introduced concept
of aggregation, we show in the aggregated plots also the average distinction distance
of the maximum overlaps, as well as the corresponding standard deviations to get a
feeling of how significant a maximum overlap indicates a comparison of two friends
lists that probably belong to profiles of the same user. If the distinction distance at a
certain x-value converges to this x-value, the corresponding maximum overlap stands
considerably apart from all other overlaps detected in the respective comparison
set(s). A maximum distinction distance that is equal to its x-value (i.e., the overlap)
means that the detectedmaximum overlap was the only overlap that could be detected
in the respective comparison set. In the following results section, we demonstrate
that distinction distances are always next to the x-value so that maximum overlaps
represent not only the largest overlap, but also an outlier with respect to the actual
overlap of all other comparisons within a comparison set.
5.3.3 Results of the Empirical Study on the Linkability
Before the aggregated histograms are shown, we present Figure 5.6 that represents the
results of the preliminary study we carried out to investigate the linkability of OSN
profiles, i.e., the study based on 50,000 Facebook and about 15,000 StudiVZ profiles.
In this plot, the overlap is shown in percentages on the x-axis. The y-axes represent
the relative number of comparisons that resulted in a specific overlap. The gray curve
(with its y-axis on the right) constitutes the cumulative distinction function (CDF) of
the black curve (left y-axis). Referring to the black curve, it is obvious that a lot of
comparisons resulted in a very small (or even no remarkable) overlap. However, the
curve increases a little bit before and at an overlap of 15% to 20%. That means, we
can observe many comparisons with small overlaps but some with a higher overlap.
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Figure 5.6: Histogram that shows the probability of the friends lists overlap of two pro-
files from different OSNs with respect to the extent of the overlap and a corresponding
CDF [LDH11].
In the following, we show an aggregated plot, such as introduced in the previous
section, to investigate these higher overlaps in more detail. Figure 5.7 shows one of the
twelve aggregated histograms generated on the basis of the different comparison sets.
In particular, the plot represents the results of choosing Facebook profiles and compare
each of the corresponding friends lists with the friends lists of every potentially
matching profile found in StudiVZ. Therefore, each of the included comparison sets
includes comparisons of one single Facebook profile with all StudiVZ profiles found
with the same search string. Because the other plots are very similar compared to
the one shown in this section, we show the other plots in Appendix B.
The plot demonstrates that beginning from a certain x-value, i.e., the maximum
overlaps detected in the respective comparison sets, the corresponding y-value is
always just one (here, beginning from an x-value of four). According to the method-
ology of aggregation of the results presented in the previous section, this observation
means that if maximum overlaps larger than three occurred, these overlaps could
be identified just by a single comparison of the respective comparison sets. In other
words, we cannot find a comparison set with a certain maximum overlap larger than
three that is reached by two different comparisons of the same comparison set. There-
fore, the comparisons of every single comparison set resulted in different overlaps,
but the maximum overlap is only observable in one of these comparisons, i.e., every
detected maximum overlap larger than three also indicates a target comparison.
Furthermore, the plot shows the average distinction distances and the corresponding
standard deviations (y-axis on the right). Herein, we can make two different observa-
tions. First, each of the average distinction distances is close to the corresponding
x-value. That means, on average, every maximum overlap stands considerably apart
from all other overlaps detected in the same comparison set. The second observation
is the fact that the standard deviations are always tiny, i.e., not only the average dis-
tinction distances are close to the corresponding x-values, but also we cannot detect
a significant number of outliers with respect to the average distinction distance.
116
5 Large-Scale Empirical Investigations of Online Social Networks
?
??
??
??
??
???
???
???
???
???
?
?
?
?
?
??
??
? ? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
????????? ??? ??? ???????????????????????????????????????????
?
??
??
??
??
??
??
???
???
??
??
??
???
??
???
?
??
??
??
???
???
???
???
??
???
??
??
?
???? ?? ????????
??????? ??????????? ?????????
Figure 5.7: Maximum overlaps and distinction distances of all comparison sets of
comparisons between Facebook and StudiVZ [LTH11].
In general, we found only two different types of comparison sets by comparing
friends lists: first, comparison sets in which just minimal overlaps of friends lists
could be detected (between zero and three overlaps per comparison) and, second,
comparison sets in which all comparisons except one resulted in such minimal over-
laps and the excepted one resulted in a significantly larger overlap (larger than three).
For comparison sets that resulted in the first type of overlaps, we cannot give evidence
that we found two profiles that potentially belong to the same user. However, in the
second case, we found a strong indicator for profiles that belong to the same particular
user because of the outlier characteristic of the overlap of the corresponding friends
lists. This observation implies that every maximum overlap with a value of larger than
three corresponds to a target comparison and, therefore, a comparison of two profiles
that result in a larger overlap than every other comparison of the same comparison
set could indicate profiles of the same particular user.
Therefore, profiles whose friends lists have an overlap of more than three names
of OSN friends most likely identify profiles of the same user. All other comparisons
of potentially matching profiles that result in an overlap lower than four cannot be
identified as profiles that belong to the same user. In the next section, we discuss
the error rate of the indication of matching profiles. However, the stated assumption
with respect to matches indicated by overlaps larger than three cannot be proven
because we would have to involve the owners of the analyzed profiles into the study
in terms of asking them whether or not two potentially matching profiles are both
owned by them. In light of the presented restrictions imposed by the German law
and the aim to carry out the empirical studies as privacy preserving as possible, an
involvement of the respective users would not be compliant.
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Nevertheless, to provide a more detailed analysis on whether or not the mentioned
interpretation of the results is correct, “we implemented a module that enabled the
analysis software to compare additional available information of OSN profiles, such as
the given hometown, region, university, date of birth, etc. With this module activated
we did another short run with which the software found about 300 comparisons that
resulted in an overlap larger than three. In almost all of these cases the software found
a minimum of one other information that appeared in both compared profiles equally.
In more than half of all cases the profile image was exactly the same in both profiles.
Other attributes that were often available in both profiles were the user’s hometown,
region, university or the date of birth. In none of the analyzed comparisons the
software found two mutually exclusive pieces of information. This fact confirms the
hypothesis that two profiles with the same user name and an overlap of friends lists
larger than three are owned by the same natural person” [LTH11].
5.3.4 Discussion
In the following, we discuss the results regarding the risk that third parties can
link users’ profiles by comparing the information publicly provided and point out
limitations of the presented study. We demonstrated the risk that third parties can
link a user’s OSN profiles even at low cost. In particular, we showed that just simple
string comparisons of the names of the user’s friends can indicate whether or not
two profiles belong to the same particular user. A requirement for a high accuracy of
this approach of profile linking is constituted by the name that is used to register in
the OSNs. If a user registered his/her profiles by the use of the same user name, the
risk that third parties can accurately link the profiles can be estimated as significantly
higher than for profiles that are registered by the use of different names. However,
since some OSNs try to force users to provide their given and last name to be used
as the user name, the assumption that users often register their OSN profiles by the
use of the same user name seems valid. For instance, Google asks their customers
whether or not they like to use their real name, which is also used in Googlemail7,
if the users make use of a, for instance, phantasy name for their Youtube channel8.
Also other OSNs temporarily implemented measures to force users to use their given
and last name as their user name of their profile.
However, even if users make use of different names to register their OSN profiles,
unintended profile linking poses a risk. Actually, it is feasible to link profiles if third
parties can extract a sample of profiles out of two OSNs that contain the profiles
of the targeted user. In this context, the authors of [ZL09] show that user names
registered in one OSN can be used to identify user names used by the same users
in other OSNs. “Certainly, profiles of two differently named users who have the
same city or the same hometown in common might have a higher overlap than two
profiles that are just set up with the same name. The probability that a user with
exactly the same name as another user exists who, additionally, has same friends is
7https://mail.google.com/ [Last downloaded 2013-05-28].
8https://www.youtube.com/ [Last downloaded 2013-05-28].
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probably very low. However, the probability that in an evaluated population of users
living in the same city two users with different names can be found who have a high
number of overlappingOSN friends is obviously higher because of overlapping groups
of friends in ‘real life’. Nevertheless, we are convinced that the metrics maximum
overlap and distinction distance could also be sufficient to link profiles registered
with different names” [LTH11].
Finally, we discuss potentially existing error rates regarding the linking of profiles
based on friends lists. A third party cannot entirely ensure that profiles linked by
the presented approach do not belong to the same user, i.e., the occurrence of false
positives. In fact, in light of the restrictions imposed by the German law, we cannot
figure out the actual error rate, or rather accuracies of linking profiles. However, it is
also debatable whether third parties even care about some wrongly linked profiles.
Certainly, the answer to this question highly depends on the actual attacker. An
attacker who just targets a single user and tries to link his/her profiles might care
about false positives and false negatives. However, for another attacker who just try
to gather as lot of information as possible about a large group of users, it might not
significantly impair his/her objective if just a few of the profiles are wrongly linked.
The reason for this might be the expected profit induced by the profiles that are
successfully linkable. In this context, the presented results indicate that the error rate
is remarkably low because of the unambiguousness of the outlier characteristic of the
overlaps that correspond to a target comparison. Therefore, we assume that “poten-
tially existing false positives are negligible compared to the number of profiles that
third parties are able to link correctly. Furthermore, the expected gain of information
(...) countervails less probably [sic] occurrences of false positives from the perspective
of third parties” [LTH11]. In general, we can state that the more PII is shared by an
OSN user via his/her different profiles the more profile linking poses a risk because
the more accurate an attacking third party can link his/her profiles.
5.3.5 Summary and Conclusions
In Section 5.2, we have shown that OSN users still publicly share a remarkable amount
of PII and other information. In particular, about a half of the users provide public
access to their list of friends. In this section, we demonstrated that the linkability of a
user’s different OSN profiles poses a risk, particularly, if the profiles are registered with
similar, or even equal user names. Furthermore, we showed that profiles that belong
to the same user can even be linked at low cost, i.e., just based on string comparisons
of the names of users’ OSN friends. If we combine the findings presented so far in
this chapter, it becomes obvious that the linkability of OSN profiles not only poses a
risk in itself, but also brings third parties into the position of aggregating information
shared in one OSN together with information shared in another OSN. Since users
tend to publicly share different information in different OSNs the linking of OSN
profiles might be worthwhile for attacking third parties.
In summary, we revealed that even an overlap of just more than three friends is
probably sufficient to link profiles that are registered with equal names and belong
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to the same particular user. Furthermore, we discussed that profiles can be linked
by comparing friends lists even if the user name is similar or completely differs in
two profiles of a user. In those cases, comparisons might only result in distinction
distances that do not converge as strong as the shown distances to the corresponding
x-value and the number of false positives might also increase. However, the large
amount of publicly available PII demonstrates that third parties can exploit further
attributes to increase the accuracy of linking profiles of a user who has not registered
his/her profiles with equal user names.
In 2009, Motoyama and Varghese suspected that more information can be gathered
by finding additional OSN profiles of a user [MV09] and the study presented in
this thesis confirms this assumption. Moreover, if users have not adjusted their
privacy settings in some of their OSN profiles the data is publicly available, no matter
whether or not the user frequently make use of the respective OSN. In other words,
although Facebook gains remarkable market share in recent years, some other OSNs
are growing as well (cf. [MKG+08]), users use different OSNs for different purposes
(e.g., Xing and LinkedIn for managing professional contacts and other OSNs for
personal purposes), users probably tend to not delete old and no more used OSN
profiles, and users do not synchronize their privacy settings as discussed previously.
Therefore, the linkability of OSN profiles poses still a risk for users and third parties
can profit from aggregating information shared via different OSNs.
5.4 Attribute Prediction based on PII of OSN Friends
In this section, we present the results of the investigation of the risk regarding potential
attribute prediction introduced in Section 4.4.3. The basis for the attribute prediction
risk also constitutes the availability of users’ friends list. Following the presentation
of the results regarding the linkability risk, we demonstrate that some pieces of
information that have not even been publicly provided by a user can be inferred by
third parties based on the data publicly shared by the user’s OSN friends.
In the following, we compare publicly provided PII of randomly sampled Facebook
users with the PII publicly shared by their Facebook friends. The investigation is
based on a large sample of randomly picked Facebook profiles and the analysis of the
profiles of the correspondingOSN friends. In total, we have analyzed almost 1.3million
profiles for this study. In the following, we primarily focus on the quantification of
the risk regarding the prediction of location attributes, i.e., a user’s current city (i.e.,
the city where a user pretends to live) and his/her hometown, as well as the prediction
of the users’ age. Whereas location attributes are provided by many profiles of users’
OSN friends, the age is a rarely provided attribute. However, even for the age, or
rather year of birth, we show strong correlations that are sufficient to predict the
age of users with a remarkable accuracy even if this attribute is not provided by the
users themselves. Subsequently to the analysis of location attributes and the users’ age,
we discuss the risk that other pieces of PII are predictable by attacking third parties.
Thereby, it is demonstrated that for some attributes the risk of potential attribute
predictions can be estimated as significantly lower than for the previously analyzed
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Randomly picked α-profiles 12,500
> Profiles with a public friends list (FL) 6,404
Total number of friends in 6,404 FLs 1,278,478
> Average number of friends in 6,404 FLs 199.64
Total number of profiles analyzed 1,290,978
Table 5.3: Sample of OSN profiles [LWMH13]
attributes, at least, if a casual attacker is assumed. The reason for that is constituted
by the fact that these attributes are less often publicly provided and that the attribute
values barely correlate. The study presented in this section also lays a foundation for
future technologies to support users in managing their PII by performing an adequate
risk assessment regarding their own privacy situation. See Chapter 6 for a discussion
on privacy tools based on the studies presented in the current chapter.
The current section is structured as follows. First, we provide information on the
methodology of sampling and the gathered statistical data. Second, we show the
investigation of location attributes and, afterwards, the results regarding the privacy
risk posed by the possibility to predict users’ age. Next, we demonstrate whether or
not and how accurate also other attributes can be inferred by attacking third parties.
Finally, we discuss the findings and conclude the section.
5.4.1 Sampling and Statistical Basis
For carrying out the study on the quantification of attribute prediction risks, we
uniformly sampled Facebook profiles and corresponding friend profiles from the – at
the time of sampling – entire 950+ million Facebook profiles9. The sampling was per-
formed in July and August 2012 by use of a C#-based crawler, which constitutes also
a compliant analysis software with respect to the German law and aims at analyzing
user profiles as privacy preserving as possible. The software is implemented to utilize
an acceptance-rejection-sampling as introduced in section 5.1.3. In particular, the soft-
ware analyzes every profile found by the sampling and, additionally, all corresponding
friend profiles if a randomly sampled profile provides public access to its friends list10.
When a profile with a public friends list is found, the analysis software compares
every piece of PII provided via the information page and the favorite page of the
sampled profile with the respective piece of publicly provided PII of the corresponding
friend profiles. The software discards all profiles that do not provide public access
to the friends list. Subsequently to the fully automated comparison process of one
sampled profile and its corresponding friend profiles, the software discards also the
raw data provided within the compared profiles and stores only the statistical data
calculated on-the-fly during the comparison process. With that, no piece of PII was
extracted by the software and permanently stored within the local data bases.
9Status at August 2012; http://newsroom.fb.com/.
10“Others report that a maximum of only 400 friends can be accessed within a friends list. We did
not observe this restriction with the utilized analysis software” [LWMH13].
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Figure 5.8: Graph with nodes geo-located with respect to the current cities of those
randomly chosen users (α-profiles) and their friends who provided this attribute
(381,193 nodes). The edges represent the corresponding friendship relations. Illustra-
tion inspired by the visualization of Facebook friendships by Paul Butler (Facebook),
Dec. 201011. High resolution version can be downloaded at http://dsn.tm.kit.edu/
img/content/fb-kit-2012.jpg [LWMH13].
Randomly sampled profiles that provide public access to the friends list are referred
to as α-profiles in the remainder of this chapter. Table 5.3 shows the number of
randomly sampled profiles, the number of α-profiles, as well as the number of friend
profiles compared to its corresponding α-profile. With the acceptance-rejection-
sampling, we sampled 12,500 profiles. 6,404 of them publicly provided their friends list
with an average number of about 200 friends. In total, we analyzed almost 1.3 million
Facebook profiles for the investigation of the risk regarding predictable attributes.
“Figure 5.8 shows a graph with nodes geo-located with respect to the current
cities of those users who provided this location information publicly. The graph
shows current cities of α-profiles (2,667 α-profiles provided this attribute) and cur-
rent cities provided by their friends. The distribution matches very well with the
overall coverage and relationship visualization published by Facebook in December
201011” [LWMH13]. Furthermore, compared to the “US population density of geolo-
cated Facebook users” visualized by the authors of [BSM10], it can also be seen that
the sample analyzed for this part of the dissertation constitutes a uniform sample
of the whole Facebook “population”.
Statistical Basis for Comparing Proﬁles
In the following, we pick up the already discussed attribute availability observed in the
sample (cf. Figure 5.1 introduced in Section 5.2.3). The statistical data is based on the
analysis of the 6,404 out of 12,500 randomly sampled Facebook profiles that admitted
public access to their friends list. For investigating potentially existing correlations of
pieces of PII provided by a Facebook user and his/her OSN friends as a basis to infer
11https://www.facebook.com/notes/facebook-engineering/visualizing-friendships/469716398919
[last downloaded 2013-05-28].
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Attributes A B C D
Friends List 6,404 100% – –
Personal Attributes
Gender 5,815 90.8% 6,345 99.1 %
Current City 2,667 41.7 % 5,900 92.1 %
Hometown 2,316 36.2 % 5,806 90.7 %
Relationship Status 1,362 21.3 % 5,669 88.5 %
University 932 14.6% 5,201 81.2 %
Employer 784 12.2 % 5,134 80.2 %
School 421 6.5 % 4,715 73.6%
Year of Birth 117 1.8 % 4,286 66.9%
Favorites
Miscellaneous 3,474 54.2 % 6,092 95.1 %
Favorite Music 2,400 37.5 % 5,909 92.3 %
Favorite TV Shows 1,884 29.4% 5,783 90.3 %
Favorite Movies 1,688 26.4% 5,736 89.6%
Interests 1,370 21.4 % 5,613 87.6%
Favorite Books 1,285 20.1 % 5,572 87.0%
Activity 1,257 19.6% 5,632 87.9%
Favorite Sports Teams 778 12.1 % 5,346 83.5 %
Favorite Sportsmen 721 11.3 % 5,320 83.1 %
Favorite Type of Sport 180 2.8% 4,082 63.7 %
A: absolute number of α-profiles
B: percent of α-profiles
C: absolute number of analyzed friends lists
D: percent of analyzed friends lists
Table 5.4: Column A and B: Absolute and relative number of the 6,404 α-profiles that
provided the attribute AND shared a friends list, in which a minimum of one friend
also provided the attribute. Column C and D: Absolute and relative number of the
6,404 analyzed friends lists that contained a minimum of one profile that shared the
attribute [LWMH13].
the user’s attributes if he/she does not publicly share these attributes, we compare
specific pieces of PII among each other. However, comparisons are, or rather could
only be performed if the randomly sampled user profile and a minimum of one of the
corresponding friend profiles provide the attribute. If the user and/or, at least, one of
his/her friends does not publicly provide a specific piece of information, we cannot
compare the α-profile with the corresponding friends. Therefore, not every profile of
the 6,404 α-profiles can be included into the investigation of potential correlations
of some of the investigated attribute values.
Therefore, Table 5.4 provides the number of comparable α-profiles with respect to
specific pieces of PII. In particular, the table shows, such as other tables of this chapter,
several attributes OSN users (here: Facebook users) can reveal via the information
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and favorites pages of their profiles. In column A and B of the table, we show the
number of profiles that publicly provide a certain attribute and a friends list in which
a minimum of one friend also publicly provided the specific attribute (column A:
absolute values, column B: relative values with respect to the 6,404 analyzed profiles
with public friends lists). For example, we found 1,362 profiles (i.e., 21.3 % of the 6,404
α-profiles) that publicly provided the attribute relationship state and a friends list in
which a minimum of one friend also revealed this piece of information. Obviously,
not every analyzed attribute is publicly provided very often, for instance, only 117
profiles contained the attribute year of birth and, additionally, a minimum of one
friend, who also provided his/her year of birth.
Furthermore, Table 5.4 shows how many of the 6,404 friends lists contained, at
least, one friend profile that provided a certain piece of PII (column C: absolute
values, column D: relative values with respect to the 6,404 analyzed friends lists).
The availability of the respective attribute within the α-profile is consciously not
considered in columns C and D. In general, we can observe that for some pieces of
PII just a small portion of randomly sampled profiles publicly share a certain attribute
AND a friends list in which one of the listed OSN friends also provide public access
to this specific piece of PII. However, columns C and D show that even for those
attributes that are rarely provided, we can find a lot of friends lists that contain a
minimum of one profile that provided the attribute, which could be sufficient for
inferring users’ non-provided PII. To give an example, only 421 out of 6,404 users
publicly share the school via their profile page and provide public access to their
friends list in which a minimum of one friend also provide a value for the attribute
school, whereas 4,715 of the 6,404 analyzed friends lists contain, at least, a profile
that provided a value for this attribute. Inter alia, this statistical data indicates the
actual risk regarding attribute predictions by attacking third parties if correlations
of values of certain attributes can be shown.
In the following, we present the findings gained by comparing attribute values
of specific pieces of PII provided by randomly sampled user profiles (α-profiles)
and by the corresponding friend profiles if a minimum of one friend also publicly
provided the specific attribute.
5.4.2 Analysis of Location Attributes
Referring to the attribute current city, we found 2,667 α-profiles that publicly provided
this attribute and a friends list with, at least, one friend profile that also made the
current city publicly available. In fact, about 44% of a user’s friends provided public
access to their current city. We refer to a current city publicly provided by an α-profile
as an α-city and friends that provide exactly the same current city as the α-profile
are referred to as same-city-friends in the remainder of this section.
Initially, by analyzing the statistical data, we figured out that, on average, more
OSN friends of a certain α-profile are same-city-friends than friends who publicly
provided a different current city. In particular, in 56.3 % of the analyzed friends lists
the most frequently provided current city equals the α-city, i.e., those friends lists
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Figure 5.9: CDF of analyzed friends lists, in which the most, or rather the second, or
the third,... (x-axis) most frequently provided current city is equal to the current city
of the corresponding α-profile [LWMH13].
contained more same-city-friends than friends in any other city. We show this result
in Figure 5.9. Furthermore, the figure provides the probabilities on its y-axis that
one of the two, three, four,... (see x-axis) most frequently provided current cities
equals the α-city. In fact, in 72.8% of the cases the α-city equals the most or second
most frequently provided city. The probability that the α-city is one of the three most
frequently provided current cities within a friends list is at 80.2%.
Therefore, it is most likely that the most frequently provided current city within
a friends list equals the α-city, i.e., the current city of the owner of the friends list.
Hence, the most frequently provided city serves as a maximum likelihood estimator13.
However, 56.3 % of accuracy is not remarkably high. Otherwise, we found, on average,
42 different cities provided in a single friends list and a maximum of 337 different
locations in one of the analyzed friends lists. Therefore, we analyze the distribution of
provided current cities in more detail in the following. In particular, we analyze how
close friends are living around the α-city, i.e., the average geographical spread of a
friends list, in order to estimate the quality of the maximum likelihood estimator, or
rather the actual inaccuracy of possible wrong predictions. For this investigation, we
introduce another metric called the discriminative distance, i.e., the air-line distance
between two publicly provided cities (“as the crow flies”). In order to plot a histogram
of the distribution of friends with respect to the metric air-line distance, we calculated
the number of friends in certain distances compared to the α-city. Afterwards, these
numbers are compared to the number of same-city-friends.
Figure 5.10 illustrates an exemplary histogram with the air-line distances on its
x-axis and the percentage of friend profiles that provided a city in a certain air-line
distance on the y-axis. Note that in this example the largest peak represents the
same-city-friends, which is the case in only 56.3 % as mentioned above. Furthermore,
13Statistical model: Bernoulli distribution with P(X = 1) = p, i.e., the probability that the most
frequently provided city equals the α-city, and P(X = 0) = 1 − p (in the opposite case).
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Figure 5.10: Illustration of an example histogram that shows the percentage of
friends of an α-profile who provided a city in a specific distance compared to the
α-city [LWMH13].
the next lower peak subsumes friends that provided a city in a certain air-line distance
compared to the α-city, or rather the current city of the same-city-friends.
Figure 5.11 shows an aggregated histogram of all histograms built upon the gathered
statistical data of the individual friends lists in the aforementioned manner. The
figure also shows the air-line distance on its x-axis and the average percentage of
friends on the y-axis. Note that we only consider those friend profiles for calculating
the relative numbers that publicly provided the attribute current city. Therefore, the
whole number of friend profiles that share the current city represents 100%. In turn,
friend profiles that does not provide a current city are not considered for this and
the following figures. As illustrated in the previous figure, the first bar of Figure 5.11
also shows the percentage of same-city-friends. We cut off the plot at a distance of
500 kilometers for the sake of legibility. The last bar shows an aggregation of provided
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Figure 5.11: Average percentage of friends (y-axis) who provided a city in specific
distances (x-axis) compared to the corresponding α-profile. Additionally, the plot
shows the corresponding 0.95 confidence intervals12 [LWMH13].
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Figure 5.12: Illustration of how the difference (in percentage points) and the discrimi-
native distance between two peaks is evaluated [LWMH13].
current cities within all air-line distances larger than 500 kilometers compared to the
α-city. Up to 500 kilometers each bar represents a bin of ten kilometers. Additionally,
we show the 0.95 confidence intervals13. “It can be seen that on average 32.6% (i.e.,
an absolute number of about 44 friends) of the friends who provided the current
city are same-city-friends, which is 28 percentage points higher compared to other
distance bins. However, the standard deviation of the 32.6% of friends is at 26.9 and,
additionally, occasional occurrences of (maybe large) groups of friends that do not
live in the α-city are averaged out” [LWMH13].
Therefore, we have to individually investigate each of the generated single histograms
(cf. Figure 5.10) in order to study the actual geographical spread of friends lists. For
this investigation, we divide the sample into two different cases: (1) those friends
lists in which the most frequently provided city equals the α-city (56.3 % of the cases)
and (2) those friends lists in which the most frequently provided city is different
from the α-city. In Figure 5.12, once again, exemplary distributions of provided cities
with respect to the air-line distances regarding the α-city are shown. In particular,
both case (1) (more same-city-friends; see black bars) and case (2) (less same-city
friends; see striped bars) are illustrates in this figure. In the following, we investigate
a dedicated metric for each of the two cases that provides further information on the
distribution of friends around the current city provided by an α-profile.
For friends lists of case (1), we investigate the difference between the two largest
peaks within each histogram, i.e., a measure on how close a decision was if a third
party successfully predicted an α-city. Figure 5.13 shows these differences of the two
largest peaks on the x-axis. In particular, we calculated the differences between the
number of same-city-friends and the number of friends living in the second most
frequently provided city in absolute terms and set this value in relation to the actual
size of the respective friends list, i.e., the number of friends contained in the list. For
example, we assume a friends list containing 100 OSN friends who provide a current
city, of which 35 friends are same-city-friends, 25 friends are living in the second most
13Confidence intervals indicate the reliability of statistical values. 0.95 confidence intervals mean
that the probability that the actual values of given statistical values are within the specified intervals is
at 95%.
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Figure 5.13: Probability distribution of the differences between the number of same-
city-friends and the number of friends that correspond to the second most frequently
provided city. The differences are expressed in relative terms w.r.t. the friends list sizes.
Only the profiles are considered, in which the same-city-friends yield the highest
peak [LWMH13].
frequently provided city, and 40 friends are distributed over the other provided cities.
In this example, the difference between the two largest peaks (35 and 25) is equal to ten.
The y-axis of Figure 5.13 indicates the percentage of friends lists in which a certain
difference can be detected, i.e., the probability of occurrence of a specific difference.
The plot demonstrates, that in more than 65% of the cases, the difference between
the number of same-city-friends and the number of friends that provided the second
most frequently provided city is marginal. In fact, it is equal or less than 20 percentage
points and, therefore, a successful prediction based on the most provided city was
very often a close decision.
In light of this finding, the question remains whether or not wrongly predicted
α-cities are close to the α-city itself. To investigate this distance, we make use of the
metric discriminative distance, i.e., the air-line distance between the most frequently
provided current city and the α-city for those cases in which these two cities are not
equal. Therefore, we investigate the friends lists on top of which a prediction of the α-
profile’s current city based on the most frequently provided city does not successfully
result in the actual α-city. In Figure 5.14, the aggregated results are shown. On the
x-axis, we show the discriminative distance between the most frequently provided city
and the α-city pooled in bins of ten kilometers each. The probability of occurrence is
shown on the y-axis, i.e., the percentage of friends lists in which we could detect a
certain discriminative distance. The plot shows that in about 30% of the respective
friends lists the most frequently provided current city is located within a radius of
50 kilometers around the α-city. However, whereas some most frequently provided
current cities are very close to the α-city, some others are remarkably far away.
Thus far, we demonstrated that an attempt to predict the α-city based on the most
frequently provided current city within a friends list induces a success rate of 56.3 %.
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Figure 5.14: Probability distribution of the discriminative distances between the most
frequently provided current city and the α-city. Only the profiles are considered, in
which the same-city-friends do not yield the highest peak [LWMH13].
We have also shown that successfully predicted cities are often close to other similarly
frequently provided cities. In turn, some of the potentially wrongly predicted cities
are very close to the actual α-city. In the following, we soften the assumed attacker
model a little bit in terms of assuming an attacker that is not interested in the exact
current city of the user who corresponds to the α-profile, but rather in whether or
not the user is located in the nearby area of the actual α-city. For instance, such an
attacker is interested in whether or not a user lives within a 50 kilometer radius of
Karlsruhe, Germany. Because of the fact that the investigation of friends lists with a
most frequently provided city that differs from the α-city has shown that a significant
number of most frequently provided cities are located in the nearby area of the α-
city, we pursue the question how accurate, at least, a certain nearby area of the actual
current city of a user can be predicted by exploiting a user’s friends’ provided locations.
Figure 5.15 provides the accuracies of predicting a certain nearby location of the
α-city. The plot answers the question in how many cases of the analyzed friends lists
the number of same-city-friends plus the number of friends in a certain distance is
larger than the number of friends who provided any other city plus the friends living
in the specific distance of this city. The distance inaccuracy is shown on the x-axis as
the “included radius around provided cities” (bins of one kilometer). On the y-axis,
we show the percentage of friends lists that would induce successful predictions of a
certain distance around the α-city. At the very left of the plot the already mentioned
56.3 % success rate can be seen, which represents a distance inaccuracy of zero kilome-
ters. However, at an x-value of, for instance, 50 kilometers the success rate is already at
68.2 %, i.e., if an attacking third party do not care about an inaccuracy of 50 kilometers
the success rate of predictions based on friends’ most frequently provided current
city is at almost 70%. Starting from about 70 kilometers inaccuracy the success rate
increases to more than 70%. The curve significantly flatten in its course. At a distance
inaccuracy of 100 kilometers the success rate is at 71.7 % and at 250 kilometers at 75.3 %.
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Figure 5.15: Ratio of analyzed friends lists, in which a city prediction would be suc-
cessful if the number of friends in an x km radius around provided cities is included
in the detection of the most frequently provided city or area, respectively [LWMH13].
“Therefore, on the one hand, it is worthwhile to exploit the number of friends in a
small nearby area around provided cities if a third party is interested in predicting a
user’s city. On the other hand, the increase of the probability of a correct prediction
diminishes if the radius is more and more increased, which is obvious if we take into
account that most people live in the nearby area of their friends” [LWMH13].
Appendix C provides further results on the attribute prediction risk with respect
to location attributes. In particular, we show the same analysis as presented before
for the attribute hometown. Furthermore, we demonstrate how the accuracies of
potential predictions of current cities and hometowns change if only those α-profiles
are considered that can be explicitly identified as profiles of current or former students.
5.4.3 Analysis of the Users’ Age
In the following, we investigate the correlation of the attribute year of birth, or rather
the age, within the users’ friends lists. In contrast to the location attributes the year
of birth is very rarely provided for the public. In fact, we found only 117 of the 6,404
randomly sampled α-profiles that provided the attribute and provided a friends list
in which, at least, one friend also provided this piece of PII (1.8% of the randomly
sampled profiles with a public friends list). Therefore, it is not possible to reach
statistical significance by analyzing these 117 friends lists. However, we also found
that 66.9% of the friends lists contained a minimum of one friend who provided
his/her year of birth (4,286 friends lists in total). Furthermore, about 9.5 friends of
these friends lists shared the attribute, i.e., 40,672 friends in total. Hence, we analyzed
the interdependences of the ages provided by the users’ OSN friends.
“For this purpose, we took each profile i and extracted the provided ages ai j of
corresponding friends (max( j) being the number of friends who provided the age).
Next, we calculated the age difference di j of each friend’s age and the average age
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Figure 5.16: CDF: probability that a randomly chosen OSN friend has a maximum of
a specific age difference to the average age of the friends list [LWMH13].
a¯i j of all other friends of profile i. Afterwards, we calculated the CDF over all di j
of a profile i (with 0 ≤ d ≤ 100) and finally computed the average CDF over all
profiles” [LWMH13]. This approach of investigation is similar to the “leave-one-out
evaluation” utilized to investigate location predictions by the authors of [BSM10].
We show the resulting CDF in the bold curve of Figure 5.16. The x-axis of this plot
represents the age difference between one friend and the average age of the other
friends of the same friends list who provided this piece of PII. The y-axis shows the
average ratio of a user’s friends that are born a maximum of x years (bins of one year)
after or before the average year of birth of the other friends. In addition to the overall
results, the plot shows separated results with respect to the average year of birth of
the analyzed friends lists. These results are represented by the thinner curves. The
average years of birth are pooled in ranges of five years. On average, we detected 431
friends lists per bin. Furthermore, we show another curve in this plot that represents
the average years of birth ranging from 1900 to 1959 because we found only 58 friends
lists within this range of years. Note that the year of birth of underaged users (younger
than 18 years) is concealed from public by Facebook itself and, therefore, we analyzed
only friends lists whose average year of birth is 1994 or earlier.
In general, the figure shows the probabilities that one friend out of a friends list
who provided his/her year of birth is not older or younger than x years with respect
to the average year of birth of the other friends who provided this piece of PII. Hence,
Figure 5.16 provides the accuracies with which an attacking third party can infer the
age of a user’s friends based on the analysis of years of birth provided by other friends
of the same friends list. “As an example, if a third party determines the average year
of birth of all friends that provided the attribute (except one), the probability that
this excepted friend is not older or younger than four years concerning the average
age is at 59%. Moreover, if the average year of birth of the friends list lies between
1990 and 1994, this probability increases to 94%. Thus, Figure 5.16 indicates, inter alia,
that prediction of the age is more accurate the younger the friends in a friends list
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are” [LWMH13]. In general, the risk for users depends strongly on the attacker itself. If
it is an attacker that is interested in predicting the exact age of the user, the accuracies
might not be sufficient. However, if we assume an attacker that is, for instance,
interested in whether or not a user is younger or older than 50 years, the average age
of the user’s friends list serves as a good indicator. Therefore, age prediction poses a
risk despite the limited number of users who publicly share this piece of PII.
Since these are only valid findings for friends who provided the year of birth, we
discuss the transferability of these results with respect to the prediction accuracy of
the age of those friends who do not provide public access to the year of birth and, in
particular, with respect to the actual age of the owner of a friends list, i.e., the α-profile.
The strong correlation of the age a few friend profiles publicly share indicates that
also the year of birth of the owner of a friends list can be inferred by attacking third
parties. However, we cannot proof this assumption because of the fact that we could
not gather statistical data on the attributes that are not publicly shared. As stated at
the beginning of this section, we cannot reach statistical significance by comparing
the 117 years of birth provided by α-profiles and the ages of the corresponding friends.
However, a comparison of these profiles provide another indicator that the results of
investigating the interdependence of friends’ years of birth can be transferred to the
respective α-profile that does not publicly share this piece of information. The average
difference between the average age of a friends list and the year of birth provided
by the respective α-profile is 3.9 years. Furthermore, for the group of friends lists
that have an average age between 1990 and 1994 the average difference is at only 2.4
years. These results underpin the assumption that the results introduced above are
transferable and, thus, age prediction poses a risk for owners of a publicly shared list
of friends despite the low number of friends who reveal this piece of PII.
5.4.4 Analysis of Other Attributes
In the following, we discuss whether or not the current privacy situation regarding
Facebook and adjusted privacy settings still provides the basis for attacking third
parties to infer other non-provided attributes. A summary of the attributes analyzed
besides the location attributes and the users’ year of birth is shown in Figure 5.17. The
x-axis designates the particular attribute, whereas the y-axis indicates the average
percentage of a user’s OSN friends. For each attribute, we show two bars. The right
bars (gray) show the average relative number of friend profiles that provide public
access to a certain attribute. The other bars (blue) show the average percentage of
friends who provided exactly the same attribute value, e.g., if an α-profile publicly
provides the attribute value “in a relationship”, the corresponding left (blue) bar
indicates how many friend profiles of this α-profile also publicly shared that they are
in a relationship (in the case of the attribute relationship state, 10.9 % of a user’s OSN
friends share exactly the same attribute value as the user). To indicate the statistical
significance of the results and, therefore, the accuracy of the provided percentages,
we further show the 0.95-confidence interval in this plot. Note that some of the
analyzed attributes are multi-value attributes, i.e., attributes that can take several
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Figure 5.17: Correlations of other types of attributes provided by compared pro-
files [LWMH13].
values in parallel. To give an example, a user can like Jazz Music, Classical Music,
and Hip Hop Music so that all these three kinds of music appear as individual values
of the attribute favorite music. Referring to the figure, the attributesMiscellaneous,
Favorite Music, Favorite TV Shows, Favorite Music, Interests, Activity, Favorite Books,
and Favorite Sportsmen are potentially multi-value attributes. We include a friend
profile into the category of overlapping (multi-value) attribute values if just a single
attribute value provided by the α-profile equals just a single attribute value provided
by a corresponding friend profile. Note that a Facebook user can also share his/her
former universities, employers, and schools. However, for this plot, we only consider
the current university, employer, and school if publicly provided at all.
For most of the attributes shown in Figure 5.17, we detected just a small overlap
between a user’s attribute values and those of his/her friends, i.e., about or less than
10% except for some of the multi-value attributes and the attribute gender. However,
the gender can only take two values, i.e.,male and female. Therefore, it is no wonder
that about a half of the provided attribute values of a user’s friends equal the one
provided by the user him-/herself. Referring to the multi-value attributes, we detected
some users that share hundreds of individual values for some of these attributes. To
give an example, users publicly share, on average, 16 individual values for the attribute
miscellaneous and we found a profile that even provided 5,787 different items in
this category. Based on this finding, it is also no wonder that we detected such an
overlap for these attributes, just because of the fact that the probability that one of the
shared items in one profile matches one that is publicly provided in another profile
is significantly higher than for single-value attributes.
Other attributes are rarely publicly provided in general, e.g., on average, only 19.7 %
of a user’s friends reveal the name of their university, 15.5 % their current employer, and
10.9 % their current school. Additionally, the overlap is very small for these attributes,
i.e., only 2.8% of all friends of a user share the same university, about 1 % the same
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employer and 1.9% the same current school. Even the analysis of the overlaps of the
favorite... attributes resulted in very small values despite the fact that these attributes
are multi-value attributes. An interesting finding is also constituted by the fact that
some of the favorite... attributes are provided by many OSN friends of a user, e.g., we
found a user profile that contained 554 publicly shared items of the attribute favorite
music. However, the correlation of these types of attributes might be not that strong
compared to, for instance, the strong correlation of friends’ year of birth, because of
the fact that the values such attributes can take are more independent from each other.
“To give a concrete example for this, the prediction of a user’s age might be easier
than the prediction of his/her favorite music if, on the one hand, friends provide the
years of birth 1991, 1992, and 1994 and, on the other hand, the music types Classical
Music, Hip Hop, and Jazz. The reasons for this are the diversity and independence
of the values the attribute favorite music can take” [LWMH13].
In general, the methods for investigating correlations of attributes provided by α-
profiles and corresponding friend profiles introduced in Sections 5.4.2 and 5.4.3 could
also be applied for investigating the attributes shown in Figure 5.17. However, the
small overlaps indicate that these values correlate not as strongly as the year of birth
or the location attributes. In turn, since some of the attributes are rarely provided in
general, the small overlaps could be a sufficient pattern to predict these attributes, for
instance, by use of a more sophisticated prediction algorithm. Nevertheless, in light
of the assumed “casual attacker”, we estimate the risk regarding potential predictions
of these attributes as significantly lower than for the age and location.
5.4.5 Discussion
In the previous sections, we provided results of the investigation of accuracies that
can be estimated for inferring non-provided attributes by a third party based on
information provided by a user’s friends. The presented findings are based on two
assumptions that are further discussed in the following. For the investigations we
assume that the analyzed attribute values are not faked by the users. The second
assumption is that the identified correlations of attributes publicly shared by α-profiles
and their friends are transferable to the correlations of attributes that are not publicly
provided by the α-profiles. Referring to the first assumption, we turn the tables
and assume that users fake some of the publicly shared attributes, which seems
realistic in general. However, unless friends do not make arrangements in terms of
providing similar faked information, the occurring faked values mainly deteriorated
the presented results. In light of the aim to calculate “lower bounds”, a deterioration
by faked attribute values implies only that predictions based on actually not faked
information would result in even higher accuracies. The strong correlations detected
by analyzing OSN friends’ publicly provided PII weaken also the second assumption,
i.e., non-provided attributes correlate as strongly as provided ones. Although this
seems to be an unverifiable assumption, we have to ask the questionwhether or not any
attacker care about some incorrectly predicted attribute values. Again, this depends on
the attacker. In general, the estimated gain in information due to the prediction of non-
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provided attributes and the calculated accuracies seem to be sufficiently worthwhile
from the perspective of an attacking third party.
Previously, we stated that the investigation of possible attribute prediction quantifies
privacy risks. Certainly, for an appropriate risk quantification not only the accura-
cies of these predictions have to be taken into account, but also the probability of
occurrence of successful prediction attempts of attacking third parties, as well as the
expected “damage” for the users have to be considered. In this context, we already
argued that the media published several articles stating that meanwhile companies,
such as insurance agencies and others, perform analyses of OSN profiles to gain
knowledge about the users who are, for instance, their customers. Therefore, there
is no question whether or not the threat is existing. However, we have to ask what
kind of damages can be expected due to such attacking third parties. Daniel J. Solove
wrote an article in which he impressively discusses the weakness of the argument
“I’ve nothing to hide” that users often state [Sol07]. Hence, there is no doubt about
potential occurrences of attacks and about the damage. However, the quantification
of these influential factors regarding privacy risk quantification are an issue in itself.
5.4.6 Summary and Conclusions
In this part of the thesis, we analyzed whether or not and how accurate third parties
can predict users’ non-provided attributes on the basis of attributes provided by the
users’ OSN friends. First, we demonstrated that location attributes can be easily
inferred. In particular, we showed that in 56.3 % of the cases the most frequently
provided current city of a friends list equals the current city of the owner of this
friends list (54.1 % for the attribute hometown, see Appendix C). With an accepted
inaccuracy of predicted locations, we demonstrated that these accuracies can even
be increased. For instance, with an inaccuracy of 50 kilometers, we calculated a
success rate of predictions of almost 70%. Whereas location attributes are frequently
provided by OSN friends, other attributes are very rarely provided to be accessed by
any member of the OSN. An attribute that is often not publicly provided by OSN
friends is the year of birth. However, also for this attribute we revealed that the few
provided years of birth can bring third parties into the position to predict the age
of a user with a remarkable accuracy. In particular, we demonstrated that the year
of birth can be inferred at an accuracy of 59% if an “acceptable” inaccuracy of +/–
four years is assumed. For friends lists that have an average year of birth between
1990 and 1994, this accuracy increases to 94%. Therefore, a publicly provided list of
friends still threatens the corresponding user’s privacy.
However, we also “discussed the interdependence of other attributes and showed
that some are provided rarely and correlate little. Therefore, these results demonstrate
that the situation concerning some predictable attributes is not that threatening.
Except for the attributes investigated in detail, we consider the accuracy of attribute
prediction to be low if attackers just analyze provided values of the targeted attribute
in the friends list. On the other hand, we showed that OSN friends still threaten parts
of users’ privacy and, therefore, no all-clear signal can be given. Attribute prediction
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still poses a risk, at least, concerning some pieces of PII. The reason for this is not
necessarily the availability of an attribute, but also the interdependence of PII shared
by the OSN friends. At large, the more information can be publicly accessed the
more PII can be predicted. Furthermore, if a third party applies, for instance, pattern
learning mechanisms or other intelligent algorithms, OSN friends might reveal a lot
more information about a user. Therefore, a strong reasoning for hiding friends lists
in publicly accessible OSN areas is still given” [LWMH13].
5.5 General Conclusions
In the previous sections, we analyzed the availability of publicly provided pieces of PII
and quantified the risk regarding profile linking and attribute predictions of certain
non-provided pieces of PII based on the analysis of users’ friends lists. The results
presented in this chapter constitute an important basis to understand OSNs that are
extensively used by millions of people today. The results contribute essential findings
and data to the field of computer science to understand the interaction between
humans and those kinds of IT systems. Furthermore, such understanding constitutes
the basis for designing innovative privacy preserving technologies in the future. We
show in Chapter 6 that the results presented in this part of the thesis already induced a
foundation for a novel concept on top of which future privacy enhancing technologies
can be implemented. The findings presented in this part of the thesis can also be
utilized to evaluate the impact of future privacy tools if those tools are widely used
by the participants of OSNs. Moreover, the contributions support users themselves
in acting in a privacy aware manner, i.e., the contributions constitute a part of the
IT security and risk management users actually have to perform on their own when
participating inOSNs. In comparison to enterprise environments, inwhich developers
and administrators have the ability to take care of security and risk management,
these important management perspectives have to be recognized and addressed by
the users themselves and, therefore, still constitute remarkable issues today.
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OSNs: a Reﬂection
In this chapter, we reflect the findings presented in the previous chapters and discuss
a concept that brings users into the position to understand which kind of flows of
PII can potentially occur due to sharing content via OSNs. Such an understanding
serves as an essential basis to make use of privacy settings in a more adequate manner
than today’s OSN users do. With this reflection, we address the research questions
stated in Section 4.4.4. In particular, we introduce a design approach and an imple-
mentation of a technical measure that provides insights on who can (potentially)
access, or even infer particular pieces of PII. This concept, on top of which novel
privacy applications can be designed, provides support to synchronize users’ own
privacy demands with their adjustment of privacy settings. Thereby, the presented
concepts aim at establishing an understanding of a certain user’s current situation
regarding privacy and, therefore, provide a clear and explicit demonstration of shared
or predictable PII in combination with potential privacy risks.
Initially, we discuss users’ general reasons for sharing PII to build up a basis for
further discussion. Furthermore, from a psychological point of view (here: behavioral
psychology), we elaborate which kind of measures would be most promising to force
users to adjust privacy settings in an adequate manner. However, we also show that
the probably most effective measures would not be realizable and not be accepted
by users as well. We discuss that such approaches would result in negative effects
for users and, moreover, would infiltrate users’ urge for freedom of choice regarding
the actual adjustment of privacy settings.
To get closer towards a concept of effective privacy applications, it is necessary to
identify the essential aim of an effective privacy enhancing technology. In particular,
we discuss that the combination of increasing privacy awareness and the possibility to
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adjust privacy settings are not sufficient for acting in a privacy aware manner. In point
of fact, we hypothesize that the mental models of flows of PII users have got in their
mind probably often do not match with the actual flows of PII. However, such mental
models constitute the basis to adjust privacy settings according to a user’s own privacy
demands and, thus, are essential to act in a privacy aware manner. Therefore, we argue
the need to provide a chance to match the often inadequate mental models to actually
or potentially existing flows of PII. Moreover, we state that only the combination of
privacy awareness, privacy settings that are easy-to-understand and easy-to-use, and,
in particular, adequate mental models of data flows can result in a more appropriate
use of privacy settings. In order to tackle this issue, we introduce an approach to
provide decision support – in this context, support to appropriately adjust privacy
settings – that is inspired by Thaler and Sunstein. These authors coined the term
“nudge” as a measure that helps people to decide things appropriately (from a certain
point of view) without taking off the possibility to behave inappropriately [TS08]. We
apply the concept of “nudges” onto the design of applications that support OSN users
in managing their shared PII adequately, i.e., according to their own privacy demands.
However, before the idea of providing “nudges” in the form of a special concept to
design privacy applications as well as a respective implementation is introduced, we
contrast such an approach with what we have learned from research on data flows
within enterprise environments. We take the experience regarding IT services that
are provided in enterprise environments (cf. Chapters 2 and 3) and contrast this to
the privacy issues concerning OSNs. Parts of this chapter have already been published
in [TLH12], [Lab12], [LDH11] and [LH11].
6.1 Psychological Discussion on Eﬀective Privacy Tools
The media attention on privacy risks regarding the participation in OSNs urged a
significant number of users to adjust privacy settings in a more restrictive manner
and to behave in an increasing privacy aware manner. However, we showed in this
dissertation that still a remarkable portion of analyzed OSN profiles provide public
access to more or less sensitive PII and other information. In [Kri10], Krishnamurthy
points out the significance of preserving privacy in OSNs. He “assumes that a possible
reason for the complexity of preserving privacy is the ignorance of users regarding
the protection of PII. Users share information through OSNs without thinking about
possible consequences. Even if they have the possibility to secure their shared in-
formation by adjusting privacy settings, they are reluctant, maybe because of the
urge for ‘satisfaction of the needs for belongingness and the esteem needs through
self-presentation’ [KHG+08]” [LTH11]. Hence, we investigate what kind of measures
could further educate users in terms of increasing privacy awareness (if they are not
aware of privacy risks yet) and which type of privacy applications could help to adjust
privacy settings in an even more appropriate manner than adjusted today.
One of the major reasons why people join OSNs is obvious. In the past, people
tried to keep in touch with friends and others by communicating in an one-to-one or
one-to-few fashion with respect to the number of communication partners. OSNs
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provide the possibility to reach a larger audience (one-to-many communication)
with just a simple, single action, i.e., a post, a comment, an uploaded photo or video,
etc. that can be accessed by a large group of users. That means, with just a single
shared content element, a user can give the feeling of being present and, therefore,
being part of the life of his/her OSN friends. Responses in terms of comments and
Likes motivate even more to share information. Another motivation might be the
possibility to meet and communicate with distant acquaintances (or rather strangers)
in a familiar environment.
However, besides all the advantages OSNs provide for meeting and keeping in
touch with people, sharing PII poses risks regarding privacy. In [LDH11], we have
asked: “why do many users not think about these risks while providing personal
data?” In the following, we pick up on the argumentation that answers can be found
in behavioral psychology. This area of psychology explains the learning of human
activities on the basis of rewards and punishments. If we transfer this psychological
knowledge to the context of user behavior in OSNs, it is obvious that responses in
terms of comments and Likes reward people for sharing their PII or other pieces of
information. Furthermore, users’ actions are rewarded directly, i.e., in a short period
of time. The more content a user shares the more interest will his/her profile arise and
the more responses he/she will get from sharing content. Additionally, by sharing
information an individually distinctive urge for self-representation can be satisfied,
which can serve as another reward for being active in an OSN. In summary, users
expect benefits from publishing content and they are motivated to share information
to get rewarded by their friends and other members of the OSN. Psychologists refer to
the motivation to act in a specific manner because of anticipated rewards as “positive
reinforcement” [Zim04]. In this context, the authors of [Joi08] state that the following
categories are those features that are most frequently seen as gratifying characteristics
of an OSN: “social connection, shared identities, content, social investigation, social
network surfing and status updating. User demographics, site visit patterns and the
use of privacy settings were associated with different uses and gratifications” [Joi08].
In contrast, a “negative reinforcement” effect is the motivation to stop doing some-
thing in the sense of conditioning of human behavior by punishments as a conse-
quence of an action. In general, rewards and negative effects compete in influencing
humans future behavior and motivation to do (or not to do) something. Thereby,
not only the number of rewards and punishments matters, but also the intensity of
the corresponding effects and the time gap between an action and the effect. The
impact of effects that do not promptly occur subsequently to an action is known
as the “deferred gratification” [Mis74][MM83], i.e., a gratification (in a positive or
negative sense) that applies with a certain time gap between an action and the oc-
currence of a “gratifying” effect.
In the context of OSNs, a negative reinforcement would be a motivation for users
to not share content. However, in today’s OSNs – as argued above – rewards occur
on a very short time scale, i.e., an action is almost promptly followed by responses of
other OSN members, mostly in terms of comments and/or Likes. These responses
constitute in most cases a reward for sharing content, e.g., Facebook does not provide
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a “Dislike button”. For sure, social media can also be and is being abused, for instance,
for bullying people. In 2012, according to the earlier mentioned German survey, 23 %
of the respondents between twelve and 19 years stated that they know, at least, one
other person who has been bullied via the Internet [JIM2012]. 15 % stated that they
were confronted with undesirable content (photos, comments, etc.) about their own
person, at least, once since they are active on the Internet. However, the number of
positive responses on published content is probably much higher than the content that
annoys users. Otherwise, users would not participate in OSNs in such an extensive
dimension and would not share such amount of information via their OSN profiles.
In turn, if punishments occur at all, this effect is obviously realized on a significantly
longer time scale. Consequently, potential punishments that occur some time after
sharing a certain piece of information are less effective on users’ future behavior,
or rather on the motivation to (not) share information, than the rewards a user
probably gets promptly. Therefore, a sustainable recognition of the potential privacy
risks by negative effects of users’ behavior regarding information sharing cannot
be expected at present. To give an example, a published photo of the new pretty
house a user has bought induces most probably (positively) gratifying comments
and Likes. However, if a car dealer would have access to the picture, he/she probably
tries to not give a discount to the user who posted the newly bought house because
he/she knows that the customer has enough money to buy such a house, regardless
whether the photo has been posted just a short time before his/her offering or long
ago (in this context, cf. [Sol07]).
According to this theory, for developing users’ awareness regarding privacy risks
of information sharing, it would be necessary to intensify the punishments and/or
to shorten the time gap between an action and the realization of negative effects.
The principle objective would be a conditioning of the users. Psychologists refer
to conditioning via regulated rewards and punishments as “operant conditioning”.
However, the question arises which punishments should be provoked to achieve an
effect in terms of an increased privacy awareness. Moreover, negative responses in
terms of punishments would cause detriments to users and OSNs would not endorse
measures that punish people for participating within the OSN. Not least, the business
model of OSN providers would stand in contrast to those measures.
Besides approaches on the basis of operant conditioning – that would not be deploy-
able –, only approaches on the basis of educational work remain. Press reports and
public discussions resulted in a significant increase of users’ privacy awareness. Show-
ing people the risks regarding the participation within OSNs quite plainly leads to
the perception of these risks and is thought-provoking. The media attention is urging
more and more users to adjust privacy settings adequately to hide parts of a profile
from strangers and to be restrictive regarding information sharing with unrestricted
access conditions. In the following, we discuss what types of measures could also be
effective to educate users in terms of demonstrating them their current risks regarding
privacy, which constitutes the basis to understand potentially existing unintended
flows of PII and to adjust privacy settings according to the users’ privacy demands.
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6.2 Today’s Privacy Settings and Users’ Mental Models
Today’s provided privacy settings are often comfortable to use. However, the offer
of such settings might be not sufficient to enforce privacy aware acting in OSNs.
Certainly, by providing such often well-designed and easy-to-use privacy controls
OSN providers have, in principle, done their duties. However, just offering capabilities
to adjust who can access which piece of PII does not induce privacy aware acting as
discussed before. In particular, adjusting privacy is often very simple, but the induced
effects are not clear to the users, or OSNs are even suggestive of comprehensive pri-
vacy (cf. the statement of Marc Zuckerberg quoted at the beginning of Chapter 1). In
this context, Deuker et al. published a series of papers in which they investigate the
motivation of users to make use of privacy settings ([Deu12] and [DRA12]) and study
“the trade-off between privacy concerns and benefits associated to the usage” of OSNs
and, in particular, third party Apps [SDAN13]. The studies are based on qualitative
interviews of Facebook users. In general, these studies aim at providing a foundation
to identify requirements for designing improved andmore effective privacy setting. In
particular, in [SDAN13], the authors identify an urgent need for providing “more trans-
parency” of flows of PII. In this section, we discuss whether or not an improved design
of privacy settings or another approach might be feasible and could induce more
privacy aware sharing of PII via OSNs. In particular, we identify an essential building
block that should, additionally, be considered for designing novel privacy tools.
6.2.1 The Need for Accurate Mental Models
Considered precisely, sharing PII in a privacy aware manner and the individual
adjustments of privacy settings are not the same thing. In particular, a user who has
adjusted his/her privacy settings provided by the OSN does not necessarily behave
privacy aware, i.e., it is not sufficient for privacy aware acting to adjust privacy settings
in some way, particularly, if potential flows of PII are not clear to the users. Ordinary
OSN users seem to be overwhelmed with the task to adjust privacy settings according
their own privacy demands. The reason for this might be simple: today’s users
demonstrably do not understand, or rather perceive each of any potentially occurring
flow of information. In other words, the actual number of possible data flows exceeds
the imagination of many users. Thereby, users do not necessarily recognize that they
are overwhelmed, or rather that they are not acting privacy aware. In fact, as already
discussed, not only other users of the respective OSN can possibly access shared
PII, but also the OSN provider and, probably, even worse, third parties that aim at
processing users’ shared information as a basis of their own business. Hence, the
transparency of possible unintended flows of PII is essential to adjust privacy settings
appropriately and constitutes a key feature to bring privacy demands and privacy
settings together. Therefore, providers of OSNs or others ought to offer services that
aim at bridging the gap between the user interface provided to adjust privacy settings
and users’ mental models, i.e., their perception of flows of PII.
Whereas, so far, most related work regarding privacy in OSNs do not include aspects
regarding mental models of potential flows of PII, the involvement of such mental
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models into the design of other services is already very common. In particular, the
concept of mental models is considered in the area of designing user interfaces,
i.e., a user’s mental model represents his/her expectations of the functionality of
the interface [SN93]. Even earlier, from a psychological perspective, users’ mental
models have been discussed in the context of physical systems and devices, as well
as users’ understanding of the corresponding functionality [Hil83] (see [Rap05] for
a more detailed review on “cognitive and educational psychological research on
mental models”). However, the field of user interface design adopted the term “mental
models” and includes it in the development of interfaces from a practical point of view,
i.e., the assumption that devices, physical systems, as well as other user interfaces
along with their functionality are abstractly represented in users’ minds as mental
models (cf. [CRCC07]) in terms of small-scale simulations of the actual systems.
The adaptation of mental models can induce different user behavior because mental
models are applied to predict the real-world behavior of a system that is to be used.
To give an example, even technically inexperienced users build their own mental
model of the computer they use, although the model might be completely wrong, or
rather different from the so-called system model1, e.g., the time to boot is considered
as a warm-up phase to reach operational temperature. In general, the users’ mental
models are often less complex than the actual model of the system.
In between a mental model and a system model stands the represented model2. This
model includes the representation of the system model due to the design of the user
interface and it can match the system model very closely or can be (even consciously)
designed as representing something different, for instance, to give the users the feeling
of comprehensible system behavior. Because of the fact that users can understand
an interface better that is based on a represented model that is close to their mental
models, interface designers should follow the mental models [CRCC07], i.e., for the
design of ordinary interfaces a developer should adopt users’ expectations instead
of aiming to force users to change their current mental models.
6.2.2 Distinctive Characteristics of Privacy Settings
However, this approach works as long as the design of interfaces do not induce
an incomplete, or even wrong understanding of the system behavior. In turn, if
represented models support inappropriate mental models, users have no chance to
really understand the implications of using the system. Referring to OSNs, today’s
privacy interfaces, i.e., privacy settings, are (eventually even consciously) designed
to support users feeling of a privacy preserving environment if privacy settings are
(somehow) adjusted. In this context, the authors of [SL08] conducted a study in a
usability lab and found that the reason for not adjusting privacy settings according to
the actual privacy awareness and privacy demands of users is caused by the design
of the user interface. Additionally, not least, the use case introduced later in this
chapter shows that current mental models do not match actual flows of PII. This
1The system model is also referred to as implementation model or programmer’s model.
2The represented model is also referred to as design model, manifest model, or designer’s model.
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situation indicates the need for privacy tools that adapt users’ mental models towards
a comprehensive understanding of each of any potential flow of shared and even non-
provided PII. In particular, adaptions of current mental models regarding data flows
are necessary, at least, in light of the fact that PII once released to a third party cannot
be claimed back, i.e., a shared piece of PII that unintentionally has been accessed
by a third party constitutes an irreversible situation.
In general, we can identify three major differences between privacy settings and
ordinary user interfaces that underpin the argumentation of the necessity to support
the adaptation of users’ mental models towards a privacy aware view on potential
flows of PII: first, privacy settings are provided to manage PII that might constitute
sensitive data and a disclosure of this data cannot be rescinded. In contrast to other
user interfaces, a privacy management interface that lacks conformity with users’
expectations does not only cause inconvenience, but can also cause harm. Second,
as discussed in Section 6.1, users get rewards for sharing content, i.e., Likes, com-
ments, etc.. However, potential negative effects that could harm users occur, if at all,
on an often longer timescale. Theory of behavioral psychology says that deferred
effects induce less impact on future behavior than effects that can be immediately
recognized [LDH11]. Therefore, users are not necessarily motivated to adjust privacy
settings appropriately. Third, OSNs, such as Facebook, provide a service that is free to
use. In turn, the user shares personal data that can be exploited by the OSN vendor
or its business partners for targeted advertising, which constitutes the underlying
business model of OSNs. Users trade personal data for services. Thus, the OSN vendor
is interested in gaining and spreading as much personal data as possible. Due to user
demands and legal aspects, OSNs are forced to provide privacy management tools
but at the same time the use of it is not necessarily in their interest. Therefore, today’s
provided privacy settings have the potential to induce unintended flows of PII due to
users’ inappropriate mental models of potential flows of possibly sensitive PII.
6.2.3 Divergent Mental Models Using an Example
Previously, we discussed that mental models of users are divergent compared to
potentially occurring flows of PII. In the following, we manifest this hypothesis by use
of an example, which shows that unintended flows of PII exist and that the unintended
character of such flows is demonstrably not clear to the users.
Today, each of the 15 most popular Facebook Apps (cf. Section 4.1) are used by more
than 18 million OSNmembers per month3. The authors of [GSMY08] investigate and
characterize the “popularity and user reach of Facebook” Apps by a measurement-
based study. For this, they gathered usage data of popular applications available via
a third party service. Furthermore, the authors analyzed OSN profiles in order to
determine how many Apps a user installs on average. Inter alia, the authors found
that the total number of installed applications increases. In particular, they show
that five randomly selected applications out of the 100 most popular Apps achieve
a coverage of 30% to over 50% of all users.
3http://www.socialbakers.com/ [Last downloaded on 2013-05-28].
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OSN Apps are often provided by third parties that can – due to the use of their
provided Apps – potentially get access to personal data of the users and their OSN
friends. At least, they get forwarded basic information about the user, including the
friends list, which reinforces the mentioned risks regarding inferable data [LWMH13].
However, on the one hand, the privacy control interface of Facebook seems to be
intuitive and well-designed in terms of providing the desired functionality to privacy
aware users. All settings can be changed with a few clicks, including settings regarding
friends’ Apps. On the other hand, restricting the access to posts, photos, etc. to OSN
friends, does not exclude certain App providers from accessing the data, even if the
user him-/herself never installed an App. In particular, if other default settings of
Facebook are not adjusted, even Apps installed by users’ OSN friends can potentially
access the users’ PII. It only requires the friends to forward the permissions in an
obligatory approval process, which is a prerequisite for installing most Apps and done
via a standard interface during the installation process. In turn, Facebook users could
easily exclude friends’ Apps from accessing their own data by changing a specific
setting provided on a different page compared to the other privacy settings. However,
the small survey introduced in the following indicate that most users are even not
aware of these potential flows of PII and, not to mention, often do not adjust the
respective settings even if they would demand to prevent such flows. In this context,
the authors of [BLSC09] investigate the access control model regarding shared PII in
combination with the use of Facebook Apps. Thereby, they also show that “current
applications put users at risk by permitting the disclosure of large amounts of personal
information to these applications and their developers” [BLSC09] and demonstrate
that not only the data shared by the user of a particular App can be accessed by
this App, but also the data of his/her OSN friends. They further point out that OSN
friends will not be asked for their consent before their data is forwarded via the actual
user of the respective App. Even worse, App providers do not only request data that
is necessary to provide a certain service, such as online games and other services,
but also request data that could be interesting for further business, e.g., advertising,
although such a behavior is not compliant to the terms of use of some OSNs, e.g.,
Facebook. In 2008, it is shown that more than 90% of analyzed Facebook Apps
unnecessarily request private data [FE08].
However, although privacy issues related to Facebook Apps have been discussed
(e.g., in [WXG11], [KLS11], [HLL11]), the specific privacy problem discussed in this
dissertation is often overlooked. Wang et al. report that participants of their study
have mentioned the problem regarding the mass of data forwarded to App providers,
while it is not considered in the design of their study [WXG11]. Interestingly, from
the perspective of Hull et al. the problem is an obvious and “egregious violation” of
the norms of distribution [HLL11]. Therefore, at the end of this chapter, we present
an implementation of the introduced concepts in the form of a privacy application
that provides transparency of flows regarding this specific use case. In particular,
this privacy tool is implemented as a Facebook App and demonstrates users which
pieces of their and their OSN friends’ PII they potentially forward to a third party
App provider. Moreover, the App tries to infer users’ non-provided attributes (cf.
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Figure 6.1: Extract of the Facebook questionnaire: participants of the study were asked
who can see a post with the privacy options “Only Me”, “Friends”, “Friends of Friends”
and “Public”.
the contributions presented in Chapter 5) in order to make possible risks even more
explicitly comprehensible. We refer to the introduced use case several times in the
remainder of this chapter to apply the discussions and introduced concepts for novel
privacy tools onto a specific demonstrable deficiency concerning flows of PII that
are often not perceived by OSN users.
6.2.4 Survey on Users’ Actual Mental Models
On the basis of a small survey, we demonstrate an indication of the unintended
character of potential flows of a user’s PII to third party providers of Apps a user’s
OSN friends have installed. We developed a questionnaire that is shown (in part) in
Figure 6.1 with which we asked the respondents who can actually access shared PII if
certain privacy settings are adjusted, i.e., “Only Me”, “Friends”, “Friends of Friends”
and “Public”. The aim of this survey was to find out whether or not users are aware
of the fact that third party providers of Apps used by their OSN friends can access
their shared PII even if the accessibility is set to “Friends”.
Two groups participated in the survey. The first group consisted of 39 computer
science students participating a lecture on Web development. The other group was
formed by 41 members of several sports teams. The participants were between 15
and 35 years old. The results are shown in Figure 6.2. The very left bar represents
the overall result, which shows that more than 80% of the 80 participants were not
aware of the fact that shared information can be accessed by Apps used by others. In
addition, the figure shows the results divided into three types of users, i.e., those who
are using Facebook on a regular basis, those who stated a seldom usage and those
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Figure 6.2: Results of the survey: part of the participants that were NOT aware of the
fact that Apps installed by their OSN friends can get access to their data if the default
privacy settings are not changed.
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who are using Facebook not at all. Furthermore, we split the results into the two test
groups (group 1: students, group 2: sports team members). Moreover, we divided all
participants into those who are 18 years or older and those between 15 and 17 years.4
However, we could not detect significant variances in the divided results. We are also
fully aware of the fact that the results cannot be unconditionally generalized because
we asked only 80 respondents. However, already in this small survey it becomes
apparent that it is likely that Facebook users, regardless of their age or education, are
not aware of the fact that third party providers of Apps used by a user’s friend can get
access to his/her data without asking the user him-/herself. Based on the survey, we
conclude that unknown and also unintended data flows still exist and users are often
not able to understand these flows as a basis to adjust privacy settings in an adequate
manner. Therefore, this example serves as the exemplary case used to implement
the concepts introduced in the remainder of this chapter.
6.3 Bridging the Gap Between Users’ Privacy Awareness
and Actual Adjustments of Privacy Settings
As already pointed out, it would not be feasible to intensify negative effects of infor-
mation sharing or to shorten the period of time before such effects occur to enforce
privacy aware acting. We further argued that solely providing privacy settings is not
sufficient to induce privacy. In turn, although the aim to educate users in terms of
increasing their privacy awareness – as induced by the media attention regarding
privacy in recent years – is essential, awareness does not solely induce privacy aware
acting in each of any situation with respect to OSNs. Moreover, even the combination
of both the offer of privacy settings and appropriate privacy awareness is not enough.
Therefore, we can identify a gap between these essential building blocks of preserving
privacy, i.e., a missing understanding, or rather inappropriate mental models of the
actual flows of PII that can potentially occur in the context of OSNs and third party
providers. Figure 6.3 illustrates the chain of necessary building blocks for privacy
aware acting in OSNs and, furthermore, shows corresponding influential factors. The
figure points out that privacy awareness and privacy settings are already addressed by
related research work in terms of improvements and tools that support to increase
awareness and/or that simplify the adjustments of privacy settings (cf. Section 4.5.4).
However, the figure also indicates that establishing adequate mental models is less
addressed compared to the other building blocks of privacy aware acting.
Certainly, OSN providers could also change their privacy interfaces to support users
to understand potential flows of PII.However, as discussed before, OSNproviders have
a distinctive (and also comprehensible) urge to keep their users sharing information,
not least, in light of their business models. Hence, it would be pointless to try to
encourage OSN providers to change their implementations of privacy settings. The
4Additionally, we interviewed 25 children between 12 and 14 years. However, although most of
these respondents already registered a Facebook profile and also already made use of third party Apps,
they did not even know that third parties are involved by using Facebook and its Apps.
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Figure 6.3: Influential factors on the chain of necessary building blocks of privacy
aware sharing of PII via OSNs.
other option constitutes the offer of more transparency of potentially occurring data
flows in terms of a clear and understandable demonstration of individual privacy
risks with respect to a user’s current situation concerning shared PII. In other words,
the gap between privacy awareness and the adjustment of privacy settings could
be bridged by providing support to sharpen users’ mental models of intended and
unintended flows of PII that occurred or can occur in the future. In short, whereas
OSNs provide privacy settings and the media attention regarding privacy in OSNs
raised privacy awareness, an essential building block is still missing: interactive tools
that provide transparency in order to sharpen users’ mental models of potential data
flows. In the following, we discuss the approach of providing transparency in light of
the concept of “nudges”, i.e., supporting people to take appropriate decisions.
6.3.1 Basic Concept of “Nudges” to Induce Appropriate Decisions
The following introduction of the concept of providing “nudges”, which is a more
or less psychological support to enforce smart decisions (smart from a certain per-
spective), is based on the findings presented in a book of Thaler and Sunstein [TS08].
The authors introduce an example of a canteen within a school to explain the concept
of nudging people towards smart decisions: placing healthy food, e.g., produce, at
eye-level of children and junk food not at that same level constitutes a nudge in light
of the aim to enforce eating healthier food. In contrast, providing junk food not at
all is not a nudge because it is a non-libertarian approach to enforce smart decisions,
i.e., the freedom of choice would be limited by not offering such unhealthy food.
The fundamental basis of the concept of nudges is the assumption that the cognitive
costs to decide in one or another direction are different. Referring to the canteen
example, the cognitive costs to grab an apple is lower than necessary to search and
take the junk food. Consequently, most of the children get a healthier diet. Therefore,
providing nudges is a conscious change of the incentives of taking one or another
option (here: pieces of food) in terms of a change of the cognitive costs required to
opt for something (here: a certain type of food). In this context, those who support
others in taking decisions are referred to as choice architects. The decision support
that aims at not eliminating the opportunity to decide inappropriately is referred
to as libertarian paternalism. [TS08]
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Thaler and Sunstein further refer to thumb rules, or rather judgmental heuristics
used by humans that systematically induce biases, which goes back to Tversky and
Kahneman [TK73] [TK74], i.e., (1) the adjustment from an anchor, (2) the availability
heuristic, and (3) the representativeness heuristic. Referring to (1), decisions made
on top of this heuristic are influenced by a certain more or less comparable example
in users’ minds, i.e., an anchor. Thaler and Sunstein state that people living in a
larger city estimate the number of inhabitants of another smaller city larger than
those people living in an even smaller city. In the context of OSNs, users potentially
estimate the number of guests joining a party announced via Facebook significantly
lower than it actually can happen5. The reason is probably the comparison to “real-
life” party announcements and the resulting number of guests following such an
invitation. Another example constitutes the sharing of photos: a photo pinned at the
wall of a user’s flat can only be seen by a few people, i.e., only those who are/will be
physically at the user’s flat. However, photos uploaded to the Facebook wall can be
accessed by a much broader audience, which might be underestimated by the users
because of the feeling of pinning a photo to an actual wall. The second heuristic (2)
subsumes decisions based on the presence of examples, e.g., some people feel like it
is more likely to become a victim of terrorism compared to the probability to have
a car accident, which is a wrong assumption often made just because terrorism is
more “available” in peoples’ minds due to, for instance, its media attention. In the
context of OSNs, this effect can also be observed: some users might feel that the risks
posed by publicly shared or inferable PII is not existent because they do not know
anyone who suffered detriment from sharing PII. The third category of decision rules
constitutes the representativeness heuristic, which subsumes decisions made on top of
a comparison of the current situation to another well-known thing/situation/etc., e.g.,
Thaler and Sunstein provide the example of a very tall American guy (e.g., 2.10meters);
most people might believe it is more likely that the guy is a professional basketball
player than another guy who is only 1.70 meters tall. The authors say, that sometimes
stereotypes are right, however, in general, such comparisons lead to biases. Transferred
to OSNs, we can identify an example for biases based on the representativeness
heuristic in the context of OSN friends. Whereas the definition of a friend in “real-life”
is most likely clear to the users, an OSN friend is something completely different.
However, users might forget about the differences from time to time just because they
think about friends when they refer to OSN friends. According to [TS08], nudges can
help to avoid these biases and, therefore, we argue that the examples provide sufficient
reasons to include the concept of nudges into future privacy tools.
6.3.2 “Nudges” for Adequate Adjustments of Privacy Settings
Thaler and Sunstein further state that if people feel like they are rid of risks than
they are more likely neglecting useful precautions. Therefore, people who run risks
5Cf., for instance, http://worldnews.nbcnews.com/ news/2012/09/22/14028638-thousands-descend-
on-tiny-dutch-town-after-facebook-invitation-goes-viral and http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-
beds-bucks-herts-11376350 [Last downloaded 2013-05-28].
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because of unrealistic optimism could benefit from the offer of nudges as well. [TS08]
In the context of designing privacy applications, the concept of nudges could also
be applied to prevent users from unrealistic optimism regarding the probability of
occurrence of certain privacy leaks. Hence, the concepts presented in this chapter
follow the principle of providing nudges in terms of a demonstration of privacy risks.
Wang et al. also identified the concept of “nudges” as a basis for effective privacy
support. Implementations of such privacy tools, as well as an exploratory study on
the impact of “privacy nudges” are presented in [WLS+13], which has been published
subsequently to the main writing phase of this dissertation. Thereby, the authors
mainly focus on the privacy tools themselves, as well as the corresponding impact
assessment. In contrast, we show a more detailed transfer of the concepts and theories
presented in [TS08] with respect to the context of OSNs. Furthermore, the design
and implementation of privacy tools presented later in this chapter provides reactive
features to identify potentially unintended flows of PII based on already shared or even
non-published information, whereas the “privacy nudges” presented in [WLS+13]
focus on a proactive support to determine, for instance, the audience of PII that is
to be shared. However, both reactive and proactive features that support users in
managing their privacy are necessary to induce privacy aware acting. Furthermore,
the discussion, design concept and implementation presented in this dissertation,
as well as the findings of Wang et al. both underline the assumption that “nudging”
users to act in a privacy aware manner might be an effective approach. According
to Wang et al. “nudges could potentially be a powerful mechanism to discourage
unintended disclosures in social media that may lead to regret” [WLS+13]. Therefore,
the contributions of both this dissertation and [WLS+13] complement each other
perfectly and build the basis for more effective privacy support for OSN users.
6.4 Contrasting Privacy Apps and Enterprise IAM
In the following, we contrast privacy tools that improve users’ mental models based
on the concept of “nudges” with another field of research. In particular, we review
the experiences gained by investigating IAM systems in order to identify existing
capabilities of administrators and developers to avoid unintended flows of PII that
are not provided for today’s OSN users. With that, we try to transfer requirements
from the context of enterprise environments to the design of privacy applications.
In enterprise environments, developers and administrators are capable to control
and monitor flows of PII. To give an example, in up-front provisioning systems (as
introduced in Section 2.2.1) developers design each of any flow of information in terms
of the implementation of rules and policies. Additionally, these flows are “typically
monitored and governed by various overview boards” [Lab12], at least, in the form of
imposing the rules and policies to be implemented by the technical staff. Certainly, it
is not excluded that something can go wrong and unintended flows of PII are missed
(cf. Section 2.5.1). However, most likely, unintended data flows occur less frequently
than in OSN environments. In contrast, the management of PII is on the discretion
of OSN users themselves, i.e., no other instance is responsible for the control and
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monitoring of flows of a particular user’s PII. As shown by presented results of the
empirical studies on publicly available PII in OSNs, it seems to be already an issue for
users to determine who can potentially get access to shared information. It is even
more difficult to monitor flows of PII after sharing information.
Hence, the question arise whether or not we can learn from capabilities administra-
tors and developers of enterprise IAM systems are provided with in order to provide
support for OSN users to be able to manage their PII more adequately.
In an enterprise environment processes are defined by the companies involved in
the processes, i.e., the processes, or rather flows of PII are per se provider-engineered,
whereas the data flows in the context of OSNs are not only provider-engineered, but
also and in particular built by the users themselves. To give an example, a user shares a
certain piece of PII and makes use of a third party OSN App. In this scenario, the user
has “engineered” a flow of information to a third party, regardless of whether or not
the user intended this data flow. Whereas the flows of PII in enterprise environments
are based on implemented policies and rules, flows that occur in OSN environments
are induced by the combination of certain “circumstances” that are joined by the users
themselves. Even worse, not only a user him-/herself contributes to these data flows,
but also his/her OSN friends (cf. the use case introduced in Section 6.2.3). Another
example for information flows induced by several users constitutes the combination
of contact lists on smartphones and the use of mobile Apps provided by the OSNs.
In particular, if a user connects his/her smartphone with his/her OSN account, the
contact lists of the smartphones are often uploaded to the OSN provider so that the
user induces a flow of information (here, for instance, mobile phone numbers of
people on his/her contact list that are sent to the OSN provider).
However, the main difference between managing PII in enterprise and in OSN
environments constitutes the fact that the rules and policies that induce flows of infor-
mation are not in the hands of the users. On the contrary, the impetus for information
flows, i.e., sharing information and using certain OSN features, is incumbent upon
the user. On the one hand, in [Lab12], we stated that “if users are responsible for the
configuration of data flows outside of organizational borders, to some extent, they
are also responsible for ensuring privacy.” On the other hand, if users induce flows of
information they have to be provided with capabilities developers and administrators
of IAM systems are provided with. Therefore, since OSN users do not implement their
own rules and policies with respect to potential flows of information, it is necessary
to show users the consequences of a certain action in terms of a comprehensible
demonstration of potential data flows and corresponding risks.
In summary, we can state that, in principle, the requirements for understanding
potential flows of PII are very similar in enterprise and OSN environments. However,
we stress the point that users do not impose the rules and policies regarding the data
flows they induce by participating in OSNs. Certainly, administrators and developers
also only implement the rules and policies. However, they have to have a clear and
comprehensive understanding of the implications of these rules and policies. In light
of this “condition” regarding enterprise environments, we can derive the following
requirement for privacy tools, which we already stated in the previous sections: users
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have to be supported in understanding potential flows of PII in a comprehensive
manner as a basis to control and monitor the proliferation of their PII.
6.5 Design and Implementation of an Eﬀective Privacy
Application
In the following, we introduce the concept of privacy tools that provide “nudges”
to adjust privacy settings in a more adequate manner concerning the users’ privacy
demands. Afterwards, we present an implementation of the concepts. This particular
Facebook Privacy App (FBPA) demonstrates a user his/her current situation regarding
privacy and privacy risks according the actual data he/she and his/her OSN friends
shared. The FBPA is based on the use case introduced in Section 6.2.3. Finally, we
discuss the issues of bringing such an App up-and-running. In particular, we argue
that legal restrictions impose hurdles that might inhibit a productive application and
operation of such approaches in general and the deployment of the FBPA in particular.
6.5.1 Concept for Eﬀective Privacy Applications
In principle, we already presented the concept of such novel privacy tools in the
previous sections. Referring back to Figure 6.3, we identified the need to adapt users’
mental models of flows of PII as an essential building block for privacy aware acting.
Therefore, privacy tools should include the demonstration of potentially occurring
data flows and corresponding privacy risks. In particular, privacy tools should be
provided that demonstrate the following facts:
– Users and third parties who can potentially access a certain piece of information.
– The pieces of shared (and non-provided) PII accessible (or even inferable) by
these users and third parties.
– The pieces of others’ PII accessible by these users and third parties due to the
use of certain OSN features, i.e., others’ information that is (unintentionally)
forwarded by the user him-/herself.
– A clear and comprehensible demonstration of corresponding privacy risks.
In fact, an App that provides the aforementioned aspects can also not solely induce
privacy aware acting in OSNs. However, besides the offer of privacy settings and the
establishing of privacy awareness in general, it serves as the third essential building
block necessary to adjust privacy settings according to the own privacy demands.
In particular, the adaptation of users’ mental models of flows of PII bridges the gap
between the two other mentioned building blocks in terms of a mapping of users’
privacy awareness to adequate adjustments of privacy settings.
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Figure 6.4: Demo-Screenshot of the main page of the FBPA implementation6.
6.5.2 Facebook Privacy App (FBPA)
In Section 6.2.3, we introduced the use case in which a user potentially forwards PII
shared by his/her friends to providers of Apps he/she makes use of if a specific part of
the default privacy settings are not changed by the users’ OSN friends. Therefore, a
user can forward personal data of his/her OSN friends to third party providers without
an explicitly stated consent of his/her OSN friends. In the following, we present a
Facebook App, i.e., the Facebook Privacy Application (FBPA), that implements the
concepts stated before to establish adequate mental models of data flows in users’
minds with respect to the mentioned use case. The FBPA is implemented as a web
application that can be integrated into the Facebook site as an App6. We developed
prototypes in order to evaluate which features could be most promising for demon-
strating privacy risks with regard to the forwarding of friends’ data to App providers.
Themain page of the final solution, inter alia, includes the features shown in Figure 6.4
that we present in detail in the following (note that the numbers in the figure match
the numbering of the detailed explanation of the individual parts of the App).
6Note that prototypes of the App have been implemented by a group of students participating within
a practical course on the topicWeb Engineering at the KIT (summer term 2012) and the prototypes
have been developed further by the research assistants Alexander Wolf and Florian Werling. The
author would like to thank these students and, in particular, his colleague Matthias Keller for the
invaluable contributions.
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(1) Attention getter: randomly picked OSN friend whose PII is presented
The first section of the App shows an OSN friend of the current user of the App
in order to get this user’s attention on the fact that he/she has (potentially) already
forwarded PII of his/her friends. In particular, this part of the FBPA picks one of
the user’s friends (preferable one with a certain amount of shared PII) and displays a
“thank you”-information to the user that says he/she (potentially) brought the App
provider into the position to get data of a particular friend.
(2) Uploaded photos containing potentially precarious content
Next, the App shows photos picked out of the albums of the user’s OSN friends that are
tagged with one or more certain keywords that could indicate precarious content, e.g.,
alcohol, party, etc.. This particular section aims at further establishing mental models
that include the potential flows of PII and other shared content to an App provider.
(3) Location Information
The third section displays the current cities of a user’s friends on a map and claims
another “thanks” to the user in the form of: “Now, we know where your friends live”.
(4) Attribute Prediction
Based on the findings presented in Section 5.4, in the forth section of the App, we try
to infer a user’s current city, hometown, and age if the App provider is not provided
with this information by the user. With that, we demonstrate that even non-shared
PII is at risk regarding privacy and could be inferred by third parties. Furthermore,
this part of the App aims at sharpen the users’ mental models in the direction of
perceiving potential privacy leaks due to data shared by their OSN friends.
(5) Statistical Data
In the last section of the FBPA, we provide statistical information on the whole set of
data that could be accessed by the App. Hence, we show how many photos, videos,
and other information a user would (potentially) forward by using an App.
Besides this main page, the FBPA provides also information on how users can adjust
privacy settings so that their own PII cannot be forwarded to third party providers
of Apps their OSN friends make use of. Furthermore, we explain the potentially
unintended flows of PII induced by the installation of an App in a more abstract
manner, i.e., the FBPA suggests users with content that demonstrates the principles
on top of which the respective data flows can occur.
6.5.3 Issues with Respect to Providing Privacy Applications
In this last section on potentially effective privacy applications, we emphasize issues
regarding the deployment, or rather productive operation of such technical support
to establish adequate mental models. Certainly, a clear and comprehensive under-
standing of each of any potentially occurring flow of PII is essential to adjust privacy
settings according to a user’s privacy awareness and consequential privacy demands.
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The tool presented previously contributes an essential building block towards such
an understanding. However, in light of data protection in general and the German
data protection acts in particular, it can be difficult to deploy such application to
be used by today’s OSN users:
Strictly speaking, the processing of data shared by a user’s OSN friends by a third
party App provider is illegal because of the non-existent consent of the OSN friends,
at least, in light of the German data protection act (cf. Section 5.1.1). Since the FBPA
is also implemented as a Facebook App, this App is also not allowed to process the
data of users’ OSN friends. This applies as a matter of fact regardless of the aim of
supporting users to act more privacy aware. Consequently, such an App has to be
implemented completely as executed at the client, i.e., the computing device of the
user him-/herself. Furthermore, the App must not send any information gathered by
analyzing the data of the user’s OSN friends to a server of the App provider. Moreover,
even with an implementation that ensures a complete execution at the client-side,
we have to ask whether or not such a privacy App can be compliant, at least, in light
of the German law. The reason constitutes the fact that with a client-side execution
actually the user would analyze the data shared by his/her OSN friends, which could
be an unintended behavior from the perspective of the OSN friends. However, if the
implementation of the App ensures not any flow of PII to the provider of the App, the
analysis of OSN friend’s personal data is only be used to help the user him-/herself
and the analysis is only be triggered by the user him-/herself. Therefore, we can argue
that §1, Section 2, Number 3 BDSG and §27, Section 1, Sentence 2 could allow the
deployment of such an App. In particular, these paragraphs allow the processing of
PII for personal or familial use. If the mentioned requirements are fulfilled, with
the help of FBPA a user would only process PII of his/her OSN friends for his/her
own personal use, i.e., adapting his/her own mental models of potentially occurring
flows of PII. Therefore, a deployment of a FBPA could be seen as compliant with
respect to the German data protection act if completely executed at client-side and
if the results of the analysis “stay” at the client-side.
Besides the legal restrictions, another issue of the productive operation of these kind
of privacy tools is worth mentioning. In fact, it is not very difficult to copy the design
of a privacy App that aims at helping the users adjusting privacy settings appropriately.
Therefore, malicious third parties could implement such an App as a basis to carry
out illegal business, i.e., these third parties could provide a “Trojan Privacy App” that
pretends to be compliant, but actually gathers the data of a user and his/her OSN
friends. Thus, the FBPA and similar privacy applications could only be deployed
in a trustworthy environment. However, a privacy App is deployed within an OSN
environment, which is far more open to the public than, for instance, enterprise
IAM services. Thus, a provider has even more to consider security requirements.
With that, a privacy tool that establishes adequate mental models of potential flows
of PII could effectively support users in keeping track of their shared information
without inducing additional threats to the users. Moreover, such an App would
provide an understanding of possible unintended flows of PII as a basis to adjust
privacy settings adequately [Lab12].
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In general, in this part of the dissertation, we introduced a concept on top of which
technicalmeasures can be implemented that bridge the gap between privacy awareness
and the actual adjustments of privacy settings. However, for a productive application
of such a technical approach, we discussed that also issues have to be considered
that are, for instance, induced by the individual data protection acts. Nevertheless,
we indicated ways to advocate the application of such an approach, even in light of
the very restrictive German data protection act (compared to other data protection
acts). Therefore, in principle, the possibilities are existent to bring such user support
up-and-running. In the future, just the three main influencing factors need to be
brought even more in line, i.e., the technical design, the law, and the users themselves.
6.6 Summary and Conclusions
In this chapter, we discussed the estimated effectiveness of several approaches to
support users in understanding and avoiding unintended flows of PII. In particular,
we argued that the intensification of punishments and/or the reduction of the time gap
between sharing PII and the actual realization of negative effects would be promising
to enforce more restrictive privacy settings. However, we also discussed that such
an operant conditioning would not be realizable because of the need to harm users.
Therefore, we proposed to make use of another approach that could provide “nudges”
in the direction of adequate adjustments of privacy settings, i.e., the demonstration of
a user’s current situation regarding privacy to the user him-/herself. Combined with
a demonstration of the resulting risks, such an approach has the potential to clarify
who can actually access shared PII and what are the consequences, or rather privacy
implications. In turn, this understanding of possible data flows constitutes the basis to
adequately adjust privacy settings according to users’ privacy demands. In the process
of this chapter, we contrasted technical measures that make use of this privacy “nudg-
ing” approach with IAM systems provided in enterprise environments. Afterwards,
we presented the principle design of effective privacy tools and showed a prototypical
implementation in terms of a Facebook App. Furthermore, we discussed legal and
other issues that have to be considered to provide OSN users with those privacy appli-
cations. Finally, we pointed out that privacy tools that are based on the introduced
concepts of “nudging” towards privacy aware acting in OSNs and the findings gained
in this dissertation are promising and should be deployed in the near future.
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Due to the fact that users like to, or rather have to consume IT services, they are
confronted with the often obligatory transmission of pieces of their personally iden-
tifiable information (PII) to the service that is to be used. Additionally, the service
consumption frequently implies not only the transmission of data to the service
provider, but also the disclosure of PII beyond flows between users and consumed
services (or rather the intended audience) that have to be considered. For instance, if
users are unduly generous by sharing data in Online Social Networks (OSNs) and
have not yet set their privacy settings adequately, probably a broad audience can get
access to the shared information, i.e., even attacking third parties.
This dissertation presented research results on unintended flows of PII that may
occur by using IT services. Thereby, two different areas of application, in which IT
services are provided, were investigated. On the one hand, the thesis covered Identity
and Access Management (IAM) systems deployed in enterprise environments, which
are in charge of providing PII to services a user is going to consume. In particular, we
introduced improvements of particular IAM services, i.e., SAML identity providers,
in order to avoid unintended flows of PII. On the other hand, we investigated users’
publicly available PII in OSNs with respect to possibly unintended data flows, or
rather unintentionally publicly available information. Additionally, we identified
and investigated risks that come along with publicly available PII in terms of mea-
sures a malicious third party can take to increase value of accessible information.
Furthermore, we presented a concept to support users in managing flows of their
own personal data. In general, the thesis demonstrated strategies, methods, and
technology to avoid unintended flows of PII.
Within enterprise environments, IT services are often provided in an integrated
manner and, therefore, based on locally operated IAM systems and services. These
IAM infrastructures provide IT services with authentication services. Furthermore,
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attributes can be delivered to the services at this point in time a user is authenticated
in order to provide a basis for authorization and for providing the service itself.
IAM systems that are based on the Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML)
are very popular, particularly in the academia. SAML-based IAM systems are not
only deployed to be solely used within an organization, but also to collaborate with
other organizations in terms of federated services, i.e., providing access to services
provided by several organizations by the use of the credentials a user got from his/her
own organization, i.e., the home organization. However, these federations impose
restrictions with respect to the implementation of data flows within the local IAM
systems. Furthermore, federations expand the range of recipients that are suggested
with a user’s PII when he/she is consuming an IT service.
In this dissertation, we presented solutions to ensure that only authorized entities
can get access to PII, for instance, users’ credentials, despite the restrictions and
characteristics that emerge with the federation of SAML-based IAM infrastructures.
In this context, we implemented a plug-in for Shibboleth-based infrastructures based
on the concept of JAVA™ Authentication and Authorization Services (JAAS) that are
already used by Shibboleth identity providers. This plug-in ensures that an identity
provider sends a user’s name and password only to the intended identity source to
check whether the credentials are valid. Thereby, it also decreases the delay of authen-
tication via a Shibboleth identity provider. We also implemented login modules that
can be utilized by a Shibboleth instance of an identity provider to integrate proprietary
identity sources. Additionally, we introduced a concept and an implementation of
the integration of alternative authentication mechanisms into the frontend of SAML-
based IAM systems, e.g., QR code-based authentication mechanisms and logins via
accounts of third parties, such as OSNs. This integration can be useful, or rather
essential, if users have to be authenticated while being located in an environment
where others can spy on the person that is to be authenticated during, for instance,
typing in his/her password. Furthermore, such alternative authentication mecha-
nisms provide advantages if users have to authenticate at an open terminal where,
for instance, key loggers can be installed.
The main contributions in the field of enterprise IAM systems are not only the
innovative modules implemented. The main challenge in this area of application
constitutes the development of modules that are deployable, operable, and easy to
maintain during operation. Both, the solutions implemented for the backend and
the integration of alternative authentication mechanisms into the frontend of SAML-
based IAM systems were evaluated against these requirements. We demonstrated
with proofs-of-concepts and productive implementations that the concepts are viable.
In general, we have shown that the widely deployed SAML-based IAM systems can
induce unintended data flows, in particular, if deployed in large organizations or if
provided for users who cannot shield their input data from others. We introduced
concepts and implemented modules to improve the flows of data and demonstrated
that the solutions can be easily deployed in existing infrastructures. Furthermore,
we showed that the modules do not break the established maintenance processes
of the already deployed IAM systems. In summary, we showed that improvements
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can be integrated in such infrastructures in a “minimal invasive” manner and that
customizations are operable despite the fact that they are not invented by the de-
veloper of the IAM system itself.
For the investigations in the area of OSNs, we analyzed the legal situation and
identified a law compliant concept (w.r.t. the German law) to carry out empirical
studies on publicly available information users share viaOSNs1. This concept preserves
users’ privacy in terms of the fact that we are not able to determine the OSN profiles
originally analyzed. Furthermore, during the runtime of the analysis of users’ raw
data shared via OSNs only anonymized statistical data is stored in the data bases.
The statistical data, as well as visualizations and console outputs did not disclose
the profile IDs or any other hint that provides a relation to analyzed user profiles.
Subsequently, we introduced the concepts utilized for the automated and compliant
analysis of publicly available PII provided within OSN profiles. We presented related
work on which these concepts are based and gave insights into the implementation
of the software. Furthermore, we showed how we parallelized the analysis with the
help of cloud computing resources to enlarge the number of analyzed profiles and to
reach statistical significance while preserving users’ privacy at the same time.
With the analysis software, we performed three types of experiments, i.e., empirical
studies on the attribute availability, the linkability of OSN profiles owned by a single
particular user, and a study on the risks regarding possible attribute predictions. In
particular, based on differently sampled data sets, we demonstrated the attribute
availability of publicly shared PII within four different OSNs. Thereby, the diversity
of information made public constitutes one of the most obvious findings. Due to the
diverse information third parties can access via different OSNs, the question arose
whether third parties are able to link different pieces of publicly available PII extracted
from several OSN profiles that belong to the same particular person. A study on this
question showed that linking profiles is not only possible, but can even be performed
at low cost, i.e., attacking third parties do not need extensive computing resources and
do not have to exploit sophisticated algorithms to link OSN profiles. We showed that
friends lists, which are publicly available in about 50% of all OSN profiles (depending
on the particular OSN), and simple comparisons of strings suffice for linking a user’s
profiles registered in different OSNs. In particular, if users registered their several
OSN profiles by use of the same user name, just more than three overlapping friends
of two compared friend lists indicate that the friends lists most likely belong to profiles
of the same particular user. Moreover, those accessible friends lists constitute the
basis to predict attributes that are not even publicly shared by an OSN user. If an
attacking third party can access the profiles of a user’s OSN friends, some attributes are
predictable at high accuracy and without additional knowledge, i.e., side information
fromGoogle or other sources. In particular, we investigated the correlation of location
attributes and users’ age provided by users and their OSN friends. With that, we found
that these attributes – if not provided by a user – can be inferred by attacking third
1The author would like to thank the members of the Center for Applied Legal Studies (ZAR) at
KIT (in particular, Oliver Raabe) for the discussions on approaches to carry out empirical studies on
OSN profiles in a compliant manner with respect to the German law.
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parties just on the basis of PII shared by his/her OSN friends. However, we also
showed that not every piece of PII can easily be predicted by third parties. We showed
that privacy awareness has been increased such significant and privacy settings are
more adequately adjusted (compared to findings presented in the related work) that
the accuracy of the prediction of some pieces of PII can be estimated as significantly
lower than for location attributes and the age, at least, if no additional knowledge
is exploited, i.e., under the assumption of a low cost attacker model, i.e., an attack
performed by, for instance, a “casual attacker”.
With these empirical studies, we demonstrated still existing privacy risks, although
privacy awareness has been demonstrably increased during recent years. In particular,
we found that some pieces of attributes are even more frequently made public than
observed in previous studies. Moreover, OSN friends threaten users’ privacy because
the disclosure of the list of OSN friends is often sufficient to, for instance, predict
PII of a user. Therefore, no “all clear signal” can be given with respect to privacy in
OSNs. However, we also showed that some privacy risks have even been demonstrably
decreased, at least, if a casual attacker tries to attack a user’s privacy who cannot make
use of large computing resources or sophisticated algorithms. However, to further
enforce adequate use of privacy settings it is not sufficient to only provide support
for its adjustment and/or to apply measures to increase privacy awareness.
In the last part of the dissertation, we argued that between two already existing and
also essential building blocks of acting in a privacy aware manner another third mea-
sure is not sufficiently addressed by today’s privacy research, i.e., establishing adequate
mental models of (potential) flows of PII in terms of measures that demonstrate users
their current situation regarding privacy and emphasize corresponding privacy risks.
We stressed the point that it is an issue for today’s OSN users to take every receiver of
PII into account that can potentially get access to information that is (to be) shared.
We stated that some parts of measures to establish adequate mental models are already
discussed and some are even implemented, even though the methodological basis was
not sufficiently analyzed. In this dissertation, we provided a (in part psychological)
discussion on the effectiveness of certain approaches to adapt users’ current mental
models of data flows and privacy risks. Subsequently, we contrasted the findings
gained by investigating enterprise IAM systems with the issue of providing effective
privacy applications. Based on this discussions and analysis, we demonstrated a
fundamental basis on top of which novel privacy tools can be designed that provide
the often still missing building block towards privacy aware acting in OSNs. Finally,
we presented a Facebook application that demonstrates users their publicly available
PII and those of their friends that can potentially be forwarded to third party App
providers. Hence, we implemented the concepts introduced before concerning a
particular use case of unintended flows of PII. Moreover, we discussed the legal issues
of deploying such an application into a productive OSN environment. In summary,
we demonstrated that acting more privacy aware can be achieved, or rather enforced
by adding a third building block of privacy applications, besides measures to support
adjusting privacy settings and the aim to increase privacy awareness, i.e., support to
adapt users’ mental models towards adequate considering of each of any potential
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flow of PII and corresponding privacy risks. Although some implementations of such
tools are already productively deployed, this dissertation provides the fundamental
basis on top of which those privacy tools can be designed.
In summary, we analyzed current flows of PII, identified possibly unintended for-
warding of personal data, and investigated corresponding privacy risks. Furthermore,
we introduced measures to avoid unintended flows of PII. In the context of enterprise
IAM systems, we observed that improvements can be achieved very easily. However,
developers and administrators of such systems are confronted with the issue to even
determine unintended flows of PII. For identification of these flows it is necessary to
understand the complex structure of flows of PII, involved systems, and implemented
processes, which is provided by a detailed analysis in this dissertation. Furthermore,
this thesis tackled another issue that is constituted by the fact that IAM systems are
often already deployed, i.e., improvements have to be designed and implemented
to be deployable and as operable and maintainable as the already productive IAM
infrastructure. In the context of OSNs, avoiding unintended flows of PII is even more
difficult, which is constituted by the fact that users induce the flows of PII on their
own, which has to be considered when designing improvements of data flows. Today’s
OSN users have to be supported with effective privacy tools to influence their acting
within OSNs as a basis of preserving more users’ privacy. In the research area of
OSNs, this dissertation contributed towards increased privacy aware acting in terms
of quantifications of certain privacy risks and by discussing a novel concept on top
of which potentially effective privacy support can be implemented.
In general, the contributions of this thesis can be used for further research in several
ways. Certainly, some of the results constitute an interdisciplinary contribution. In
particular, the results of the empirical studies are also relevant in the field of social
science and, in particular, investigations of users’ behavior in OSNs. However, the find-
ings contributed mainly in the field of computer science. On top of the results gained
by analyzing and improving enterprise IAM systems future IAM services can be built
in order to ensure deployability, operability, and maintainability. Furthermore, the
detailed and deep analysis of such IAM systems contribute an essential understanding
of induced data flows as a basis for further research on and improvements of today’s
IAM systems and services. The empirical studies on publicly available PII in OSNs
and corresponding privacy risks contribute a comprehensive understanding of the IT
system OSN.The findings reveal the result of providing OSNs as IT services whose
flows of PII are induced by the users themselves in contrast to other IT services that
only consists of provider-engineered and, therefore, pre-configured processes and
data flows. Computer scientists can build future OSNs by considering the findings of
this research work regarding privacy risks induced by users actual interaction with
the IT system OSN. Additionally, future privacy tools can be built upon the concepts
introduced in the last part of this thesis in order to even more avoid unintended flows
of PII in the future. Furthermore, the methodology used to analyze more than 1.5
million OSN profiles and corresponding “big data” can be reused for future studies
on publicly shared PII. In this context, the findings provide a reference for future
161
7 Conclusions and Outlook
measurement studies and, in particular, impact assessments of privacy enhancing
technologies deployed in the future. In particular, the specific attacker model, i.e., a
model of a “casual attacker”, assumed for investigating publicly available PII in OSNs
leads to a fundamental basis for future research. Another research community of the
field of computer science that can benefit from the presented findings constitutes the
simulation community that we provide with more detailed data to model the actual
user behavior within OSNs than existent before. Finally, the contributions provide a
basis for adequate risk assessments by the users of OSNs themselves as part of their
own IT security management, which also constitutes a field of computer science.
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AIntegration of the JAAS Dispatcher
In this part of the appendix, we present the integration of the JAAS Dispatcher into
productive IAM systems. First, we show the integration of the module into Shibboleth
identity providers, which constitutes an implementation of SAML identity providers.
Second, we discuss the interoperability of the JAAS Dispatcher with respect to other
identity-related services that are already based on the JAAS concepts. The following
sections are originated from the documentation of the JAASDispatcher. This guideline
can be downloaded at https://dsn.tm.kit.edu/3050.php.
A.1 Integration for Shibboleth Identity Providers
For the installation of the JAAS Dispatcher one has to copy the file JaaSDispatcher.jar1
into the “lib”-folder (usually WEB-INF/lib) of the war-file (usually /opt/shibboleth-
idp-x.y.z/war/idp.war) of the Shibboleth identity provider that is to be adapted. To
configure the JAAS Dispatcher the file login.config has to be modified as follows.
The following lines have to be added to the top of the configuration file login.config
(the <...>-parts have to be replaced with appropriate content):
ShibUserPassAuth {
edu.kit.scc.dei.jaas.dispatcher.Dispatcher sufficient
regExp.0="<RegEx1>" jaasContext.0="<JAASContext1>"
regExp.1="<RegEx2>" jaasContext.1="<JAASContext2>"
...<Maybe more lines like the previous ones>...
;
};
1see folder JaaSDispatcher/JAR/ of the zip file that can be found by use of the
following links: https://dsn.tm.kit.edu/3050.php [Last downloaded 2013-05-28] or
https://www.aai.dfn.de/dokumentation/identity-provider/tools/ [Last downloaded 2013-05-28].
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Note that each configured login module has to be encapsulated into a separated
JAAS Context like the following example:
<JAASContext1> {
edu.vt.middleware.ldap.jaas.LdapLoginModule required
host="<Host>"
...<more configuration>...
;
};
Subsequently, the file has to be stored and the identity provider restarted by restart-
ing the application server.
A.2 Generic Integration
The installation for other identity-related applications that make use of the JAAS
concepts to authenticate users is as easy as the above presented installation description
for Shibboleth identity providers. The only difference is that the name of the first
JAAS Context (ShibUserPassAuth) has to be replaced with the appropriate name for
the application that is to be adapted. Furthermore, the jar-file has to be placed into
the correct library path. Note that the JAAS Dispatcher makes use of the framework
slf4j for logging purposes.
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BFurther Results on the Linkability Risks
This part of the appendix provides further results of the comparisons of two friends
lists at a time that are extracted out of two different OSNs. The following plots are
structured as Figure 5.7 shown in Section 5.3.3, i.e., aggregated plots are provided that
show only the detected maximum overlaps of compared friends lists taken from two
particular OSNs and the maximum number of occurrence within single comparison
sets (cs). Furthermore, as in Figure 5.7 the plots visualize the average distinction
distance between the detected maximum overlaps and the next lower overlaps of the
same comparison set. Figure B.1 shows comparisons of Facebook friends lists with
friends lists of possibly matching profiles found in XING. Figure B.2 shows these
results for Facebook friends lists compared with MySpace friends lists. Figure B.3 and
Figure B.4 present the results of comparisons of StudiVZ friends lists with Facebook
and XING friends lists, respectively. Figure B.5 and Figure B.6 show these results from
the perspective of XING profiles, i.e., we took profiles out of XING and compared
each of the corresponding friends lists with any potentially matching profile out of
Facebook and StudiVZ, respectively. Figure B.7 presents the results of comparisons be-
tweenMySpace and Facebook. Since the analysis of comparisons between friends lists
of StudiVZ andMySpace (and vice versa), as well as between friends lists of XING and
MySpace (and vice versa) resulted in just minimal overlaps, we do not show the respec-
tive aggregated histograms in this thesis. Furthermore, because we could not detect
significant overlaps, we estimate the linkability risk between these particular OSNs as
significantly lower than for the other compared OSNs addressed in the plots shown in
this thesis if the attacking third party only exploits the publicly provided friends lists.
Similar as interpreted in Section 5.3.3, the plots indicate that a maximum overlap oc-
curs just a single time within a single comparison set (except some very lowmaximum
overlaps, i.e., less than four overlapping friends). Furthermore, the average distinction
distance of the maximum overlaps indicate that these overlaps stand almost always
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considerably apart from all other detected overlaps detected within a comparison
set if this maximum overlap is larger than three. Hence, we conclude that linking
profiles is feasible at low cost by just comparing names listed in friends lists of possibly
matching profiles. However, the risks regarding linking profiles registered inMySpace
with corresponding XING or StudiVZ profiles is estimated as significantly lower than
for linking profiles between Facebook, XING, and StudiVZ.
?
??
??
??
??
???
???
???
???
???
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
? ? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
????????? ??? ??? ???????????????????????????????????????????
?
??
??
??
??
??
??
???
???
??
??
??
???
??
???
?
??
??
? ?
???
???
???
???
??
???
??
??
?
???? ?? ????????
??????? ??????????? ?????????
Figure B.1: Maximum overlaps and distinction distances of all comparison sets of compar-
isons between Facebook and XING [LTH11].
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Figure B.2: Maximum overlaps and distinction distances of all comparison sets of compar-
isons between Facebook and MySpace [LTH11].
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Figure B.3: Maximum overlaps and distinction distances of all comparison sets of compar-
isons between StudiVZ and Facebook.
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Figure B.4: Maximum overlaps and distinction distances of all comparison sets of compar-
isons between StudiVZ and XING [LTH11].
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Figure B.5: Maximum overlaps and distinction distances of all comparison sets of compar-
isons between XING and Facebook.
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Figure B.6: Maximum overlaps and distinction distances of all comparison sets of compar-
isons between XING and StudiVZ.
?
?
??
??
??
??
?
?
??
??
??
??
? ? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
??
?
????????? ??? ??? ???????????????????????????????????????????
?
??
??
??
??
??
??
???
???
??
??
??
???
??
???
?
??
??
? ?
???
???
???
???
??
???
??
??
?
???? ?? ????????
??????? ??????????? ?????????
Figure B.7: Maximum overlaps and distinction distances of all comparison sets of compar-
isons between MySpace and Facebook.
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CFurther Results on the Risks Regarding
Location Predictions
In each section of this part of the appendix, we present four plots that show further
results of the analysis of location attributes and the investigation of the risk that
these attributes can be inferred by an attacking third party if the attribute is not
provided by the user. The results are gained by comparing shared locations of users
and those shared by their OSN friends. Whereas we analyzed provided current cities
in Section 5.4.2, in the following Section C.1, we present the results with respect to
users’ and their friends’ hometowns, or rather the interdependence of this attribute.
In Section C.2 and Section C.3, we limit the analysis to comparisons of location
attributes of those users (α-profiles) who indicated that they are students and compare
provided locations with those shared by their OSN friends. Section C.2 provides these
results with respect to the attribute current city, whereas Section C.3 demonstrates
the findings of the investigation of students’ and their OSN friends’ hometowns.
The plots are similarly structured than those shown in Section 5.4.2, in particular,
Figures 5.9, 5.13, 5.14, and 5.15. We show that the results presented in this appendix
are also very similar to the findings gained by investigating the interdependencies
of publicly shared current cities.
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Figure C.1: CDF of analyzed friends lists, in which the most, or rather the second, or
the third,... (x-axis) most frequently provided hometown is equal to the hometown of the
corresponding α-profile [LWMH13].
C.1 Prediction of Users’ Hometown
In the following, we show comparisons of the attribute hometown. 2,316 α-profiles
publicly shared this attribute, as well as a friends list that contained, at least, one OSN
friend who also publicly provided the attribute hometown. “Figure C.1 shows that in
54.1 % of the analyzed friends lists the most frequently provided hometown equals
the hometown of the corresponding α-profile. In more than 75% of the cases, one
of the three most frequently provided hometowns equals the one provided by the
α-profile. Figure C.2 indicates that the difference of the two largest groups of friends
who provided a specific hometown is often marginal. For the case of same-hometown-
friends, in 77% of the friends lists the second most frequently provided hometown
is provided by a maximum of 20 friends less than the most provided hometown.
However, for those friends lists in which the most provided hometown does not
equal the hometown provided by the corresponding α-profile, Figure C.3 shows that
the most frequently provided hometown is often located in the nearby area of the
hometown provided by the α-profile. In Figure C.4, we show that 66% of predictions
resulted in a correct hometown with a distance inaccuracy of 50 kilometers and more
than 70% for distance inaccuracy of 100 kilometers. For a more detailed explanation
of the plots in this appendix, we refer to Section 5.4.2, in which the corresponding
plots are introduced” [LWMH13].
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Figure C.2: Probability distribution of the differences between the number of same-
hometown-friends and number of friends that correspond to the second most frequently
provided city. The differences are expressed in relative terms w.r.t. the friends list sizes.
Only the profiles are considered, in which the same-hometown-friends yield the highest
peak [LWMH13].
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Figure C.3: Probability distribution of the discriminative distances between the most fre-
quently provided hometown and the hometown of the α-profile. Only the profiles are consid-
ered, in which the same-hometown-friends do not yield the highest peak [LWMH13].
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Figure C.4: Ratio of analyzed friends lists, in which a hometown prediction would be
successful if the number of friends in an x km radius around provided hometowns is included
in the detection of the most frequently provided hometown or area, respectively [LWMH13].
C.2 Prediction of Students’ Current City
In this Section, we present the results of interdependencies of publicly shared current
cities of α-profiles and their OSN friends. Thereby, the results only consist of those
α-profiles that could be clearly identified as profiles of current or former students. In
particular, the comparisons consist of those students’ profiles that shared their current
city, as well as a friends list with a minimum of one friend who also provided this
attribute (1,073 α-profiles in total). With this investigation, we address the question
whether or not location prediction poses a more remarkable risk for students. The
first plot (Figure C.5) shows that in 56.4% of the analyzed cases the most frequently
provided city of a friends list equals the current city shared by the corresponding
α-profile (cf. Figure 5.9: 56.3 %). Even in the course of the curve, we cannot identify
significant differences compared to the plots shown in Section 5.4.2. Figure C.6 also
indicates no remarkable differences, i.e., in more than 64% of the cases, the difference
between the number of same-city-friends and the number of friends who shared the
secondmost frequently provided current city is equal or less than 20 percentage points
(cf. Figure 5.13: >65%). However, it can be seen that the number of same-city-friends
and friends who shared the second most frequently provided current city differs, on
average, a little more compared to the results that consist of all α-profiles. Figure C.7
confirms this little difference. Compared to Figure 5.14 the discriminative distances
of the cases in which the number of same-city-friends is smaller than those living in,
at least, one other city is a little bit larger, which could be explainable due to users
who are moving to study in a certain city, e.g., they might still have a large number of
friends living at their hometown. This observation also effects the accuracy of location
predictions if a larger radius around the actual current city is “accepted”. Figure C.8
shows these results for the α-profiles of students. Herein, it can be seen that including
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a larger radius around the most frequently provided current city is promising from
the perspective of an attacking third party. However, the effect is a little bit smaller
than detected by considering all analyzed profiles, which is also explainable by the
fact that many users are (physically) moving to another city for their studies.
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Figure C.5: CDF of analyzed friends lists, in which the most, or rather the second, or the
third,... (x-axis) most frequently provided current city is equal to the current city of the
corresponding α-profile (only α-profiles of students considered).
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Figure C.6: Probability distribution of the differences between the number of same-city-
friends and number of friends that correspond to the second most frequently provided city.
The differences are expressed in relative terms w.r.t. the friends list sizes. Only the profiles are
considered, in which the same-city-friends yield the highest peak (only α-profiles of students
considered).
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Figure C.7: Probability distribution of the discriminative distances between the most fre-
quently provided current city and the current city of the α-profile (only α-profiles of students
considered). Only the profiles are considered, in which the same-city-friends do not yield the
highest peak.
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Figure C.8: Ratio of analyzed friends lists, in which a current city prediction would be
successful if the number of friends in an x km radius around provided current cities is included
in the detection of the most frequently provided current city or area, respectively (only α-
profiles of students considered).
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C.3 Prediction of Students’ Hometown
For the results presented in this section, we consider the 803 α-profiles of students
that publicly provided their hometown and a friends list containing, at least, one
friend profile that also shared the hometown. The results can be compared to the plots
shown in Section C.1 of this appendix. Figure C.9 shows the probability that the most,
second most, third most,... frequently provided hometown matches the hometown of
the correpsonding α-profile. Figure C.10 shows the results of the detailed analysis
of potentially successful predictions of the hometown and Figure C.11 the findings
regarding the investigation of the discriminative distance of unsuccessful hometown
predictions. Figure C.12 again includes a larger radius around provided cities and
provides accuracies of respective potential hometown predictions. However, the
effects explained by the moving of students from their hometown to another city for
studying discussed in Section C.2 are not that obvious in the plots regarding students’
hometown. In fact, the results are very similar compared to the results presented in
Section C.1, i.e., no significant difference between the analysis of all users’ hometowns
and those of only students can be detected.
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Figure C.9: CDF of analyzed friends lists, in which the most, or rather the second, or
the third,... (x-axis) most frequently provided hometown is equal to the hometown of the
corresponding α-profile (only α-profiles of students considered).
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Figure C.10: Probability distribution of the differences between the number of same-
hometown-friends and number of friends that correspond to the second most frequently
provided city. The differences are expressed in relative terms w.r.t. the friends list sizes. Only
the profiles are considered, in which the same-hometown-friends yield the highest peak (only
α-profiles of students considered).
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Figure C.11: Probability distribution of the discriminative distances between the most fre-
quently provided hometown and the hometown of the α-profile (only α-profiles of students
considered). Only the profiles are considered, in which the same-hometown-friends do not
yield the highest peak.
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Figure C.12: Ratio of analyzed friends lists, in which a hometown prediction would be
successful if the number of friends in an x km radius around provided hometowns is included
in the detection of the most frequently provided hometown or area, respectively (only α-
profiles of students considered).
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